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International divisions over Syria’s internal crisis have shaped the map of the war against 
international terrorism which has erupted amid anti-government protests. Since September 2015, 
Syria has witnessed a multi-sided war on the Islamic State organisation (IS) as the US-led coalition 
and Russia fought against this transnational armed organisation in separate military campaigns 
with the stated purpose to eliminate IS threats at home and abroad. Then, many political actors that 
have divergent policies in Syria and different approaches towards fighting IS, participated in the 
war against that common enemy.  
The news media have devoted close attention to the situation in Syria and contributed to shaping 
the role of each military campaign; then, they have an influence on how this conflict can be 
imagined. Therefore, this study is intended to examine and compare how the multi-sided war on 
IS was reported by transnational news media to Arab viewers. It takes the Doha-based AJA and 
the Moscow-based RT Arabic as case studies. The research is qualitative. It relies on a sample of 
(480) news reports [240 reports from each broadcaster’s YouTube channel] tracking a one-year 
period, from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016. It applies Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
as a research method to examine how this multi-sided war is framed throughout the governance, 
the military and the humanitarian aspects.  
The study shows that these transnational news media supported their governments. So, it confirms 
Samuel Azran’s (2013) conclusion that AJA is a hybrid network whose independence is limited 
by the boundaries of Qatar’s crucial interests. Also, the study supports previous research on RT’s 
role as a tool of Russian public diplomacy.  
This research contributes to studies on media and public diplomacy as it examined the coverage 
of a multisided war on terror in transnational media. It concludes that when states that have 
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different counterterrorism policies fight against a common enemy, their media will reflect that 
political divergence, rather than emphasising the shared global counterterrorism objective. The 
degree of convergence in anti-terrorism approaches between a political actor and the state from 
which the media operate has an influence on how the media portray the role of that actor in the 
war against the shared enemy. The closer the policy proximity between a political actor that is 
engaged in the conflict and the country in which the media operate, the more likely that actor will 
be framed positively. For instance, AJA’s framing of the US-led military campaign, which 
involved Qatar, was less critical than its coverage of the Russian military intervention, in Syria. 
RT represented the US-backed SDF and the Russian-backed Syrian army as liberators. However, 
the anti-IS operations which were conducted by the opposition factions, that fight against the 
Russian-backed Al Assad regime, were not represented as liberation actions.  
Furthermore, the study showed that transnational media outlets that are sponsored by authoritarian 
regimes may adopt significantly different reporting styles and so align with their governments in 
different ways. Unlike AJA, RT adopted a propagandist reporting style to support its sponsor’s 
policies. Thus, this study contributed to understanding of the complexity of the operations of power 
in transnational media outlets and showed how the coverage of a global war against a common 
enemy is still driven by the national and regional policies of the countries from which the news 
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With the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions in December 2010, the Middle East has witnessed 
significant changes which have led to redrawing the map of the region and influenced its 
geopolitical balance. Old dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were overthrown. In Syria, 
anti-regime protests started in 2011. Backed by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, Al Assad has managed 
to stay in power and suppressed the protesters by force. Then, the country has been pulled into a 
spiral of violence when peaceful demonstrations turned into an armed conflict between opposition 
factions and pro-regime forces.  
The Syrian internal conflict has taken a sectarian character. Violent confrontations have erupted 
between Sunni opposition groups, supported by Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and 
the Alawite regime which is linked to the Shia (Brown, 2015; Hove and Mutanda, 2015; 
Olanrewaju and Joshua, 2015). For Hove and Mutanda (2015) “the Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Kurds 
took advantage of the Syrian conflict to advance their objectives amid increasing violence” 
(p.560). The Kurds managed to establish an autonomous area known as Rojava (Thornton, 2015). 
Also, Al Qaeda-linked jihadi fighters who were active in Iraq, where they established the so-called 
“the Islamic State of Iraq” in 2010 managed to expand to Syria. According to Litsas (2017) “the 
Syrian Civil War and its tragic evolution not only produced a failed state at the heart of the Arab 
world; it opened the way for a new hybrid form of jihadism” (p.60).  
In 2014, the so-called Abu Baker Al Baghdadi declared the establishment of the Islamic caliphate 
- a state governed based on the Islamic law, or Sharia, by prophet Mohammed’s deputy on Earth, 
or the caliph. This transnational armed organisation includes fighters from different countries and 
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seeks authority over Muslims worldwide. It is known for its violent actions, mass killings and 
abductions, which targeted Arab and Western people. For example, IS executed two US citizens, 
Steven Sotloff and James Foley, in 2014. In response to IS threat, the then-US President Barack 
Obama declared his will to destroy IS, as he said: “I have made it clear that we will hunt down 
terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are. That means I will not hesitate to take action 
against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq” (Obama, 2014). The US led an international coalition to 
fight against IS in Syria and Iraq. The Syrian government and its allies were excluded from this 
coalition. In September 2015, Russia intervened, in Syria militarily, declaring war on IS in 
cooperation with Al Assad (Notte, 2016). So, political divisions over Syria’s internal crisis 
influenced the fighting against IS; each superpower used its preferred local proxy to battle IS on 
the ground. According to Thornton (2015), the involved states provide “the training, the weapons, 
the technical support, and the airpower; but someone else has now to do the dying on the ground. 
Proxies are thus essential” (p.866). The US supported the so-called moderate Islamic opposition 
factions and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) while Russia supported Al Assad’s army. 
Nevertheless, the countries and non-state actors that are involved in the war on IS have conflicting 
interests in parallel with the fighting against their common enemy, which makes the war on 
international terrorism in Syria increasingly complicated. For example, the US supports Islamic 
opposition factions, but it has concerns about the growth of the Salafist groups in Syria (Minardi, 
2016). Also, Turkey is a member of the US-led coalition, but it has concerns about the expansion 
of Kurdish armed groups that joined the US-backed SDF (Güner and Koç, 2017). Iraq is part of 
the US-led coalition, but there are strong ties between the Shia-dominated Iraqi society, Iran, as 
well as Syria in the war against IS. A point to take into consideration is that these countries and 
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Hezbollah seek to undermine the role of the Sunni non-state actors for this would increase the 
power of Iran and its Shia allies in the region (Brown, 2015; Cragin, 2015).  
This multiplex and broader conflict is still more apparent in media communication. For politicians, 
mass media are considered as a central space of global politics where rival powers exert efforts to 
undermine each other and advance their own interests. So, governments created media outlets to 
promote their preferred messages to the world. Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson (1992) 
argue that news media provide us with “the lens through which we construct meaning about 
political and social issues. This lens is not neutral but evinces the power and point of view of the 
political and economic elites who operate and focus it” (p.374). This means that news media can 
participate in serving the interests of their sponsors. However, one should consider that the role of 
the news media in conflicts varies and is influenced by different factors. For example, in 
asymmetrical conflicts, the amount of hostility, the relative level of political power, and the 
cultural or political values of the actors can be influential in how such conflicts are imagined and  
reported in different countries (Sheafer and Shenhav, 2009; Sheafer, Shenhav, Takens, and van 
Atteveldt, 2014; Wolfsfeld, Alimi, and Kailani, 2008). According to Wolfsfeld (2011) since news 
media are ethnocentric, their portrayals are influenced by the political and cultural context in which 
they operate, and they tend to show maximum support for their governments in wartime; at the 
same time “the media have their own professional interests that have major effects on the 
construction of news stories. They do not only reflect political realities, but they also actively 
translate them into news stories that are both interesting and culturally resonant” (Wolfsfeld et al., 
2008, p. 377).  
In Syria, which is the focus of this study, the war on international terrorism is distinctive in that it 
is led by two superpowers (the US-led coalition versus Russia and its allies). They fight against a 
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global enemy while adopting different policies and conflicting agendas. In this situation, news 
media organisations can play a crucial role in shaping the meaning of each intervention against IS. 
Journalists can draw boundaries, by positive and negative discourses, between the in-group and 
the out-group, the good and the bad, to make the situation understandable for audiences, tell 
interesting stories, and at the same time respond to the policies of their sponsors (Sheafer and 
Shenhav, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 2011). Against this backdrop, this study seeks to examine and compare 
how Al Jazeera-Arabic (AJA) and Russia Today-Arabic (RT) covered each military campaign, 
with focus on the roles of the US and its main local allies, the Syrian opposition factions and the 
SDF versus the roles of Russia and its local ally, the Syrian regime.  
Analysis of these media outlets helps understand the construction of the war on IS in Syria in 
particular by exploring the extent to which media align with their respective governments, when 
the governments are participants in this war but are in disagreement with other key actors on how 
the war should be fought.   
AJA is classified as a Pan-Arab network. It was created by Qatar in 1996, and since its 
establishment, it has emphasised that its mission is to give a voice to the voiceless in the Arab and 
Islamic world. It is known for its critical tone towards the US as well as Arab regimes. For 
example, when AJA covered the US-led military intervention in Afghanistan, it concentrated on 
“rallying Arab and Muslim masses and leadership to confront what was portrayed as the United 
States' ‘arrogance’ and ‘disproportional’ action” (Jasperson and Kikhia, 2003, p. 126). Yet, the 
environment of the war on IS in Syria is more complicated, because Qatar is a member of the US-
led coalition, but it is in disagreement with the US over how IS crisis should be managed. For the 
Qatari regime, the US-led coalition is not doing enough (Sciutto, 2015). Also, Qatar stands against 
Al Assad regime and does not welcome Russia’s military campaign in Syria (Hove, 2016). 
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According to Samuel-Azran (2013), AJA adopts state-sponsored-style broadcasting when 
covering issues or crises involving Qatar. Then, this study provides an opportunity to re-examine 
Samuel-Azran’s conclusion regarding AJA dependence on Qatar since it will investigate how AJA 
represented the rival international interventions against IS, in the context of Qatar policies towards 
Syria. Will AJA frame the US-led intervention, which involves Qatar, as a war on Muslims as was 
the case in the coverage of the previous US-led wars? Will it delegitimise the Russian campaign? 
Will it frame the war in terms of the shared counterterrorism objective? Or it may adopt a more 
complex discourse.  
RT was founded by the Kremlin in 2005. Since 2001, Russia and the US Administration have been 
partners, in the war against Islamic non-state actors (Dawisha, 2015). However, the war against IS 
has erupted in a tense political environment, where Russia and the US are rivals, but, at the same 
time, they act over the same skies against a common threat. In the context of information war, RT 
Arabic needs to compete with AJA and other news media outlets to communicate the Russian 
voice to the Arab world. So, this study will show how RT has reacted in this war towards the rival 
interventions: Will it present its sponsor’s military action as a clean war? Will it delegitimise the 
rival air campaign or adopt a positive discourse which focuses on the shared objectives? Or it may 
need to develop a more complex news discourse.  
AJA and RT Arabic, as transnational news media outlets that operate in authoritarian political 
systems, need to consider the local and global spheres in which they operate. They need to keep 
the attention of their viewers and respect basic principles of professionalism when representing the 





1.1 Aim and Questions of the Study 
This study seeks to examine how a multi-sided war against a common enemy is reported, by 
transnational media, to Arab-speaking audiences. 
To answer to this overarching question, the research addresses the following sub-questions 
comparing AJA and RT: 
-How does AJA frame the US-led military campaign and Russia’s military campaign, in the 
context of Qatar’s policy towards Syria, particularly in relation to IS crisis?   
-How does RT Arabic represent the US-led military campaign as well as Russia’s military 
intervention in Syria in the context of the Kremlin’s policies, particularly its approach towards 
fighting IS?  
Answering the above questions leads to showing how these transnational TV channels responded 
to their professional norms and the political context in which they operate, and how they framed 
the roles of the actors that disagree with their sponsors’ policies, when covering the war against 
IS. Examining AJA and RT war coverage will show how they differ in terms of themes as well as 
reporting styles.   
1.2 Scope of the Study  
This study focuses on news reports, collected from both AJA's and RT Arabic’s YouTube 
channels, tracking a one-year period, from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016. I conducted 
qualitative frame analysis to study the collected samples (240 reports from each media outlet). The 
analysis will cover verbal and visual texts. While asserting the active role of the news media in 
meaning-making processes, I shall, here, recognise that the reading of media messages is always 
open-ended because signs are polysemic, intertextual and contextual. So, one message can be 
understood in different ways (Fairclough, 2003). This brings to our attention the issue of 
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subjectivity in qualitative research methods. An important point to take into consideration is that 
in qualitative research, scholars cannot aim at collecting a representative sample through which 
they can make generalizable claims about a phenomenon. They are interested in the meaning of a 
particular question and seek deep interpretations about it (Patton, 1990). Accordingly, in this 
research, I apply qualitative textual analysis as my primary aim is to deconstruct the meaning of 
the news texts to explore how this unprecedented multi-sided war on terror is introduced to Arab 
audiences by the media outlets under study. I selected the abovementioned period, because, in 
September 2015, Russia started its military action in Syria in the name of the war on IS, while the 
US-led coalition has been already targeting this enemy in Iraq and Syria since 2014.  
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The research takes a comparative approach to study the content of two transnational media outlets 
that address Arab audiences: AJA and RT Arabic. Both TV channels are sponsored by 
authoritarian governments that are engaged in the war against IS. AJA is financed by the Qatari 
regime which participates in the US-led coalition but does not agree with the US counterterrorism 
policies on IS. Also, Qatar criticised Russia policies towards Syria including IS crisis. RT-Arabic 
is based in Moscow and financed by Russia, a significant rival to the US in the Middle East. The 
study shows the interactions between media and politics, particularly in wartime and how such 
interactions lead the media to deconstructing and reconstructing their discourses to respond to the 
circumstances around them. Furthermore, this research contributes to the literature on media and 
public diplomacy as it will explore how transnational media outlets will relate the rival campaigns 
to the war against international terrorism. Moreover, it contributes to comparative media studies 
as it compares and contrasts between AJ and RT whereas most of the previous research that took 
AJ as a case study put it in contrast to western media, particularly the US news media, such as (Al-
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Majdhoub and Hamzha, 2016; Alshathry, 2015; Jasperson and Kikhia, 2003; Kolmer and Semetko, 
2009; Samuel-Azran, 2013). Also, whereas most of the previous research focused on the English 
language channels of international media, this research deals with the Arabic language channels 
of AJ and RT. It contributes to dewesternising media studies; it is a view from a Middle Eastern 
scholar concerned with the region, not just western concerns; furthermore, the study contributes to 
understanding the role of the media in shaping Arab public opinion. 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
This introductory section is followed by a background about the situation in Syria, particularly 
after the outbreak of the anti-regime revolution in 2011. That is to say, in the second chapter, 
readers can find information about how the situation developed dramatically and turned into an 
armed proxy war, which has facilitated the growth of IS. It discusses the conflict of interests 
between the superpowers as well as among other actors in the context of the war against 
international terrorism. Also, it provides an overview of IS’s origin. Moreover, this chapter defines 
the scope of the concept of terrorism in this study. Finally, it shows how counterterrorism policies 
on IS that are adopted by the US, Russia and Qatar vary. The third and fourth chapters provide the 
theoretical framework of the study. The third chapter tackles media-state relationship, that is to 
say, it discusses the political communication theories of conflict reporting to assess how AJA and 
RT are expected to act when covering the war on IS. This chapter also discusses the media role in 
reproducing power and communicating terrorism and counterterrorism activities. The fourth 
chapter deals with the importance of the media as a tool for winning the publics’ hearts and minds, 
particularly during crises. It provides an overview of the foreign policies of Qatar and Russia, 
particularly towards Syria after 2011. It also discusses the level of media independence in these 
countries, with focus on the roles of AJA and RT as tools for public diplomacy. The fifth chapter 
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provides details about the methodology and the analytical framework. The analysis of each 
intervention covers three aspects: the governance, the military and the humanitarian. The sixth 
chapter looks at how AJA framed the US-led intervention and the Russian military campaign 
throughout the abovementioned aspects. Similarly, the seventh chapter deals with how RT 
represented the rival interventions and positioned them against their enemy. This chapter is 



















This chapter discusses key topics related to the context of the multi-sided war on IS in Syria. It 
provides a background knowledge that will assist in the analytical chapters’ exploration of the 
interactions between the media under study and their political contexts. Those analysis chapters 
will explicate the political agendas that shaped AJA and RT coverage of this conflict in the light 
of the developments that occurred in Syria after 2011.  
 2.1 Syria: conflicts, Proxies, and Interests   
The Syrian President Bashar Al Assad was elected in 2000 after the death of his father Hafiz Al 
Assad who was a key figure of the Baathist political party. Al Assad family belongs to the Alawite 
minority that occupied dominant positions in Syria during and after the end of the French Mandate 
in the 1950s and the 1960s; “even though the Alawis make up a mere 12 percent of the total 
population, the regime continues to count on support from other minorities that fear Islamists 
coming to power and from important segments of the Sunni population who fear civil war” 
(Landis, 2012, p. 73). The Alawite ruling class has been engaged in conflict with the Islamists, 
particularly, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria since the 1970s when the latter used weapons 
against security apparatus and accused the regime of sectarianism and corruption. In 1982, Sunni 
people participated in anti-regime protests in Hama, where the Muslim Brotherhood members were 
dominant. The Syrian regime met the rebels with unprecedented brutality, killing thousands of 
people. Like his father, Bashar Al Assad suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities in Syria 
(Conduit, 2016; Landis, 2012).  
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When he came to power, Bashar Al Assad sought to make Syria a secular state with a modern 
lifestyle, but in a way that reinforces the power of the ruling family. Landis summarises these 
developments as follows: 
He introduced private banking, insurance companies and liberalized, real-estate laws. He 
dropped tariff barriers with neighboring states, licensed private schools, and permitted use 
of the Internet in an effort to encourage private and foreign investment. To avoid the 
emergence of a capitalist class that would be largely Sunni and not beholden to the regime, 
Asad turned to his cousin Rami Makhlouf, who became “Mr. Ten Percent” of the Syrian 
economy. He assumed a majority stake in many major enterprises and holding companies 
and ensured that the Asad family maintained control over the economy (...) A new class of 
businessmen drawn from the progeny of major regime figures — called the “sons of 
power” (abna al-sulta) — has become notorious for its wealth and economic assertiveness. 
The result has been an explosion of corruption and public resentment at the growing 
inequality and injustice of Syrian life (…) Growing poverty has underscored the failure of 
the Baathist regime and is a leading factor in the Syrian uprising (Landis, 2012, p. 79). 
After the revolutionary waves that took place in Tunisia and Egypt, critical voices in Syria have 
called for political changes. One can trace the Syrian revolution back to March 2011. According 
to Spyer (2012), 
The regime’s overreaction to the writing of graffiti demanding its downfall by a number of 
schoolchildren was the spark. The Syrian revolt, famously, began in the poor, southern 
Sunni region of Dar’a. The killing of 13-year-old Hamza al-Khatib in custody, and the 
return of his mutilated body to his family, led to widespread rioting throughout the 
province. In retrospect, this was the beginning of what would turn into the rebellion against 
Asad’s rule and the subsequent Syrian civil war (p.2-3). 
 
After Dar’a event, masses took to the streets in other areas such as Idlib, Homs, Douma, and 
Latakia. In response, the Syrian regime attempted to calm down the public protests by removing 
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the governor of Dara’a from his position, announcing reform policies and full investigation into 
the death of Hamza al-Khatib (Muir, 2011). Also, the right of citizenship was given to a number 
of Syrian Kurds whose families were stripped of Syrian citizenship by the Baathist regime in the 
1960s. As the protests have increased, Al Assad considered the revolt as a “conspiracy” against 
the Syrian republic deriving from the critical stance it took toward the US policies in the region 
(Spyer, 2012). In July 2011, Syrian officers who took the side of the rebels announced the 
formation of ‘the Free Syrian Army’ (Landis, 2012). Initially, the role of this armed group was to 
protect protesters, but then it has used weapons against pro-regime forces that have met the civil 
demonstrations with violence. Human rights activists reported that during the first six months of 
the revolt, 3000 persons were killed as a result of the regime’s brutality (Ajami, 2013). By 2012, 
the regime was unable to impose its control over all the areas where anti-regime protests have 
continued and where armed opposition factions gathered, despite the Russian and Iranian military 
support. Also, the rebels lacked the power to remove the regime; “neither side could deliver a fatal 
blow to the other” (Spyer, 2012, p. 6). In this environment, Al Assad’s forces withdrew from the 
Kurdish areas [Afrine, Kobane and Qamishli]. Then, the control over these areas was transferred 
to the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat – PYD), which declared an 
autonomous zone in Syria known as Rojava. This political party is described as the Syrian branch 
of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The armed branch of the PYD is known as the YPG 
(Yekineyen Parastina Gel – People’s Protection Units). In 2013, hundreds of the PKK’s armed 
wings, the People Defence Forces (Hezen Parastin Gel), as well as the Women's Protection Units, 




Furthermore, in this chaos, radical Sunni figures were released from the regime’s prisons and 
joined Islamist opposition factions (Hove and Mutanda, 2015). The Sunni armed group which used 
to be known as Al Qaeda in Iraq sent fighters to support the Sunni opposition factions. Also, 
fighters from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Pakistan joined the Syrian armed rebels which are divided 
into factions (Cragin, 2015). The opposition camp includes the Free Syrian Army and other smaller 
armed groups such as “Jbhat al-Nusra, the Syrian Liberation Front, the Syrian Islamic Front, and 
the Independent Brigade Alliances” (Hove and Mutanda, 2015, p. 560). As mentioned in the 
introduction, the conflict turned into a proxy war in which the Arab Sunni axis led by Saudi Arabia 
supported the so-called moderate Syrian opposition factions while Iran and Hezbollah supported 
Assad (Olanrewaju and Joshua, 2015). According to Hove (2016), “a regional Cold War is 
believed to exist between Iran and Saudi Arabia and is manifested in their leading conflictual roles 
in the weak states in the region, especially in Syria” (p.147). Thus, supported by Russia, and its 
Shia allies, Al Assad regime has continued to fight against the rebels.  However, the division of 
the Syrian opposition can be another factor which contributed to the survival of Al Assad as 
discussed below.     
The weakness of the Syrian opposition and failure of negotiations: The Free Syrian Army which 
was formed in Turkey under the leadership of Riyadh Al Asaad was “poorly organised.”  (Hove 
and Mutanda, 2015, p. 560). It had limited military capabilities; it did not have access to heavy 
weapons since the Western countries estimated that the opposition should adopt non-violent 
strategies (Landis, 2012). The political representative of the Syrian opposition is the Syrian 
National Council (SNC), which claims to have control over the Free Syrian Army. The SNC did 
not invite the leaders of the Free Syrian Army to its meeting in Tunis, in 2011 which resulted in 
tensions between them. Moreover, Landis (2012) explained  
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the SNC claims to speak for the entire opposition but has been struggling to contain 
divisions within its own ranks as well as to unite with competing opposition parties. The 
United States and Europe recognize the SNC as the rightful leader of the opposition and 
have sought to build up its legitimacy and authority, but they continue to wring their hands 
over its internal weaknesses (...) Secular supporters of the SNC often complain that the 
Muslim Brotherhood is the real power behind the organization (pp. 75-76).   
Then, SNC failed to unify the opposition parties and create an organisation that represents the 
Syrian people ("National Coalition Of Syrian Revolution And Opposition Forces," 2017).  
Another major political opposition body is the National Coordination Committee for Democratic 
Change, led by Haytham Manaa (Olanrewaju and Joshua, 2015). The leader of the SNC Burhan 
Ghalioun led unity discussions with Mana, 2011; however, this initiative was not successful. The 
SNC members accused National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change of collaborating 
with Al Assad while the Committee accused the SNC of putting the Syrian people in danger by 
supporting military actions which would cause a spiral of violence and further foreign 
interventions in Syria’s affairs. The Kurdish groups did not join the SNC as it is sponsored by 
Turkey and its Arab allies, that do not support the Kurdish demand for independence (Landis, 
2012). As the internal conflict has continued, the opposition has become more vulnerable. 
According to Khaled Khoja, a key Syrian opposition politician, over the past five years, “the 
revolutionary forces on the ground in Syria have lost the majority of its military leadership. The 
political bodies abroad and the internal revolutionary movement have also lost influential 
members, and the burden of the revolution has become greater on those who seek its victory” 
(Khoja, 2017).  
This study covers a one-year period starting from October 2015, when Russia launched its military 
campaign in Syria, to September 2016, when IS was driven out of Manbij, Jarablus, Al Bab and 
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most of its positions along the Turkish border with Syria. At the same time, the Syrian opposition 
factions were driven, by the Russian-backed Syrian army, out of many areas in Aleppo. It was 
reported that in 2016, the opposition factions lost 40% of their areas (BBC, 2016). Since then, the 
Syrian regime has strengthened its power further, while the Islamist opposition groups and 
particularly IS have weakened.       
Bilaterally, the US urged Russia to convince Al Assad to leave power or negotiate with the 
opposition over power-sharing; “Washington contended that the best course to obviate the 
emerging jihadist threat would be to remove Assad, who was clearly motivating it. For Russia, the 
best course would be to support Assad, who clearly had the capacity and incentive to defeat it” 
("The tenuous diplomacy of the Syrian conflict," 2016, p. 1). By June 2012, a multilateral 
negotiation process under the auspice of the UN was necessary. So, the so-called Geneva process 
started. The US and Russia supported the formation of a transnational government which includes 
members of Al Assad regime as well as the opposition; this phase is known as Geneva I. However, 
this proposal was refused by parts of the opposition factions. In January 2014, another negotiation 
round took place- called Geneva II; no agreement was concluded. The parties disagreed over the 
position of Al Assad in a transition phase ("The tenuous diplomacy of the Syrian conflict," 2016). 
The negotiations as well as the armed confrontations are going on at the time of writing this 
research, with no agreement at sight. 
IS crisis: By mid-2014, the so-called “Islamic State organisation” (IS) gained territories in Iraq 
and Syria and committed itself to protect the Sunni Muslims and establish a Caliphate governance 
system that adheres to the Sharia (the rise of IS is discussed in the next section).              
Then the violence escalated further as the US led an international coalition to destroy IS in Iraq 
and Syria. One year later, Russia has intervened in the name of the war on IS; “the Kremlin has 
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justified its involvement in Syria using a reductionist counterterrorist narrative,” establishing it “as 
IS vs. Assad struggle” (Notte, 2016, p. 59). However, Russia was accused of bombing the areas 
held by the Syrian opposition factions, and it was urged to stop targeting the rebels (Hove, 2016).  
The US and Russia signed an agreement that aimed at avoiding in-flight accidents in the skies over 
Syria. However, “among other things, the struggle for dominance by the two great powers both in 
vindictive speech and deed in Syria, among other conflicts, represent what the world once 
experienced prior to the collapse of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]” (Hove, 2016, 
p. 136). In line with the realist approach in international relations which empathises egoistic 
passion and self-interest in political relations (Burchill et al., 2013), it is possible to say that both 
America and Russia have their strategic and economic interests in the Middle East, which influence 
their policies on Syria and the whole region as shown below.  
 The US VS Russia: Conflict of interests in parallel with the war on international terrorism  
There have been heightened tensions between the US and Syria since 2003, as the US have 
imposed economic sanctions on Syria for supporting Hezbollah and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization. In 2011, the US took the side of the rebels for it seeks to establish a pro-US regime, 
which contributes to preventing “the jihadists linked to Al-Qaeda from establishing a safe haven 
in Syria” and limiting the influence of Iran and Hezbollah (Olanrewaju and Joshua, 2015, p. 49). 
In reaction to the US sanctions, Al Assad has strengthened Syria’s ties with Russia, Iran, and 
Hezbollah. This alliance which has been constantly strengthened may influence the US dominant 
position in the Middle East.  
The US interests in the region exceed the security concerns. According to Kellner (2012), after the 
eruption of the Arab Spring, Obama commented: "We have witnessed an extraordinary change 
take place in the Middle East and North Africa (...) though these countries may be a great distance 
17 
 
from our shores, we know that our own future is bound to this region by the forces of economics 
and security; history and faith" (p. 165). This shows that the US Administration has concerns about 
the impact of the recent political upheaval in the Arab world on its interests. The US has 
agreements of cooperation with its Arab allies in different fields. For example, it has military bases 
and troops in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan (Brull, 2017; George, 2002).  
The US Combined Air Operations Center is located there [in Qatar], providing command 
and control of US and allied air power throughout the region, especially over Iraq, Syria 
and Afghanistan. All of this makes Qatar one of the most important bases for American 
military power in the Middle East. Bahrain hosts the US Fifth Fleet, leaving them with just 
7000 US troops. Otherwise, Kuwait has the most, with 15,000, then there are the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iraq, with about 5000 each; and lastly Jordan, with only 1500 
(Brull, 2017, p. 69).  
Moreover, these countries are good markets for the American weapon industry. The USA exports 
long-range missile defence systems to many countries including the UAE (Wezeman and 
Wezeman, 2015). Generally, the Gulf weapons market is dominated by the US, with about 40 
percent of all sales (Cunningham, 2015). So, any political changes, in the context of the Arab 
Spring may result in establishing pro-Russian regimes or enable IS or other armed organisations 
to expand. Therefore, the US needs to be actively present and cooperate with its allies to ensure 
that the ongoing conflicts, particularly in Syria and Iraq would not lead to consequences that 
operate against their interests in the future. 
 Another important field of investment is the energy market. The US imports oil from the Middle 
East, especially Iraq and Saudi Arabia. According to Chang (2015) the US supported a Qatari plan 
to transport gas to Europe through Syria and Turkey so that it can put a limit to Russia’s hegemony 
over the European energy market. However, Russia has managed to decline this project. This 
means that the intervention of Russia in the region has operated against the interests of Qatar and 
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the US. Dr Robin McFee, a member of the US Counterterrorism Advisory Team, estimated that 
after the Russian intervention:  
We are losing the game, and badly. This is not to be gloom and doom, but to remind that 
our future, and that of our children depends upon the economic and security future we 
create and pass along. The two are inextricably intertwined. One cannot separate the 
economy, energy, immigration, and security issues. Within that construct, the Middle East 
matters to our economy and security – unfortunately (McFee, 2015). 
 In relation to the Russian-Syrian alliance, the collaboration between the Soviet Union and Syria 
can be traced back to 1946.  It was reported that “a secret agreement was signed on February 10, 
1946, which entailed the provision of political and diplomatic support of the USSR to Syria in the 
international diplomatic arena, as well as Soviet military assistance for the foundational training 
and establishment of the national army of Syria” (Olanrewaju and Joshua, 2015, p. 45). With the 
accession of Hafiz Al Assad to power, he became Russia’s main ally in the region. Syria has hosted 
a Russian naval base at the port of Tartus, since 1971; it is the only foothold for Russia in the 
Mediterranean Sea (Plakoudas, 2015). The Soviet Union supported Syria during the Arab-Israeli 
conflict (Hove, 2016). Hafez Al Assad reinforced the diplomatic and military cooperation with the 
Soviets as the two parties signed a Treaty of Amity in 1980 (Olanrewaju and Joshua, 2015). By 
2000, when Bashar Al Assad and Putin took control over their countries, the relations between 
Russia and Syria have grown. The Kremlin “has continuously extended military, economic and 
social aid to Syria. Syria has, in turn, become a trustworthy ally for Moscow from the point of 
view of Middle Eastern policies,” for strategic interests (Aghayev and Katman, 2012, p. 2068). 
Souleimanov and Petrtylova (2015) argue that Russia considers IS as an outcome of US strategic 
failure in the region and has benefited from the emergence of this organization to protect and 
advance its investments; “Russia’s intervention in Syria has undoubtedly increased its profile in 
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the region and enhanced its claims of being an ‘indispensable global power’. It has ensured that it 
will now have a role in deciding the future of Syria and of the region” (Unnikrishnan and 
Purushothaman, 2017, p. 265).  
It has been reported that the Russian military industry lost about $4 billion worth of weapons 
contracts when Gaddafi's regime was overthrown, so Russia has lost one of its allies. This may 
justify its full support for Al Assad (Borshchevskaya, 2013; Unnikrishnan and Purushothaman, 
2017). If IS or any other Islamist political actor replaced Al Assad, Russia may lose its influence 
in the region. Moreover, Russia is the world's second-largest arms exporter after the US. In 2017, 
it was reported that orders from Middle Eastern countries made up 20% of Russian weapons' 
exports (Sputnik 2017). According to Unnikrishnan and Purushothaman, “Russia has been 
exporting arms to countries such as Iran, Syria and Algeria. It wants to promote exports of arms, 
nuclear reactors and other goods as they are produced by enterprises key to sustaining its current 
political and economic order” (2017, p. 253). In the field of energy production, Russia is a leading 
player in the international market; Russian oil companies take part in the extraction of oil not only 
in Syria but also in Iraq (Souleimanov and Petrtylova, 2015). As I mentioned previously, Russia 
is a key gas supplier to Europe. Thus, it seeks to restrict any potential projects that lead to the 
establishment of alternative gas lines to the European market (Fawzi, 2012). 
In fact, the policies of the US and Russia in relation to the war on IS in Syria are influenced by 
their stances towards Al Assad as well as their strategic interests in the region. So, these rival 
powers struggle to build a strategic narrative that can explain their war policies convincingly and 
justify their counterterrorism actions, since they need to build coalitions and connect themselves 
to the ideas that build these alliances; also, they seek to shape international media coverage and 
public opinion in their favour. For example, the US Administration introduced its military 
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intervention against IS in Syria as an act of collective self-defence while the Kremlin represented 
its intervention as a pre-emptive war to face the threat posed by IS as well as the Caucasian fighters 
who were recruited by this transnational organisation, as will be discussed in section [2.4.]  
2.2. The Growth of Radical Islam as a Global Threat 
The debates about the link between Islam and terror groups, the so-called "Islamic terrorism" 
increased after the emergence of IS, a transnational radical Islamist organisation that took control 
over territories in Iraq and Syria. As this study focuses on the coverage of the war on IS by AJA 
and RT, whose countries of origin are implicated in this conflict, it is important to tackle IS 
ideology and development. This helps understand why it is seen as a global enemy by the 
international community.  
On 29 June 2014, the so-called Abu Baker Al Baghdadi – his name is Ibrahim Awwad Al Husseini 
Al Qurashi – announced from Al Mosel, the second largest city in Iraq, the establishment of the 
‘Islamic State’ (IS) as a worldwide Caliphate. IS is inspired by the Salafist ideology, which calls 
for the strict application of Sharia and emphasises the need to return to the Caliphate governance 
system to solve the crises which spread across the Middle East. This idea was initiated by Sayyid 
Qutub who was executed by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966 (Brown, 2015). For Qutub, armed jihad 
and martyrdom are part of a holy war against the so-called disbelievers. His view has paved the 
way for the foundation of an Islamic state (Rich, 2016). Also, IS like al Qaeda is influenced by the 
Wahhabi movement, which spread in Saudi Arabia and called for the return to “what they imagine 
to be the pure or pristine version of Islam as practised by Muhammad and his earliest followers. 
They often have strict interpretations of Islam, strict dress codes and separation of the sexes” 
(Hughes, 2016, p. 22). One manifestation that showed IS’s will to revive the Islamic Caliphate 
governance system was the removal of the border, which separated Iraq and Syria, as IS declared 
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the end of the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916). Also, the organisation destroyed sites of antiquity in 
Iraq and Syria, inspired by the Wahhabi doctrine which forbids the construction of mausoleums. 
(Gelvin, 2016). 
IS is considered as a developed form of the Salafist jihadism which was established by Al Qaeda 
(Litsas, 2017). This can be traced back to the 1980s when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. 
At that epoch, thousands of Islamic fighters or “Mujahedeen” were mobilised and supported by 
the US and its allies, including Arab countries, to defeat the Communist Soviet Union (Rashid, 
1999, p. 31). When the war ended, the US stopped its aid to them. In this environment, Osama bin 
Laden founded Al Qaeda organisation in Afghanistan in 1988. He concentrated on the ‘far enemy’ 
that is to say, he declared ‘jihad’ against the West, particularly the US. Then, Al Qaeda-affiliated 
members managed to carry out attacks against American targets in different countries. Bin Laden 
“portrayed the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States as an ‘act of defensive jihad’ or a 
just retaliation for American domination of Muslim countries” (Gerges, 2014, p. 341). After the 
events of 11 September, the US waged war on Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda had been based under 
the custody of the Taliban regime. The US-led strikes had destroyed most of Al Qaeda’s 
infrastructure and killed many of its members. Under such circumstances, many fighters fled 
Afghanistan to Iraq, where they could resume their activities. Among those who moved from 
Afghanistan to Iraq was Abu Musaab Al Zarqawi; he founded “Al Tawheed and Al Jihad” as a 
jihadist organisation that put the protection of the rights of the Sunni Muslims at the top of its 
agenda. Then he expressed allegiance to Al Qaeda and led Al Qaeda’s branch in Iraq (AQI). Al 
Zarqawi and his group declared ‘Jihad’ against the ‘US occupation’ in Iraq (2003), carrying out 
many suicide-bombing attacks against US soldiers and the Shia as well. Unlike Bin Laden, Al 
Zarqawi focused on the near enemy. That is to say, 
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He ignored repeated pleas from his mentors, bin Laden and Zawahiri, to stop the 
indiscriminate killing of Shia and to focus instead on attacking Western troops and citizens. 
Although Salafi jihadists are nourished on an anti-Shia propaganda diet, al-Qaeda Central 
prioritized the fight against the “far enemy”—America and its European allies. In contrast, 
AQI and its successor, ISIS, have so far consistently focused on the Shia and the “near 
enemy” (the Iraqi and Syrian regimes, as well as all secular, pro-Western regimes in the 
Muslim world) (Gerges, 2014, p. 340). 
Al Zarqawi was killed as a result of an American air raid, in 2006. Then, the so-called Abu Omer 
Al Baghdadi took the leadership of this branch of Al Qaeda which became to be known as “the 
Islamic State of Iraq” (Atwan, 2015). He followed Al Zarqawi’s Jihadi line, targeting the near 
enemies. So, he and his followers planned and committed attacks, especially against governmental 
institutions in Iraq. When Nuri Al Maliki took power in Baghdad in 2006, the Iraqi army supported 
by the US, launched a campaign to degrade the Islamic State of Iraq. In this mission, the US 
mobilised and trained 100,000 Sunni fighters from Iraq tribes. They succeeded to some extent to 
degrade the threat of this organisation (Atwan, 2015). Then, the US recommended to Maliki, who 
was in charge of the Iraqi military institution, to integrate those fighters into the Iraqi army, but Al 
Maliki formed a Shia-dominated government and marginalised the Sunni Iraqis. As a result, the 
fighters who helped Al Maliki face the Islamic State of Iraq were deeply frustrated. (Atwan, 2015). 
In reaction, they decided to initiate contact with members of the Islamic State of Iraq. In 2010, 
when Abu Omer Al Baghdadi was killed, his relative, the so-called Abu Baker Al Baghdadi, took 
the leadership of this organisation, and he welcomed the Sunni soldiers who were disbanded by Al 
Maliki’s government as well as Sunni young people who suffered from marginalisation and 
discrimination (Brown, 2015).  
In 2011, when the Syrian revolution started, Al Baghdadi and Ayman Al Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s 
associate, decided to send fighters to face Al Assad regime, so the former sent the so-called Abu 
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Muhammed Al Julani to Syria, where he formed the Al Nusra Front. Al Julani managed to gather 
thousands of fighters and to carry out successful attacks against the Syrian army. Atwan (2015) 
reported that in 2013, Abu Baker Al Baghdadi unilaterally announced the unification of Al Nussra 
Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the formation of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” 
(ISIL). This organization is also known as “the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham” (ISIS) or Daesh1 
in Arabic. Abu Muhammed Al Julani refused Al Baghdadi’s decision and declared Al Nusra Front 
as Al Qaeda branch in Syria. Since then, the two organisations have become rivals, and Al 
Baghdadi criticised both Al Zawahiri and Al Julani’s ‘Jihad strategy’ (Atwan, 2015).  
After occupying key territories in both Iraq and Syria, Al Baghdadi proclaimed himself a caliph of 
a worldwide Islamic State (IS) with Al Raqqa – in Syria – as its capital. It was reported that IS 
fighters in Syria and Iraq grew from 30,000 in 2014 to 50,000 in 2015 (Gunaratna, 2016). IS’s 
adherence to Sharia and its vision to establish a society in which Sunni Muslims live in dignity 
encouraged many Sunni Muslims to support it. Moreover, among the reasons that made many 
people in Iraq and Syria respond positively to IS is the political chaos in these countries where the 
governments have been unable or unwilling to answer their citizens’ needs. As mentioned above, 
the Iraqi Sunnis have been marginalised and suppressed by Al -Maliki government; therefore, 
some of them preferred to join IS. The Caliphate created an organised Sunni community whose 
affairs were managed through councils such as the Advisory Council, the Sharia (religious 
legislations) Council, the Defence and Intelligence Council, the Economy Council, the Education 
Council, and the Media institutions (Atwan, 2015). 
                                                           
1 Daesh is the Acronym of the Arabic term (ي العراق والشام
 The equivalent term in English is (the .(الدوله االسالميه ف 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham). The acronym “Daesh” is widely used in the Arab world to refer to IS. 
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Similarly, IS has benefited from the sectarian division in Syria where the Alawite regime of Al 
Assad has oppressed the Sunni majority and refused to transfer power to them as shown in the 
previous section. Furthermore, IS answered the civilians’ needs in the areas under its control, 
whereas the Syrian government has become unable to respond to the needs of its people adequately 
after 2011. This encouraged many Syrians to join IS-held territories and cooperate with it:  
In Raqqa, ISIS’s Syrian headquarters, the organization has built a new market, installed 
new power lines, initiated public transport and fixed potholes on the streets. ISIS has 
orphanages where children and parents displaced by the conflict are often reunited. They 
even organize fairs for children, complete with ice cream and inflatable slides. They also 
run soup kitchens, offer health services, including vaccination programs against polio. 
These efforts of state building and governance, though far removed from what most of the 
population may actually want, do provide stability in a chaotic environment. They also 
provide ISIS with a community that is more willing to support them, making the insurgent 
organization’s job of mobilizing, recruiting and arming its insurgents, as well as developing 
a market and economy capable of financing the leadership and insurgency, possible  
(Brown, 2015, p. 211). 
Furthermore, IS managed to attract Muslims who were born and grew up in Western societies. 
According to Gerges (2014), 
Muslims living in Western countries join ISIS and other extremist groups because they 
want to be part of a tight-knit community with a potent identity. ISIS’s vision of 
resurrecting an idealized caliphate gives them the sense of serving a sacred mission. 
Corrupt Arab rulers and the crushing of the Arab Spring uprisings have provided further 
motivation for recruits. Many young men from Western Europe and elsewhere migrate to 
the lands of jihad because they feel a duty to defend persecuted coreligionists (p.342).  
Those who migrated from Europe, the US or Caucasus to “the Islamic State” are considered as a 
significant threat in case they returned to their countries of origin; this is one of the concerns that 
Western politicians raise to present the war on IS as unavoidable, for security reasons. As 
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mentioned above, this overview of the environment in which IS was created, and its ideology is 
needed for this study since IS is a key actor in the war story. One should have some background 
knowledge about this organisation to recognise why it is seen as a global threat and targeted by 
Russia and Qatar among other countries.  
2.3. Terrorism 
The rival international campaigns against IS are introduced by their members as counterterrorism 
actions. However, one should take into consideration that terrorism as a concept cannot be reduced 
to one meaning. It concerns a range of matters from violence and attacks of various kinds to threat, 
fear, and vulnerability. It can be attributed to non-state actors or state actors. So, to understand the 
media coverage of this multi-sided conflict, we need to consider the role that the highly unstable 
notion of terrorism can play in how the war on IS is represented by various actors. 
According to Bonanate (1979), terrorism is not a static fact. It is a product of "social judgment 
rather than a description of a set of phenomena" (pp. 197-198). So, one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s Mujahid or hero. The signification of the so-called terrorism is shaped by power relations 
in any society. Since the ruling elites have regular access to mainstream media, they can promote 
their preferred interpretation of what terrorism means; “who the terrorists are in the first place is a 
question largely determined by these officials” (Livingston quoted in Jackson, 2005, p.165). After 
the attacks of September 2001, this term has received growing attention and has been linked to 
Islamic non-state actors. 
In 2015, the UN Security Council designated IS as a terrorist group and supported any military 
actions taken against it. It issued a resolution which,  
Calls upon Member States that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, 
in compliance with international law, in particular with the UN Charter, as well as 
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international human rights, refugee and humanitarian  law, on the territory under the control 
of ISIL also known as Da’esh in Syria and Iraq (…) and entities associated with Al-Qaida, 
and other terrorist groups, as designated by the UN Security Council, and as may further 
be agreed by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and endorsed by the UN 
Security Council (O'Connor, 2016, p. 76).   
So, the term “terrorism” in the context of this study refers to the politically motivated violence 
committed by transnational non-state actors. In what follows, I show how this notion is approached 
in different ways by scholars and how it is so flexible to carry different significations including 
the violence practised by transitional armed organisations, like IS. This flexibility allows 
governments and their media to use this term in different ways and contexts to justify military 
projects such as the wars in Syria, Iraq and other places. For Tiffen (2006), powerful metaphors 
such as terrorism and war on terrorism encourage strategies which “may be substantially 
ineffective, perhaps even counter-productive, while politically benefiting the governments 
adopting them” (p.99). 
 Etymologically, the term "terrorism" is derived from the Latin stem "terrere" which means "to 
frighten" (Weimann and Winn, 1994). Some scholars focused on the violence committed by non-
state actors. For Hoffman (1998), in the 20th century, terrorism refers mainly to political violence 
committed by non-state actors. Richardson (1999) defines terrorism as a "politically motivated 
violence” committed by transnational armed non-state actors “directed against non-combatant or 
symbolic targets, which is designed to communicate a message to a broader audience" (p. 209). 
From the perspective of the US Federal Statute, the term ‘terrorism’ means "premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups 
or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (Watson, Covarrubias, and 
Lansford, 2013, p. 4). Based on the abovementioned conceptualizations, the victims who are 
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exposed to terror attacks are different from the target audience whom the perpetrators seek to force 
to take a particular decision or action.  
However, other scholars argue that the notion of terrorism cannot be reduced to refer to non-state 
actors, for the specific character of terrorism is vague; this term is used as a synonym to describe 
different actions such as street battles, rebellions, or civil wars (Laqueur, 1978). Therefore, like 
any text, the so-called terrorism signifies intertextually and contextually. That is to say, the 
meaning of this term lies in the cultural, social, and political context in which it is used. For 
example, the Islamic armed groups that fought against the communist Soviet Union in Afghanistan 
in the 1980s, were considered by the US and its allies as freedom fighters, but later these fighters 
were designated as terrorists (Mamdani, 2004). From another perspective, Chomsky and Herman 
(1979) adopted a critical approach when dealing with the concept of terrorism. They focus on the 
terror acts committed by the US and its allied leaders in the Third World against the peoples there, 
to maintain the interest of America and its client states. According to Herman (1982), 
There is a huge tacit conspiracy between the U.S. government, its agencies and its 
multinational corporations, on the one hand, and local business and military cliques in the 
Third World, on the other, to assume complete control of these countries and "develop" 
them on a joint venture basis. The military leaders of the Third World were carefully 
nurtured by the U.S. security establishment to serve as the "enforcers" of this joint venture 
partnership, and they have been duly supplied with machine guns and the latest data on 
methods of interrogation of subversives (p 3). 
In fact, the public outrage against state-sponsored terrorism is a key reason that stands behind the 
eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions. Critics consider that the US policies towards the Middle 
East have led to the growth of radical movements in the region. Graham Fuller, a former CIA 
analyst, said, in reference to IS, “I think the United States is one of the key creators of this 
organisation” (2014).  
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In Syria, there are various types of political violence such as: 
- State-sponsored terrorism: the violence practised by the Syrian regime of Al Assad backed by 
Russia and Iran, and Hezbollah.   
 - Local terrorism: the violence committed against civilians by non-state actors who fight against 
the Syrian regime and its allies. 
-Transnational terrorism: the violence perpetrated by IS, which has carried out attacks in Syria, 
Iraq as well as different places all over the world, targeting non-combatants. For example, the 
organisation killed David Haines and Alan Henning from the UK, in addition to Steven Sotloff, 
James Foley, and Peter Kassig from the US. It also claimed responsibility for many attacks such 
as the destruction of a Russian passenger plane, killing 224 passengers (2015), killing 130 people 
in Paris (2015) and 84 others in Nice (2016). 
The state-sponsored terrorism lies beyond the scope of my study. As mentioned above, for the 
purpose of this research, the concept of terrorism focuses on the violence practised by the 
transnational non-state actor. However, the thesis acknowledges that the uses made of the term are 
unstable and partial. Russia and RT use the term “terrorist” when describing IS, as will be shown 
below. The Qatari regime uses this term to refer to IS as well while AJA uses the organisation’s 
name (IS). The next section provides an overview of the counterterrorism policies adopted by the 
US, its ally Qatar, and Russia to deal with IS crisis. 
2.4 Counterterrorism on IS: Different strategic narratives and Policies   
In wartime, governments introduce their violent actions through various moral and ideological 
justifications. Then, the media react to the official narratives they report according to their 
professional norms and political interests. So, to understand how AJA and RT news discourses 
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about the war on IS are influenced by the policies of their sponsors, one needs to have an idea 
about the anti-IS approaches which are adopted by Qatar as a member of the US-led coalition 
and by Russia. The discussion, below, starts with the White House’s counterterrorism policy on 
IS, for the war should be first understood in terms of the strategy of the US, the leading power 
of the international coalition against IS. Then the Qatari policy towards fighting IS will be 
explained to show the critical stance of Qatar vis-à-vis the US and Russia’s war strategies. Also, 
the Kremlin’s counterterrorism policy on IS is discussed.   
These political actors need to develop what Lawrence Freedman (2013) refers to as a “strategic 
narrative”: a story that can explain the political developments convincingly and justify their 
policies. Levinger (2015) argues that 
As strategic narratives are essential for non-state actors seeking to exert influence on the 
global stage, they are equally vital for those at the pinnacle of power—such as heads of 
state—who need to motivate and co-ordinate actions by thousands or even millions of sub-
ordinates, as well as to build and sustain coalitions involving diverse domestic 
constituencies and international partners (p. 29).  
The US stance: The White House has introduced its military intervention against IS in Syria as 
an act of collective self- defence. It has established the cause for this decision in a letter 
presented to the UN Security Council on September 23, 2014, stating that  
ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, but also to many other 
countries, including the United States and our partners in the region and beyond. States 
must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of individual and 
collective self-defence, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, when, as is the case 
here, the government of the State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to 
prevent the use of its territory for such attacks. The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot 
and will not confront these safe-havens effectively itself. Accordingly, the United States 
has initiated necessary and proportionate military actions in Syria in order to eliminate the 
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ongoing ISIL threat to Iraq, including by protecting Iraqi citizens from further attacks and 
by enabling Iraqi forces to regain control of Iraq's borders (Scharf, 2016, p. 34). 
The legality of the US-led air strikes in Syria is beyond this research interest. The point that I want 
to emphasise is that Obama’s Administration introduced its intervention as a legitimate  action, 
which is needed to protect the civilians who have suffered from IS. When Obama declared the 
expansion of the US-led airstrikes to target IS in Syria, he justified this decision to the US public 
in terms of individual and collective self-defence as he said: “I have made it clear that we will hunt 
down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are. That means I will not hesitate to take 
action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq,” (as cited in Levinger, 2015, p. 37). He added: “in a 
region that has known so much bloodshed, these terrorists are unique in their brutality. They 
execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They enslave, rape, and force women into 
marriage” (as cited in Levinger, 2015, p. 30). Thus, the US is aware that it needs to “engage in 
robust efforts to craft and communicate a coherent strategic narrative that can enlist cooperation 
and support from America’s friends and international partners (…). Protecting threatened civilians 
throughout the world from genocide and mass atrocities is one imperative around which American 
interests and American values coalesce” (Levinger, 2015, p. 41). 
Obama introduced his strategy to defeat IS, saying this intervention “will not involve American 
combat troops fighting on foreign soil" (Obama, 2014). However, the White House has changed 
this strategy and deployed special forces in Syria in 2015. On the ground, the US supported two 
proxies: the so-called ‘moderate Syrian opposition factions’ and the SDF. Nevertheless, in the 
context of “the Western involvement in Syria, (…) using proxies is concerned of ‘escalated 
involvement’, of ‘unintended consequences’” (Geraint Hughes as cited in Thornton, 2015, p. 867).  
The US faced difficulties in classifying the armed groups in Syria into moderate and extremists; 
then it has supported some groups, that were classified as “moderate” but, at the same time, the 
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US fears the growth of Islamic groups in Syria (Minardi, 2016). Moreover, the US 
counterterrorism strategy has faced obstacles because of political tensions among its partners. For 
example, the SDF include Kurdish members who have conflicting agenda with Turkey. The SDF 
is “a multi-ethnic and multi-religious armed force made up of dozens of militias that is committed 
to the political project of ‘democratic confederalism’, the participatory democratic project 
associated with the Kurdish-led Rojava revolution” ("Raqqa liberated: 'We dedicate this to all 
women'," 2017, p. 16). So, Turkey, like the SDF, has aligned with the US in the war against IS,  
yet the Turkish government considers the SDF and other Kurdish armed groups in Syria as a threat 
to its national interests (Thornton, 2015). This explains why Turkey has supported the Free Syrian 
Amy in its efforts to drive IS out of Jarablus and Al Bab as well as other areas in northern Syria, 
and it has sought to ensure that these lands are free of the SDF as well. Also, the Gulf countries, 
particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar have a negative stance towards the Kurds’ political ambitions 
in Syria (Güner and Koç, 2017; Shaswar, 2016). For the Gulf countries, the US-led air war is not 
enough to defeat IS. Saudi Arabia and Qatar raised the need for more involvement against IS in 
Syria (Sciutto, 2015; Yeranian, 2016). However, Obama’s Administration did not support further 
intervention; “it is highly likely that Russia was successful in Syria, partly because Obama wanted 
to avoid an Iraqi-style intervention, with its consequent implications for American casualties” 
(Hove, 2016, p. 148). Munardi (2016) criticised the US counterterrorism policy in Syria and Iraq, 
and estimated that: 
Practically, U.S. counterterrorism used other hands to defeat ISIS such as Iraq forces army, 
Peshmerga, and other allies groups which resulted into large and complex conflict (…) 
More importantly, the U.S. and its allies have to prove that they are defeating terrorism 
instead of making new enemy and war as their interests (p.205).  
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In fact, the US war strategy is inconsistent, and it has led to more tensions arising in the region 
since it does not take into consideration the conflicting agendas of the coalition’s members, such 
as the Kurdish armed groups, Iraq, and Turkey. Besides, the changes that Obama made to the war 
strategy, during the period studied here, such as the deployment of special forces, reflect that the 
US Administration does not have a clear vision about how IS can be defeated. 
Qatar’s stance: Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan have been the 
first countries to support the US-led actions against IS in Syria, in the UN Security Council 
(O'Connor, 2016). However, the Qatari regime has reservations on the US counterterrorism 
policies in Syria. The Emir of Qatar Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani has told CNN that he did not 
agree with Obama’s administration decision to limit the mission of the US-led coalition in Syria 
to the fight against IS. He estimates that the Syrian regime is the cause of all chaos and it must be 
held accountable. For him, the Syrian people have suffered from the Syrian regime and terrorist 
groups. He said: “the whole thing has to be solved. If we believe that we can get rid of terrorist 
movements and leave Al Assad regime especially do what he is doing, then the terrorist movements 
will come back again” (Al-Thani, 2014). Moreover, CNN’s senior correspondent Jim Sciutto 
reported that Qatari officials “believe the coalition is not doing enough to fight the terror. In 
particular, these officials say the training of moderate rebels needs to be accelerated and expanded” 
(2015). In a meeting with Obama, in February 2015, the Qatari Emir questioned how IS could be 
degraded, while Al Assad has been still in power (Abdul-Hussein, 2015). Later in a speech in front 
of the UN General assembly in 2016, the Emir maintained that the growth of terrorism in Syria 
had something to do with the violence committed by the Syrian regime against the Syrian people 
that has been abandoned by the world (Al-Thani, 2016). The linkage between the growth of IS and 
the Syrian internal conflict, the condemnation of the Russian air strikes, and the whole Qatari 
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policy towards Syria were partly shaped by the desire to limit the Shia power led by Iran in the 
region through the removal of their proxy Al Assad and the placement of a Sunni regime (Hove, 
2016; Hove and Mutanda, 2015). 
The Russian stance: In Syria, Russia is a rival power to the US. The Kremlin has not supported the 
US-led coalition air strikes against IS in the Syrian territories and considered this intervention as 
an act of aggression because it has been conducted without the permission of Al Assad (O'Connor, 
2016). This was not the case during the war in Afghanistan (2003) where Russia supported the US 
military actions and provided military aid to anti-Taliban rebels (Covarrubias and Lansford, 2007; 
Rywkin, 2015). It is noteworthy that Russia is engaged in armed conflict with Islamic separatist 
movements in the Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya. So, when Putin supported the US-led war 
in Afghanistan, he raised the Islamic identity of the non-state actors in the Caucasus as a threat 
and linked them to Al Qaeda. In this way he has given the impression that both Russia and the US 
face a common enemy; that is the radical Islamists, who are trained or inspired by Osama bin 
Laden (Simons, 2006). According to Rywkin (2015), 
Despite overwhelming opposition from Russia’s Security Council, he [Putin] endorsed 
Washington’s antiterrorist campaign without preconditions and accepted the American 
deployment in Central Asia. Those decisions allowed him to gain better American 
understanding of his policies and to sell his military campaign in Chechnya as a purely 
antiterrorist enterprise (p.235). 
In 2015 Russia intervened militarily in Syria in the name of fighting against IS at the request of 
the Syrian regime. The Kremlin highlighted that IS recruited more than 1700 fighters from 
Caucasian origins, particularly Chechnya, so Russia should lead a pre-emptive war against IS to 
protect its national security (Souleimanov and Petrtylova, 2015). 
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For Putin, IS should be fought in terms of a broad coalition and in cooperation with Al Assad 
regime:  
We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and 
its armed forces, who are valiantly fighting terrorism face to face (…) Moscow’s stated 
aim was to fight the IS and to stop its terrorists from returning home and continuing with 
their ‘criminal activities’ (Putin, 2015). 
According to Plakoudas (2015) “By putting forward the idea of an international alliance of 
antijihadi powers with the United States and Russia at the forefront, the Kremlin inter alia strives 
to convince the United States that they must cooperate as allies against the common enemy-the 
Islamic State and jihadism” (p.36).  
Since Putin created a church-state alliance, the Orthodox Christian Church in Russia has supported 
his policies (Skillen, 2016). Thus, the Church defined the Kremlin’s intervention in Syria as a 
“holy war” on terrorism (Parfitt, 2015). That is to say, Russia employs religious discourse as well 
as the national security discourse to legitimise its recent action in Syria.  
In November 2015, a Russian passenger plane was brought down by IS. In reaction, Putin stressed 
his will to punish the perpetrators, saying: "It is not the first time that Russia confronts barbaric 
terrorist crimes…We will search for them anywhere they are hiding. We will find them anywhere 
on the planet and punish them.” He called for global actions against terrorism (Kremlin, 2015). 
While taking such security concerns into consideration, one should not forget the geopolitical 
interests which influence Russia’s use of military power in the Middle East. As mentioned 
previously, “challenging the west, and particularly the US, Putin used hard power against Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Syria;” he “is striving to transform the international system into a multipolar world 
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in which the United States will share power with Russia and other powers (e.g. China) rather than 
operate unilaterally” (Plakoudas, 2015, p. 35).  
Thus, the state actors that are engaged in the war against IS in Syria have their agendas which 
shape their counterterrorism policies. The US, Russia and Qatar’s involvement in the fight against 
IS need be understood on multiple levels at once – it is connected to regional aims as well as 
national security concerns. Nonetheless, each actor adopts a strategic narrative that justifies its 
position as shown above. In this context, I stress that war discourse is a practice of power, a 
selective process through which officials aim at providing a preferred meaning to what happens in 















Media and War: Theoretical Framework 
This chapter discusses the political communication theories of war reporting and the media’s role 
in communicating terrorism and counterterrorism actions. 
3.1 The Media as Space for Struggle Over Meaning and Power  
In every nation, there is a ruling class that seeks to impose its ideology on the whole nation to 
maintain its position. The ruling elites usually adopt a nationalist discourse which fixes the sense 
of the self (We/in-group) versus the other (They/outgroup) in a way that serves their policies and 
justifies their actions. This operates within the Gramscian term “hegemony” which means "the 
ideological predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes that accept 
them as normal (Daldal, 2014, p. 157). The elites use the media to tell the public what is good and 
what is bad or who belongs to the self and who can be seen as other. In this context, Van Dijk 
(2013) argues that the news media help reproduce and maintain power relations since news 
reporters rely on officials as primary sources of information. These authoritative voices have 
permanent access to the news media; “it is not surprising, therefore, that most news comes from 
and is about such institutions or the elite persons that control them. (…) news production routines 
are finely tuned to the representation of ruling elites’ actions, their points of view, and ultimately 
their ideology” (p155). 
He maintains that “due to their organized and routine contacts with the political power structure, 
the media largely reproduce the concomitant political panic of the authorities” (Van Dijk, 2013, p. 




So, news media representations are not neutral practices; news discourse is shaped by an 
ideological power which seeks to communicate a particular worldview to the public(s). News 
frames involve processes of inclusion and exclusion through which news media organisations 
decide what to tell their audiences, how such events should be communicated, and with what 
possible effect. This role is very crucial in wartime when news discourse is employed to reflect 
the voice of the ruling elites. Hall (1997) defines discourse as the capacity of signifiers to construct 
reality within specific social power relations. In war reporting, news as discourse operates deeply 
within Van Dijk’s (2006) “ideological square”, which is based on the positive presentation of the 
in-group and the negative presentation of the out-group: “Emphasize Our good things, and Their 
bad things, and de-emphasise Our bad things, and Their good things” (p. 125).  
This research deals with television news coverage of the war on IS in Syria. For Chouliaraki (2005) 
“it is difficult to deny that the power of television to provide images and information is crucial in 
the shaping of public opinion” (p.144). According to her: 
The viewing asymmetry of television does not explicitly thematize the economic and 
political divisions of our world but reflects and consolidates them. Who watches and who 
suffers reflects the manner in which differences in economic resources, political stability, 
governmental regimes and everyday life enter the global landscape of information. 
Similarly, who acts on whose suffering reflects patterns of economic and political agency 
across global zones of influence – North and South or East and West (p.84).  
So, she argues television has the power “to represent the world to the world” and “to map 
information flows in terms of geographical neighbourhoods, cultural affinities and political 
alliances” (Chouliaraki, 2006a, p. 4) 
Television is a powerful and attractive medium as it provides a hyper-mediated regime of 
representations through the usage or co-appearance of language and image. It helps audiences see, 
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hear and read information about things that take place in far places where wars are fought, people 
suffer, or other events occur. Therefore, this medium is a multi-modal space where political powers 
compete and seek to legitimise their actions. A noteworthy example is the US war in Iraq where 
“the coalition sought to gain legitimacy over the war (…) mainly through the humanitarian 
argument of relieving the Iraqis from the oppressive Hussein regime. The coalition also appeared 
on our television screen as aggressors that daily bombed the city of Baghdad for three consecutive 
weeks” (Chouliaraki, 2005, p. 145). 
For Chouliaraki, “the dilemmatic identity of the troops on screen as, at once, benefactors and 
bombers, is therefore instrumental not only in managing the spectator’s emotions vis-à-vis the 
spectacle of Iraqi suffering, but crucially in managing the political task of taking sides in the 
conflict and thereby of establishing or withdrawing public  consent to the legitimacy of the war” 
(2005, p.146). According to her, the BBC represented the spectacle of war in Iraq in a way that 
“effaces the presence of Iraqi people as human beings and sidelines the question of the coa lition 
troops’ identity either as benefactors or bombers (...) there is no reference to the Iraqi as a human 
being, either in language or in image”, while the actions of the coalition soldiers are “represented 
in non-human terms” and in this way, the BBC “suppresses the emotional, ethical and political 
issues that lie behind the bombardment of Baghdad” (Chouliaraki, 2005, pp. 147-152). She 
estimates that the BBC does not let the audiences witness Baghdad’s streets, hospitals and 
“therefore, it is unable to shift the position of the spectator from the ‘detached’ overview to an 
‘involved’ observation of suffering in proximity as for example Al Jazeera did” (p.151).  
People all over the world have turned to news media to learn about the recent crises in Syria, 
particularly the war on IS; the news programs they watch on TV screens shape their understanding 
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of the situation there and help them develop a particular view about the meaning of this war, as 
well as its expected outcomes.  
3.2 War Reporting: Political Communications Theories  
For politicians, the media are soft power instruments that enable them to connect with their 
audiences. According to Wolfsfeld (1997, 2011), all politicians are aware that access to media, 
with positive coverage, is a key factor for success in the political arena. So, they compete over the 
news media along two dimensions: one is structural which deals with the access to the news media, 
i.e. the interaction between media and media sources, and the other is cultural which focuses on 
the media frames, i.e. the interpretive frames that organise the construction of the news. He 
describes the relationship between media and politicians as a symbiotic: politicians seek publicity 
while journalists are looking for interesting stories, and each one wants to get the maximum from 
the other without paying so much (Wolfsfeld, 2011, p. 10). Also, he argues that while politics and 
media influence each other, politics have more effect on the media rather than the other way round, 
for the media often respond or react to what happens in the world of politics.  
This brings to our attention the ‘indexing hypothesis which was developed by Bennett (1990). He 
argues that “mass media news is indexed to the dynamics of governmental debate” (p. 110). This 
means that governments influence the media’s agendas and that news coverage is indexed within 
the range of debate among the elites. 
In his book, The Uncensored War (1994), Daniel Hallin discovered that journalists operate in three 
spaces: first, the sphere of consensus when journalists show full support for their governments’ 
policies and mute the opposition. Within this sphere, the media takes a ‘patriotic’ rather than 
critical stance. When journalists start to give access to voices from the opposition, then they move 
from the sphere of consensus to that of legitimate controversy; this happens when the government 
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is unable to control the events on the ground or convince the opposition to take its side (Wolfsfeld, 
1997, 2011). For Hallin, it is within this sphere that media takes a balanced stance during wartime. 
Hallin argues that the move to this sphere depends on elite debate. The third sphere is the sphere 
of deviance where we can find the views that are marginalised within mainstream society when 
the media (rarely) give voice to deviant views such as the anti-war movements or terror groups, 
but at the same time frame them negatively and reinforce their exclusion. When placing their news 
sources in these three spheres in ways that reflect elite views, news media strengthen the frames 
that prevail amongst those elites and help them maintain their authoritative positions.  
It is noteworthy that these theories were established within liberal media systems and were applied 
particularly to the US media. However, RT which is under study in this thesis can be classified as 
belonging to an authoritarian media system in which access and pluralism are tolerated but within 
limits. In the Russian political system, media freedom should be controllable (Skillen, 2016). So, 
the state owns key media outlets, particularly the TV networks, while private media organisations 
are owned by loyal businessmen who support the Kremlin’s policies (Gehlbach, 2010; Skillen, 
2016). Becker (2004) describes the Russian media system as a neo-authoritarian system in which 
the state exercises control over important issues such as elections and Chechnya and tolerate 
pluralism in other issues. Non-news programs are free to set their agenda as long as they do not 
criticise the political system in Russia (Gehlbach, 2010).  
RT was launched in 2005 to promote Russia’s policies abroad. RT’s freedom is limited by the 
Kremlin’s interests, as Skillen (2016) maintains that this international  TV network is allowed to 
display a pluralism of opinions on non-crisis events. This means that RT depends fully on Russia 
when it covers crises in which Russia is implicated. Similarly, Samuel-Azran (2013) maintains 
that AJA represents a model of “hybrid network whose independence is limited by the boundaries 
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of Qatar’s crucial interests” (p.15), so AJ supports Qatar policy in crises but “operates 
independently in routine affairs” in which Qatar is not involved.  
Hence, whereas journalists in liberal media systems can operate in three spheres, moving from the 
sphere of consensus to that of legitimate controversy or deviance, RT and AJA journalists, who 
work under authoritarian political systems, are expected to have limited freedom. However, this 
study provides an opportunity to explore whether there is a space for legitimate controversy or 
deviance where these TV channels, being global media organisations, can promote frames that are 
not preferred by their governments, including the enemy’s voice when covering the war on IS in 
Syria.  
It is noteworthy that notions like ‘democracy’ or ‘global public debate’ are not addressed in my 
research since I do not seek to examine to what extent the news organisations under study 
contribute to democracy, pluralism, or global publics. As I mentioned, AJA and RT operate in 
authoritarian countries, where public debate is restricted. This research focuses on how the news 
discourses of these international TV channels are influenced by their political contexts not on their 
contribution to a global public sphere.  
3.3 Media, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism  
The role of media in conceptualising terrorism as well as counterterrorism is a very sensitive one 
as they are lines of communication among the ruling elites, the publics, and the so-called terrorists. 
Yet, news media organisations are not passive agents, for they participate in framing terror/anti-
terror-related questions and putting them on the public agenda. According to Paletz and Tawney 
(1992), 
The media are the central connection in the terrorism-government-public nexus. Which 
terrorist activities are reported, how prominently, how framed, with what emphases, and 
42 
 
whose views predominate—all influence the behavior of terrorists, the reactions and 
responses of government officials, and the views of the public. The media, moreover, can 
often become more than chroniclers of terrorists’ actions: They may contribute to or 
interfere with the resolution of an incident by transmitting terrorists’ communiqués; they 
may become a party to the negotiations; they may even jeopardize the lives of hostages by 
broadcasting personal information (as cited in Marin, 2011, p. 257). 
In what follows I discuss the media’s role in covering terrorism and counterterrorism actions:  
Media and terrorism 
Communication scholars such as Weimann and Winn (1994) Wolfsfeld (2011) Camphuijsen and 
Vissers (2012) argue that non-state actors that are labelled as terrorists in their communities rely 
on the media to pass their violent messages, terrorise the public, achieve publicity, and put their 
governments under pressure. According to Jetter (2017), “international news outlets are 
extensively covering Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and recently the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) (…) the attention of the public seems to be a fundamental objective and potential driver of 
terrorist activities with the media serving as an indispensable platform” (p. 34). Supporting this 
view, Wojtasik (2017) maintained: “it should be underlined that terrorists have always been 
dependent on the media which showed, quoted and, so to speak, mediated in spreading fear” 
(p.105). Terrorists know that the media are eager to cover dramatic events to attract the attention 
of their audiences and make money. That is to say, there is a symbiotic relationship between media 
organisations and terrorist groups. According to Aaron Hoffman et al.,  
News organizations supply terrorists access to their audiences in exchange for the right to 
publish information about events that will entice consumers to purchase their products. 
[…]. Both terrorists and news organizations benefit when information about terrorist 
attacks is turned into the commodity of news (2010, p. 576). 
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Yet, this symbiotic relationship does not mean that media and terror groups are friends. For Tiffen 
(2006), there is a hostile relationship between mainstream media and terror groups because news 
media frame terror acts and groups negatively. It should be taken into consideration that the media 
rely on official sources when covering violent events. Moreover, those who are defined as terrorists 
consider media personnel as their enemies and target them.  
IS understands that media are very helpful in information and psychological warfare. Therefore, 
the organisation produced many media materials, documenting beheadings, mass killings, and 
fighting operations. For Neer and O’Toole, ISIS’s violence is premeditated, purposeful, cold-
blooded, and predatory and has a sadistic quality to it. It is an “instrumental violence and is the 
type typically preferred and engaged in by psychopaths” (Neer and O'Toole, 2014, p. 147).       
According to Camphuijsen and Vissers (2012), terrorists as non-state actors design media-oriented 
events to achieve many goals. First, they seek to intimidate political regimes, showing their 
vulnerability to violent acts. Disseminating terror acts through the media help terrorists prove their 
power and demonstrate to audiences that their governments are unable or unwilling to protect 
them. An example worth recalling is when IS filmed John Cantlie, a British hostage, while he was 
criticising his government for refusing to make a deal with the IS to save his life: “Only the British 
and American prisoners were left behind. […] Our governments had chosen not to negotiate with 
the Islamic State through our families and friends. And while everyone else had fulfilled conditions 
for release, for us there was no deal” (as cited in Neer and O'Toole, 2014, p. 88). This journalist 
was forced to appear in multi-part footage titled ‘Lend me your Ears – Messages from the British 
Detainee John Cantlie.’  
Second, terror groups may seek to use the media with the aim to show the inappropriate or 
excessive use of power by governments in reaction to violent events; this includes any oppressive 
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actions and decisions taken in the name of the war on terror. A clear example of that is when IS 
and its followers employ media to show the impact of the US and Russia’s air campaigns on 
civilians and then call for ‘jihad’ against Russia and the West as well as their allies in Syria and 
Iraq. Also, armed groups can use the media to gain the sympathy of audiences (Wojtasik, 2017). 
Linked to this purpose is another goal, which is to convince people to adopt their ideologies and 
then recruit more members who help them disseminate their ideas. Within this framework, media 
may be accused of being instigators of violence. However, this is not a very tenable view, because 
according to selective exposure theory, audiences are always selective; they tend to watch the 
media content that reinforces the assumptions, the ideas, and the beliefs that they already have in 
their minds (Whitaker et al, 2013).  
So, some viewers support IS or watch its videos for such materials resonate with their pre-existing 
views. Also, Cottle (2006) argues that the media cannot be seen as a cause for promoting terrorism 
because mainstream news media organisations portray terrorists negatively and use episodic 
frames. This type of news framing represents stories isolated from their context and from a narrow 
perspective (Iyengar,1994). Then, audiences cannot make well-informed judgements about what 
happens around them. Alternatively, news media outlets can use thematic news frames, which 
apply a wide-angle lens to the coverage of the issues, like terrorism or the so-called war on 
terrorism. Thematic frames provide information about the context of the reported stories 
(Iyengar,1994). When reporters use thematic frames, they investigate the reasons that led to the 
rise of crises like IS and raise the need for better policies to encounter violence. However, it should 
be taken into consideration that news media prefer episodic frames due to broadcast constraints or 
restrictions imposed by governments on what can be reported.  
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Armed non-state actors, like Al Qaeda, initiated contacts with international media as Bin Laden 
accepted to be interviewed by AJ in Afghanistan, and he used to send Al Qaeda’s tapes to this key 
international media outlet (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003). Today, with the growth of online 
communications, armed groups have developed their media outlets. So, they can act more 
independently and strategically to achieve their goals. According to Wolfsfeld (2011), the media 
help these groups collect and exchange information so that they can plan their attacks successfully. 
Also, they can publish videos and other materials that inspire other movements or encourage their 
supporters to commit violent actions. In fact, IS uses new media efficiently and regularly.   
The Internet is currently the most popular ground used by terrorist organizations for 
publishing, communicating and exchanging information. Currently, teams of specialists 
from groups such as al-Hayat Media Center (associated with ISIS), al-Malahem Media, as-
Sahab and al-Fajr Media Center (media wing of al-Qaeda) and al-Furqan Institute (ISIS) 
prepare professionally informative and propaganda-like campaigns, produce 
documentaries, online magazines, and directed executions. They prepare various materials 
and publications (Wojtasik, 2017, p. 109).  
The cyber-space provides IS and the like with a sense of belonging to a particular community 
where they can express their sense of self versus the other. They can explain their views, trying to 
influence the political arena around them. However, Tinnes (2015) maintains that IS still 
recognises the importance of the mainstream media to get the maximum publicity, not only in 
terms what acts should be reported but also how such actions are portrayed. She estimated that IS 
forced Cantlie to produce video series for it to encounter the western media discourses which 
always frame the organisation negatively. So, when Cantlie reported in IS’s favour, the 
organisation took the opportunity to promote its story, its sense of self versus the Western other(s). 
She quoted Cantlie, who said on IS’ behalf:  
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I’m gonna show you the truth behind the systems and motivation of the Islamic State and 
how the Western media, the very organization I used to work for, can twist and manipulate 
that truth to the public back home. There are two sides to every story – think you’re getting 
the whole picture? [..]. Join me for the next few programs and I think you may be surprised 
at what you learn (2015, p. 87).  
She added that IS employed Cantlie as news analyst to promote selected opinions from different 
media reports which “fit into the IS’ argument that an intervention by the US.-led alliance is 
doomed to fail” (p. 88). In so doing, IS wanted to warn the US and its allies over the continuity of 
the war or the launch of more attacks. I conclude this part with a quote from Al Qaeda leader 
Ayman Al Zawahiri: “we are in a battle and more than half of this battle is taking place in the 
battlefield of the media” (Lynch, 2006, p. 50). 
Media and War on Terror 
Like terrorism, the so-called War on Terrorism is contextual and intertextual. It is oriented to serve 
political ends (Altheide,2007). For example, the US presented its actions in Afghanistan as a war 
on terror, and then it used the same frame to justify its intervention against the regime of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq. Also, the Turkish government considers its fight against the Kurds as a war on 
terrorism. As noted in chapter [2], journalists rely on official sources, particularly when they define 
the meaning of terrorism and war on terrorism. So, news media organisations play a role in 
reproducing and circulating the views of this class and participate in preparing audiences for 
official decisions and policies declared in the name of war on terrorism. This may lead to accepting 
such policies as normal without question and reinforcing the hegemonic position of the ruling elites 
in their societies. The abovementioned Gramscian concept of hegemony allows us to examine the 
relationship between news media and political power without having to claim that news 
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organisations are forced to reflect the voice of the ruling elites since the notion of hegemony 
implies willing agreement and support by the media actors.  
Wolfsfeld (2011) maintains that reporting terrorism and war on terrorism lies within a Politics-
Media-Politics (PMP) circle: he argues that the cycle starts with what takes place in the political 
context. For example, when IS killed two American journalists, this act caused the US 
Administration to mobilise and discuss the need to launch a global war on IS. In their turn, the US 
media, index themselves against the US policies, and other news media around the world have 
given more attention to IS crimes. This may accelerate the US response. The framing of 
counterterrorism actions is an exercise of power in which the news media rely on the official 
discourse of their governments. For news media organisations, war stories are newsworthy, so they 
do their best to broadcast live stories and images from the battlefields. In conflict areas, media 
personnel such as reporters or photographers may lose their lives. Examples worth recalling are 
Mohammed Al Hurani and Zakarya Ibrahim who worked for AJA in Syria. In fact, every media 
outlet is eager to provide its audiences with exclusive reports, to keep a high rate of watching. 
When CNN was the only western channel that covered from the field during the Gulf War (1990), 
and when AJA covered the war in Afghanistan (2001), from the front line, they enjoyed a 
privileged status in terms of economic benefits, respect and popularity.  
Therefore, war coverage is always a dramatic newsworthy question, but the construction of its 
meaning is shaped by the political and cultural context in which the media operate. The US-led 
military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were framed, in the US media, as humanitarian 
interventions which aimed at liberating Arab and Muslim people from dictatorship regimes; 
however, these invasions were framed, by AJA, as wars against Muslims (Jasperson and Kikhia, 
2003; Samuel-Azran, 2013). According to El-Nawawy (2004), the US military intervention in Iraq 
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was referred to as an act of “occupation” by AJA. Also, some Arab reporters used the term 
‘martyrs’ to refer to those who were killed by the US-coalition forces. Another example is Russia, 
where the frame of the “war on terror” is used by the Kremlin and reproduced by the Russian 
media to justify oppressive military actions against Chechnya. According to Vartaniva and 
Smirnova (2012), when this conflict started in 1994, the Chechens were not labelled as terrorists 
in the Russian media, but after 1999 and onward the Russian media framed Russia’s offensives in 
the Caucasus as anti-terrorist operations and the Chechens were defined as terrorist groups. Of 
course, the events of 11 September provided a strong ground for the Russian officials to reinforce 
such a discourse.  
So, the war on terror frame has no fixed definition. It can be used by any government and their 
media to describe any internal or external other. Given the ethnocentric character of news media, 
they index their coverage according to the range of debate among the elites. In today’s global 
communication system, when international broadcasters are established by state actors and operate 
in the context of a rise in securitising narratives in national and international politics, the space of 
autonomy is likely to be limited. So, AJA and RT are expected to operate within the limits of their 
countries’ policies when covering the war on IS. Moreover, the portrayal of this common enemy 
as a terror group is expected to be influenced by the political contexts in which these news media 
outlets work.     
 
  





The Media as Instruments to win the publics’ minds and hearts 
As discussed in the previous chapter, news media reporting is often ethnocentric, and media outlets 
need to appeal to the political and cultural contexts in which they work. So, this chapter will discuss 
the role of media as public diplomacy tools, with focus on AJA and RT, for these news channels 
need to be considered not only as transnational media outlets but also media set up in national self-
interest contexts. Both broadcasters operate under authoritarian political systems, then they can be 
used by their governments to move away from other political actors in this multi-sided war or 
bring them closer.  
4.1 Media as tools of public diplomacy in the context of counterterrorism 
In the context of the rise of transnational terrorism led by non-state actors, governments need to 
develop counterterrorism strategies that involve not only military actions but also information war 
to encounter the ideas promoted by terrorist organisations (Archetti, 2010). In line with this view, 
Yarchi, Wolfsfeld, Sheafer, and Shenhav (2013) maintains “since terror threatens a country’s 
security, countries must promote a foreign policy that will enlist other countries’ support to combat 
terrorist organisations. A country’s projected image and its foreign policy are two parts of the same 
issue because public diplomacy is a strategic foreign policy tool that helps recruit allies in the 
struggle against terror” (p.266). This view supports Joseph Nye’s argument that countries need to 
combine hard power and soft power, which he refers to as “smart power” to defeat transnational 
terrorism (Nye, 2008, p. 94). The idea is that governments can lead military actions to fight IS and 
the like, yet an essential part of winning this war is to obtain the support of the publics, i.e., to win 
the hearts and minds of people around the world through what is known as “public diplomacy.” 
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Seib (2012) defines this concept as “the element of diplomacy that involves a government reaching 
out to a public, rather than to another government” (p. 64). Wang (2006) maintains that public 
diplomacy aims “to communicate and cultivate on behalf of a nation-state a desired image and 
reputation, and to build common ground and understanding among nations and peoples” (p. 32).  
The media are one of the public diplomacy tools, through which politicians can establish 
sustainable and durable relations with the international community and create a favourable 
environment to conduct their policies (Nye, 2008). In this context, Entman (2008) and Gilboa 
(2008) focused on media diplomacy which involves the use of “the media and other channels of 
communication to influence public opinion in foreign societies;” this includes “media framing, 
information management, PR, nation branding” (Gilboa, 2008, p. 58). This issue is very crucial in 
times of conflict since a country’s positive image and external relations with other nations may 
contribute to generate international support and so alter the outcomes of a conflict in its favour 
(Gilboa, 2000). Being aware of the power of media in public diplomacy, many political actors 
have paid attention to international broadcasting and created media outlets to promote their policies 
to the world. For example, AJ, in Qatar, RT in Russia, Al Alam in Iran, and the BBC World in the 
UK. Besides, presidents exert efforts to promote a positive image of their policies in foreign media. 
For Entman, media diplomacy refers to “the organised attempts by a president and his foreign 
policy apparatus to exert as much control as possible over the framing of his policy in foreign 
media” (Entman, 2008, p. 89). He empathises that the success of a government to promote its 
preferred frames in foreign media “depends most importantly on political cultural congruency” 
between that government and the targeted nations” (p.87). According to him, the more the cultural 
and political congruence between a particular government and the target nation, the more this 
government is framed positively in the target nation’s media. Similarly, previous research on the 
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coverage of terror-related conflicts in international media proved the influence of cultural and 
political proximity on how the media that operate in a particular country relate to the wars that are 
declared by other state actors against armed organisations (Sheafer and Shenhav, 2009; Sheafer et 
al., 2014). In addition to the factor of proximity, Yarchi et al. (2013) maintain that if a country has 
experience with terror, its media are more likely to frame counterterrorism actions adopted by 
other countries positively.  
From a political perspective, Sheafer and Shenhav (2009) argue that while mediated public 
diplomacy is supposed to be a means for creating or reinforcing positive relations among states, it 
happens in practice that countries use mediated public diplomacy to “move away from other states 
rather than bringing them closer. In these cases, governments apply public diplomacy to draw lines 
and borders by positive and negative discourse, to ratify and redefine collective communities in 
the international arena” (p. 279). This study provides an opportunity to examine how the media 
under study frame the roles of the actors that disagree with their governments’ policies and 
approaches to IS in Syria but at the same time contribute to the war against this common enemy.   
 4.2 Qatar and Al Jazeera 
In the previous section, I tackled public diplomacy as a theoretical framework that explains aspects 
of the media-state interaction, but there is a need to consider how it emerges out of specific 
circumstances. So, I will discuss Qatar’s case for the purpose of this research which examines AJA 
coverage of the war on IS. Qatar is a small country; it is not in a position to shape a global strategic 
narrative in which it stands at the centre.  In what follows, I provide an overview of the Qatari 
foreign policy, particularly after the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions as well as AJA’s 
relation to Qatar. The Russian context will be discussed in section [4.3]. 
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4.2.1. Qatar Foreign Policy: An Overview   
Qatar is a small Gulf country ruled by Tamim Ben Hammad Al Thani, with a population under 
half of a million. It is rich in natural Gas and oil resources. Although it is a tiny state, Qatar is an 
active regional player.  
As a result of a highly beneficial combination of a small indigenous population and massive 
hydrocarbon wealth, Qatar has transformed its peninsula from an impoverished backwater 
to a sophisticated metropolis, boasting the world’s highest per capita income and immense 
growth figures. Qatar’s fast-paced economic development has facilitated its emergence as 
an important diplomatic power broker. Amid a precarious regional context, Qatar has 
pushed forward with an activist international agenda defined by high-profile mediation 
initiatives (Mohammadzadeh, 2017, p. 19). 
According to Khatib (2013), Qatar is known for its role as a mediator in the region and international 
conflicts and as a provider of humanitarian aid to vulnerable people around the world. For example, 
Qatar acted as a mediator between the Palestinian rivals Fatah and Hamas in 2007. It played a 
similar role in Lebanon, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Yemen. Through this policy, Qatar seeks to achieve 
several goals:  The first goal is to maintain its security; “by increasing its international profile, 
Qatar aims to protect itself from the perils of small-state anonymity and vulnerability—perils of 
the kind from which Kuwait suffered in 1990” (p.418). According to Nuruzzaman (2015), 
“surrounded by giant neighbours, Qatari rulers, especially after 1995, have attempted to maintain 
relations with both friends and foes to minimise security risks” (p.230). By engaging in mediation 
between conflicting factions such as the Houthis and the Yemeni government, or between 
Hezbollah and its allies on the one hand and the Lebanese March 14 bloc on the other, Qatar can 
be seen as attempting to contain those conflicts and put a limit to the expansion of Iran (Khatib, 
2013). Also, Qatar hosts US military bases (the al-Udeid and As-Sayliyah); “with negligible 
military capabilities of its own, Qatar’s defence is almost wholly dependent on the United States’ 
53 
 
security umbrella” (Mohammadzadeh, 2017, p. 21). Furthermore, Qatar, through its active role as 
an essential ally to the US, tries to distract attention away from its non-democratic political and 
life system (Khatib, 2013; Nuruzzaman, 2015).  
Khatib describes the Qatari foreign policy as pragmatic, but not coherent. For example, it hosts the 
Israeli trade mission; also, Qatar provides “a home to Islamists such as Sheikh Yusuf al-
Qaradawi—who is close to the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement vocal in its criticism of Israel” 
(2013, p. 420). In the context of the Arab spring, it adopted an inconsistent foreign policy. In 
Egypt, Qatar supported the Egyptian people in their anti-government protests in 2011 
(Pourhamzavi and Pherguson, 2016). In Bahrain, Qatar intervened, along with other Gulf 
countries, to protect the throne of Al-Khalifa. In Libya and Syria, “Qatar’s support for the anti-
Gaddafi and anti-Assad rebel forces has ranged from use of the powerful Al Jazeera news channel 
to direct military intervention to a large follow of cash and arms for the rebels to diplomatic 
backing for the rebel groups at different regional and international forums” (Nuruzzaman, 2015, 
p. 228). In Syria, Qatar has supported the Syrian opposition factions. 
 Not only has Qatar been actively involved in arming Syrian rebels such as the Free Syrian 
Army, it has also successfully brokered the creation of an umbrella organization unifying 
the different factions of the Syrian opposition (…) In November 2012, it was revealed that 
Libya had been the Syrian opposition’s main source of finance, providing half of the Syrian 
National Council’s budget, with Qatar being the next largest source of funds (Khatib, 2013, 
pp. 424-425). 
 So, since 2011, Qatar has been an active regional player in the Syrian crisis, supporting the Syrian 
opposition, logistically and financially. As mentioned in the second chapter, Qatar holds Al Assad 
as responsible for the growth of IS, so for the Qatari regime the internal crisis and IS crisis should 
be dealt with as a whole. Qatar supports more military involvement against IS and urges the US to 
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increase its military assistance to the Syrian opposition in the war against IS and the regime (Al-
Thani, 2014; Sciutto, 2015).   
4.2.2 AJA In Qatar.. Qatar in AJA 
AJA which was established in 1996 by the royal family of Al Thani is seen as a public diplomacy 
tool, a global platform to serve Qatar’s foreign policy. This channel criticises ‘everybody’ except 
its government, and it ignores sensitive matters related to Qatar, such as violations of human rights 
and lack of democracy (El-Nawawy, Iskandar, and Iskander, 2003; Samuel-Azran, 2013; Zaidi, 
2003). The Freedom House organisation reported in 2016 that  
Media houses and professionals in Qatar are subject to significant restrictions, and the 
overall landscape encourages a high level of self-censorship. While the country’s flagship 
satellite television channel, Al-Jazeera, is permitted to air critical reports on foreign 
countries and leaders, journalists are subject to prosecution for criticizing the Qatari 
government, the ruling family, or Islam. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter,  AJ is classified as a “hybrid network which acts 
independently when it addresses routine affairs; and this “gives it the credibility of a privately 
owned station”, yet it “reverts to state-sponsored-style broadcasting only during a crisis in which 
Qatar is implicated” (Samuel-Azran, 2013, p. 2).  So, it is possible to say that AJ’s power to report 
independently is constrained by demands that it indexes itself against political orthodoxy in Qatar.  
The dependence of Al Jazeera on Qatar is noticed clearly in the context of the Arab Spring (Khatib, 
2013; Nuruzzaman, 2015; Pourhamzavi and Pherguson, 2016). In words of  Nuruzzaman (2015),    
“Al Jazeera has played a supportive role to promote Qatar’s foreign policy objectives in the Arab 
Spring” (p. 232). It is noteworthy that AJ has adopted an inconsistent editorial policy towards the 
Arab Spring revolutions, which has raised questions about its credibility and its popular image as 
a platform for the voiceless people.  
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The Arab Spring has presented a tough challenge for Al Jazeera’s credibility. After an 
initial surge in popularity due to the channel’s intensive coverage of the Egyptian 
revolution, the channel was faced with the conundrum of the Bahraini uprising that 
coincided with the Libyan one. While Al Jazeera fully embraced the Libyan uprising as a 
legitimate rebellion, its lukewarm stance towards the Bahraini case appeared contradictory 
to its image as a supposed champion of Arab freedom. It also revealed the limits of the 
channel’s self-promoted ‘independence’ from the Qatari state (Khatib, 2013, p. 428).  
This channel has been known for its criticism of the US as well as Arab regimes. This critical 
editorial policy has led some Arab governments to ban its activities in their countries. During the 
presidency of George W. Bush, it has been reported that the US government complained to the 
Qatari regime over the negative tone adopted by AJ towards the US: “the US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell met with Sheikh of Qatar Hamad in Khalifa Al Thani, asking him to use his influence 
to tone down Al-Jazeera’s coverage” (Samuel-Azran, 2010, p. 55).  
During the war in Afghanistan, AJA was considered by the US officials and media as a mouthpiece 
of Islamic terror and was accused of supporting Bin Laden through diffusing his videotapes. 
According to Jasperson and Kikhia (2003), AJA addressed “the impact of the war on the ordinary 
Afghan as well as the perceived ineptness and paralysis of Arab regimes in influencing events on 
the ground. Hence much of the coverage focused on the havoc U.S. bombing had on Afghanistan’s 
people, cities, and already dilapidated infrastructure” (p.125). In 2003, AJA was accused of being 
pro-Saddam Hussein and of supporting the Iraqi armed groups. This channel played a role in 
revealing the vulnerability of the US army when it showed videos of killed US soldiers, lying face 
up and interviews with five others captured by the Iraqi armed groups at the very beginning of the 
war. AJA, also, focused on the high toll of civilian deaths in Iraq. In this context, some critics 
accused the US of deliberately bombarding AJ’s offices in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). 
According to Samuel-Azran (2010) a top-secret document leaked to the Daily Mirror in 2005 
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revealed that the US President, Bush, discussed with Tony Blair the bombardment of AJ’s office 
in various places, but Blair stood against that plan and considered that such attack would lead to 
“a worldwide backlash” (p.46).  AJA’s consistent coverage of the US-led military actions shows 
that it can operate independently when it covers issues in which Qatar is not involved directly.  
There is enough research on AJE overall, but there are few research studies on how Arab-speaking 
audiences are addressed in global conflicts. So, pinning down how AJA can operate in the context 
of a key Qatari foreign policy area and in an area where there are tensions across the Arab world 
and its neighbours is a valuable question to study. This research builds on Samuel-Azran’s (2013) 
conclusion about AJA’s attachment to Qatar’s policies, so it examines how Qatar’s direct 
involvement in the US-led war against IS has influenced AJA coverage of this multi-sided conflict.    
4.3 Russia and RT  
This section addresses how public diplomacy can emerge out of the specific circumstances of 
Russia since this research looks at RT’s coverage of the war on IS.  Russia is a great power, so it 
is in a position to shape a global strategic narrative in which it stands at the centre. In what follows, 
I provide an overview of Russia’s foreign policy, particularly towards the Middle East as well as 
the media-state relationship in Russia.   
4.3.1 The Russian foreign policy under Putin: An overview  
The Russian President Vladimir Putin was re-elected in 2012. He occupied that position previously 
between 2000 and 2008. Throughout his presidency periods, Putin has adopted an authoritarian 
political system (Dawisha, 2015). He “dictates” in the sense of “having the final word on all 
matters” particularly foreign policies, security, and defence (Motyl, 2016, p. 35). Putin muted and 
oppressed oppositional voices and restricted the right of free press and other civil liberties  
(Dawisha, 2015; Motyl, 2016; Skillen, 2016).  
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Putin’s foreign policy is driven by his will to restore Russia’s superiority as a global power 
(Dawisha, 2015; Motyl, 2016; Plakoudas, 2015; Stent, 2008). According to Rutland and Kazantsev 
(2016), “a central theme of Putin’s presidency has been his concern to restore Russia’s standing in 
the world, and he recognises the importance of all dimensions of the issue – security, diplomacy, 
economics, and image” (p.397). In 2011, when the revolutions of the Arab Spring erupted in the 
Middle East, Russia did not show enthusiasm towards such significant political developments in 
the region. For example, Russia did not welcome the intervention of the NATO in Libya, and it 
has supported the Syrian regime against the rebels as it considers that the removal of its regional 
ally in Syria will reduce its influence. Also, it has strengthened its relations with Egypt; “Putin has 
begun to flirt with Abd al- Fatah al-Sisi, the new strongman of Egypt” (Plakoudas, 2015, p. 35). 
In 2015, Russia started to conduct air strikes in Syria in the name of the war on IS. In addition to 
protecting its allies in the region, Russia fears the growth of Islamic jihad inside its territories, 
particularly the threat posed by IS as it has been reported that there are up to 5,000 Russian-
speaking members in this organisation. Russia estimated that over 3,000 IS fighters might be 
Russians (Unnikrishnan and Purushothaman, 2017). As mentioned previously, Russia considers 
that IS should be fought in cooperation with the Syrian regime as Putin said: "We have been 
providing and will continue to provide the necessary military and technical assistance to the Syrian 
government and urge other countries to join us" (Sputnik, 2015). So, unlike the war on 
Afghanistan, the role of Russia in the war on IS is not merely assistive and complementary. Russia 
is a leading superpower which acts as a rival to the US-led coalition. As mentioned in the 
background of this study, Putin seeks to limit the US expansion in the Middle East. Also, he aims 
at changing the geopolitical balance of the region and creating a new world order in which Russia 




The Freedom House reported in 2015, when Russia intervened in Syria, that the Russian media 
outlets “became more firmly incorporated into the Kremlin’s policy efforts, moving from 
supporting the government with biased news to actively participating in an ‘information war’ with 
its perceived adversaries.” The report has mentioned that the Russian government controls the 
news agendas and that debates are rarely allowed but not in political issues. In 2016, the 
organisation continued to criticise the complete dependence of news media organisations in Russia  
on the government’s narrative when covering military incursions into Ukraine and Syria: 
The nationalistic tone of the dominant Russian media continued to drown out independent 
and critical journalism in 2015, stressing patriotic themes associated with Russia’s 2014 
military incursions into Ukraine and the launch of air strikes in Syria in September 2015. 
Russian leaders and progovernment media outlets also sought to mobilize public support 
and suppress any dissent in the face of an economic downturn linked to falling oil prices 
and Ukraine-related sanctions. 
As mentioned above, the political system in Russia is authoritarian in which the state owns key 
media outlets, such as major television networks, radio outlets, news agencies, and newspapers, 
while private media organizations are owned by Russian businessmen who have friendly 
relationships with the Kremlin (Gehlbach, 2010; Skillen, 2016). So, any voices that criticise the 
Kremlin are muted (Gehlbach, 2010). In 2005, Russia created Russia Today (RT) as a toot of 
Russia’s media diplomacy. Its goal is to promote positive image about Russia abroad in terms of 
politics, culture, and language study, “in close cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church, 
which in itself has come to serve as a tool of Russian soft power” (Rutland and Kazantsev, 2016). 
Critics consider that RT was initiated mainly, by Russia, to compete with the BBC, CNN and other 
key international news media outlets for Russia seeks to break the monopoly of Western news 
outlets in the global media market (Rutland and Kazantsev, 2016; Yablokov, 2015). It is 
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mentioned, in the third chapter, that RT’s freedom is limited by the Kremlin’s agenda. According 
to Skillen (2016), this international TV network is allowed to show a pluralism of views on non-
crisis events; it is not allowed to criticise the political system. That is to say, RT operates as a 
national news media when it deals with issues in which concerns the Kremlin. Hutchings and 
Szostek (2015) showed how Russia employed its news media including RT to legitimise its 
intervention in Ukraine. They noted that the Russian media described the Western governments 
which stood against the Russian action as hypocritical and foolish. Also, the Russian news media 
accused the West of adopting double standards policies (Hutchings and Szostek, 2015).  
For Ioffe (2010), RT- America is a propaganda tool for Russia and a weapon used by Putin to deal 
with its rivals, mainly, the US. In one article published in Columbia Journalism Review’s website, 
she argues that  
Russia Today was conceived as a soft-power tool to improve Russia’s image abroad, to 
counter the anti-Russian bias the Kremlin saw in the Western media. Since its founding in 
2005, however, the broadcast outlet has become better known as an extension of Vladimir 
Putin’s confrontational foreign policy. Too often the channel was provocative just for the 
sake of being provocative. It featured fringe-dwelling “experts,” like the Russian historian 
who predicted the imminent dissolution of the United States; broadcast bombastic speeches 
by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez; aired ads conflating Barack Obama with Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad; and ran out-of-nowhere reports on the homeless in America. Often, it 
seemed that Russia Today was just a way to stick it to the U.S. from behind the façade of 
legitimate newsgathering (Ioffe, 2010). 
McClennen (2016) argues that there is a difference between the editorial policy of the Moscow-
based RT office and that of RT America regarding opinion show. She maintains that RT America 
has more freedom. She noted that Abby Martin, former host of “Breaking the Set,” a talk show 
that aired on RT America from 2012 to 2015, criticised the Russian military action in Ukraine in 
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2014 and continued to host her show for another year before quitting her job. However, the 
Moscow-based RT anchor Liz Wahl resigned, citing disagreements with the network’s editorial 
policy. McClennen suggests that we should divide at RT America over editorial freedom in opinion 
shows versus news coverage, which depends on the Kremlin’s agenda. For her, while it is crucial 
to hold RT America accountable for bias when covering Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine, 
one should hold the U.S. media equally responsible for following the White House’s agenda when 
covering the events of September 2001 and the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Unlike AJ, the BBC, and CNN, there is not enough research to date on RT, so more is needed to 
explore how it operates in relation to the Kremlin’s policies or/and the theories of conflict reporting 
or media diplomacy. This research is intended to fill this gap since it examines how RT has reacted 










Chapter 5  
Methodological approach 
This research seeks to examine and compare how RT Arabic and AJA covered the US-led military 
campaign and the Russian military campaign, in the context of the multi-sided war declared against 
IS in Syria.  
The study applies a qualitative research method to achieve its purpose, for analysing news reports 
qualitatively helps researchers find out not only what is said about the war but also how messages 
are articulated to portray the roles of the rival interventions against IS. As mentioned in the third 
chapter, the role of the news media in reporting terrorism and counterterrorism actions is not 
passive. They can decide which stories are newsworthy and how to cover them. In this context, 
news organisations tend to rely on official sources, but at the same time, they seek to tell good 
stories to keep their audiences’ attention. So, media messages are not neutral and can shape public 
perceptions of what happens in Syria.    
This study takes a constructionist approach to frame analysis. In this perspective, social and 
political realities are created within the border of discourse. I support the Foucauldian argument: 
“nothing has a meaning outside of discourse” (cited in Hall, 1997, p. 45). Foucault links between 
truth or knowledge and power. For him,  
Every attempt to put something into meaning comes about from a position of power 
because power connects and organizes the social positions that cause meaning to come 
about. Meaning, then, makes a claim to truth precisely because of the power position that 
enunciates it. This is not the truth but always a truth effect – a truth that seeks to reconstitute 
and re-establish power in meaning” as cited in (Chouliaraki, 2006a, p. 83). 
This thesis aims at deconstructing news texts to show the power relations that inform their 
structure. According to Maingueneau and O'regan (2006), “critical approaches to texts and talks 
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would show how these hide power relations, prejudices, discrimination, and so on. It is doomed to 
question the authority of any text, by reflecting on the very process by which a text gets 
‘authorised.’” So, texts are looked at “as connected to the interests implied by social practices” 
(pp. 229-230). 
I understand the framing of political news as an “imprint of power”, which in words of Entman 
(1993) “registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text” (p.55). For 
him, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p.52). 
He maintains that some information can be made more noticeable by placement or repetition. 
Supporting Entman’s argument, Wolfsfeld (2011) defines news frames as “tools for providing 
meaning to events. Once a news frame has been established, journalists use frames to tell us how 
to understand a particular event” (p.51). According to him, “in news stories connected with the 
war on terror, for example, one finds heroes and villains as well as victories and defeats” (p.51). 
For Gitlin (1980), frames are “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of 
selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organise discourse 
whether verbal or visual” (p.7). Then, the power of frames lies in the selectivity process through 
which the news media tell their audiences how to think about a particular issue. Entman (1993) 
says: “most frames are defined by what they omit as well as include, and the omissions of potential 
problem definitions, explanations, evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the 
inclusions in guiding the audience” (p.54). Thus, in this study, conducting qualitative frame 
analysis of news reports means analysing news as a discourse, to explicate how the news media 
under study have selectively constructed the meaning of each military intervention through 
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patterns of inclusion, exclusion, repetition, interpretation, evaluation, and/or visualisation of some 
aspects of the conflict.  
5.1 Context of the study 
This study takes a comparative approach to examine how AJA and RT Arabic represented the 
separate military campaigns declared by the US and Russia, in cooperation with their allies against 
IS. I selected these media outlets because they operate in a sensitive context: their countries of 
origin are engaged in the war on IS but disagree with key actors on how this common enemy 
should be fought. That is to say, AJA operates in Qatar which is a close ally to the US and a 
member of the US-led coalition against IS, but the Qatari regime is in disagreement with both the 
US and Russia over counterterrorism policies in Syria. RT is sponsored by Russia. The Kremlin 
aligned with the US in its war against the Islamic non-state actors like Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, 
as I have mentioned previously; however, in this war, Russia does not belong to the US-led 
coalition, and it disagrees with the US over counterterrorism approaches in Syria. Moreover, these 
media are similar in that they are sponsored by authoritarian governments and target Arab viewers. 
By comparing how these news media represent the rival campaigns, the study explores how the 
meaning of this multi-sided war on terror is affected by the surrounding political environments in 
which the media operate and shows the similarities and differences in their reporting styles.  
In this context, one should consider that, in comparative media studies, the state remains a strong 
marker of difference and a principal reference point “, on the basis of which media systems, media 
markets, and media cultures are theorised” (Couldry and Hepp, 2009, p. 10). Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) classified media models as democratic versus authoritarian and directed attention to the 
political system under which the media operate, which means that conducting comparative media 
research relies on the state as a basic unit of assessment and comparison.  
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5.2 Samples of the Study  
This research examines news reports (images accompanied by running voiceover), collected from 
both AJA's and RT Arabic’s YouTube channels, tracking a one-year period, between October 2015 
and 30 September 2016.  
In qualitative studies, like this research, scholars seek to make deep interpretations about particular 
issues.  Generally, the significance and conclusions drawn from such studies have more to do with 
the information richness of the samples. So, there is no standard sample size in qualitative studies; 
instead, the researcher makes his/her decision based on some guidelines, such as the research 
question(s) and aims, the timeframe of the study, and the resources available to him/her (Patton, 
1990). When I collected the sample of this study, I took into consideration that its size should be 
manageable, and it should include enough information about the roles of the main actors (Russia, 
the US and their local allies) to address the research questions.   
This research relies on a sample of 480 news reports in total. I selected (20) reports per month 
from each channel between 1 October 2015 and 30 September 2016. As a result, 240 reports were 
collected from AJA’s YouTube channel and 240 ones were selected from RT Arabic’s YouTube 
channel. I collected my data from YouTube because AJA’s website does not include online archive 
of TV news footage. RT’s website includes online archive, but since I seek to follow the same data 
collection procedures when studying AJA and RT, I decided to use the YouTube channels of both 
media outlets. There were many reports that deal with the war on IS in Syria on these channels. 
Concerning AJA, the sample (240 reports) was selected from an overall output of 625 reports. 
Regarding, RT, the sample (240 reports) was selected from an overall output estimated to be 460 
reports collected from its YouTube channel.  
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I decided on this sample size as it is thought to be manageable and provide enough data to achieve 
the purpose of the study. One of the limitations of using YouTube is that it may not include all 
broadcast videos about the war, so there is a risk that important stories were left out by the 
broadcaster. However, (20) reports per month are expected to cover most of the events that 
occurred in that month since they did not include too many stories about one event and therefore 
represent a broad spread of reporting.  Another limitation is that the broadcasted reports were put 
up without the news reader’s introduction which is important to understand the framing of news. 
Nonetheless, the news reports, by themselves, provided reasonable evidence of media-state 
interactions and variations in war coverage in these two channels. So, I did not miss the 
introductions too much.  
It should be taken into consideration that this research focuses on the discursive patterns of the 
news texts and the ideas that are communicated about the roles of each intervention to explicate 
the political and moral agendas that inform the war discourse. It is noteworthy that neither Russia 
nor Qatar has changed its policies towards Syria throughout the study period, so audiences are not 
likely to find a developing picture with different patterns or a shift in the war discourse. Therefore, 
the sample has not been segmented for analysis of different moments in the reporting.  
5.3 Data Collection 
Regarding the data collection process from AJA, the news reports about the war on IS in Syria 
were broadcast in two playlists created by the broadcaster. The first one is concerned with the 
international campaign against IS. There were 322 reports published on this list between 1 October 
2015 and 30 September 2016. They are related to IS’s violence, and the war on IS in Iraq, Syria, 
and Libya.  I selected 85 reports only from the list. These are the news reports that deal with the 
US and the Russian interventions in Syria during the above-mentioned period. This means that any 
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report that deals with IS in Egypt, Libya, or IS attacks in Europe was excluded. Also, any news 
reports related to IS in Syria whose length was less than 1:30 minutes were discarded as they were 
found to contain too little details to study the research questions. The second list concentrated on 
Syria. This list includes 820 reports during the said period. After watching all the news reports, I 
selected the reports that covered the Russian and the US campaigns in Syria. Any materials related 
to talk show programs about Syria were excluded in addition to any reports which were already 
found in the first list. Also, any news reports about the Russian and the US-led roles in Syria whose 
length was less than 1:30 minutes were discarded. As a result, 540 reports were collected from this 
list. Then, 625 reports were collected in total from both lists. These reports were listed and put into 
order according to their dates. Twenty reports were selected per month throughout the study 
period. To be precise, the first 20 reports which appeared in the list every month were selected. 
So, in total 240 reports were taken as a study sample, while the 385 others were discarded. 
Analysing 20 reports per month provides a ground to trace the discursive patterns in news texts 
throughout the period of study. These reports covered most of the events that happened in that 
month. I did not miss out reports about important events, and I did not include too many reports 
about any one event. 
In respect of data collection from RT, news reports about the war on IS in Syria can be found in a 
playlist dedicated to political news. This list includes news about different issues including Syria. 
I surveyed the list which is composed of over 1000 reports. I followed the same procedures I 
adopted when collecting data from AJA. So, the news reports related the Russian and the US-led 
interventions in Syria, whose length was at least 1:30 minutes were selected. As a result, 460 
reports were collected. Then, these reports were listed and put into order according to their dates, 
and 20 reports were selected per month. These comprised the first 20 reports which appeared in 
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the list every month throughout the year of study while 220 reports were excluded.  Thus, 240 
reports in total were selected as a study sample. Certainly, as a researcher, I cannot claim that the 
samples of this study are completely exhaustive; AJA and RT are television news outlets, and the 
reports used in this study were selections from the overall output. However, since the research 
approach to understanding frames is primarily qualitative, that aims at deconstructing the meaning 
of the stories, rather than quantitative, the selected samples help show how AJA’s war coverage 
differs from RT.  
5.4 Data Analysis and Translation 
The textual analysis takes an inductive approach. First, I watched all the selected reports three 
times to gain an overall impression and idea about their content. Then, I watched them a further 
two times to notice any recurring themes or discursive practices throughout the reports. This 
research builds on Jasperson and Kikhia’s study (2003). They took a qualitative approach to frame 
analysis to compare how CNN and AJA covered the US war on Afghanistan. They discussed three 
main frames, which are the governance, the military, and the humanitarian. So, in this research, 
these aspects serve as a general framework under which the discursive constructions of the roles 
of the actors involved in the war are analysed. 
So, the analysis was divided according to three aspects, as three different representational domains 
regarding the conflict in Syria emerged in initial readings. These were:   
- The Governance aspect: It looks at the representation of local and international support for the 
approaches of the US and Russia to IS crisis in Syria.  
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- The Military aspect deals with the depictions of the military power and actions of each campaign. 
This aspect also looks at the framing of the interaction between the Russian and the US-led air 
forces in the skies of Syria. 
- The Humanitarian aspect deals with the depiction of humanitarian situation in Syria and how 
each military campaign is related to the suffering of civilians in the context of the war.  
The focus on these three aspects helps me achieve the aim of the study. Through examining the 
portrayal of each intervention at these three levels, it is possible to show how the meaning of the 
war is influenced by the political sphere in which these media operate and look at their professional 
practices. Dividing the analysis into three main themes helps me identify aspects of exclusion, 
inclusion, emphasis, evaluations, and interpretations in the meaning-making processes.  This three-
fold analysis will shape the findings of the study, as I will focus on the aspects mentioned above, 
while other issues that may be related to the war coverage will not be addressed. Adopting that 
three-fold analysis allows to develop a focused analytical framework and answer my research 
questions. It also helps the readers notice the development of the discussion as they move from 
one section to another. 
Moreover, the analysis addresses the visualisation of the military and humanitarian frames to 
examine how each media outlet employed visual elements to establish the meaning of this war and 
how the visual and the verbal texts interrelate. For Nabi (2003), visuals arouse emotions that affect 
message processing. Graber (1987) states that visuals “make audiences care about an issue and the 
people involved in it” (p. 76). For her, war images have a strong effect on how audience respond 
in wartime. Therefore, the selection of visuals in news reflects ideological values, and it aims at 
shaping viewers’ perceptions in a particular way; “features of television messages guide our 
attention to certain parts of the message” (Lang, 1995, p. 89). A clear example of how visuals were 
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ideologically selected to serve political interests is the US media coverage of Operation Desert 
Storm. According to Elihu Katz, the US media “mobilised huge audiences for a live television war 
. . . But the fact is that we didn’t see war at all. . . . We saw portraits of the technology – 
advertisements for smart planes, tanks, missiles, and other equipment in dress rehearsals of what 
they are supposed to do in combat, but we rarely, if ever, saw them in action. Indeed, it was as if 
there was no other side” (Katz, 1992, p. 8). 
 Similarly, Baudrillard (1995) provocatively claimed: “the Gulf war did not take place,” noting 
that the war existed more as a media event than a physical occurrence. Therefore, it is important 
to analyse the military and the humanitarian aspects of the war on the visual plane to explore how 
visuals were used by AJA and RT to shape their audiences’ perceptions. The analysis will show 
how the verbal and the visual discourses interrelate. That is to say, it will examine whether the 
visualisations of the roles of the military actors confirm, contradict, or have nothing to do with the 
verbal discourses, which describe their actions in the battlefields and the impact of such actions on 
the humanitarian situation. 
 For the purpose of this study, there is a need to translate news texts from Arabic into English. 
Since the text is the vehicle through which the meaning is ultimately transferred to the reader, 
language differences generate additional challenges that might hinder the transfer of meaning and 
might result in loss of meaning. For Van Nes, Abma, Jonsson, and Deeg (2010), 
Language differences may have consequences, because concepts in one language may be 
understood differently in another language (….) Translation of quotes poses specific 
challenges, because it may be difficult to translate concepts for which specific culturally 
bound words were used by the participants (…) Using quotes is not unproblematic because 
participants might feel that they are not fairly represented, when they see their spoken 
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words in written form. Translating the quotes to another language enlarges this problem, 
because in the translation the words are literally not their own anymore (pp. 313-315).  
I did the translations needed for the texts that will be discussed in the next chapters. I was able to 
do this to a high level of accuracy, addressing some of the issues noted above, because my mother 
tongue is Arabic, and I have a BA in English. Also, I worked as a translator and news editor, so I 
have experience of providing English translations for Arabic news texts; however, I acknowledge 
that the abovementioned problems that arise when translating news texts for academic research are 
one of the limitations of this study.  
5.5 Analytical Framework  
As mentioned above, the research takes a constructionist approach to frame analysis, so it looks at 
news texts as a site of meaning-making; however, one should take into consideration that news is 
a special political language (Stenvall, 2007) and this language is constructed through discursive 
practices which take place within journalistic norms. Journalism, as a professional discipline, is 
based on the idea of telling the truth and informing audiences about what happens around them; 
therefore, journalists are required to convey a fair and reliable account of the events they cover 
(Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007). This means that they need to report verified facts, seeking out 
multiple witnesses, disclosing as much as possible about sources, or asking various sides for 
comment. Journalists can provide their own evaluative statements as observers or eye-witnesses.  
However, sourced materials are the backbone of news stories, as they provide legitimacy and 
credibility to journalists’ accounts (Cozma, Hamilton, and Lawrence, 2012). The more sources 
and various voices the reporters include in their texts, the more their coverage shows evidence of 
credibility and balance. According to the literature of journalism studies, news media prefer to rely 
on official sources (Bennett, 1990; Gans, 1979). 
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Iyengar and Kinder (1987) state that news frames reflect and maintain traditional values in such a 
way that reflects and reproduces the official view, leaving much of the task of defining what is 
news to sources representing those values.  
The dependence on official sources and their accounts increases in wartime, despite general public 
expectations that the reporters give access to the conflicting parties. They may seek to incorporate 
non-official voices such as civilians or experts, who reflect and evaluate the difference among the 
rivals as evidence of balanced coverage. However, when reporting and framing these conflicting 
claims or viewpoints, scholars note that reporters tend to support the political stand of their 
governments; an ‘in-group’ VS ‘out-group dichotomous mentality guides their coverage 
(Wolfsfeld, 2011). Non-official voices such as experts or civilians are often used in stories to 
reinforce the rhetoric of the officials (Bennett, 1990). It is important to look at sourcing practices 
and particularly how political and military sources are contextualised since they are the primary 
sources of news stories. By tracing the way in which they are textured in relation to other sources, 
it is possible to show media-politics interaction in this multi-sided conflict and investigate whether 
the voice of civilians is used in a way that reinforces the stances of the ruling elites.  
For the purpose of this research, I used critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine news texts, 
addressing the governance, military and humanitarian aspects of this conflict in turn. To do this, I 
did not use van Dijk’s CDA framework although it is the major approach in this sub-field. Rather, 
I followed Fairclough’s (2003) approach to crtical discourse analysis. He defined a set of analytical 
questions that can be applied to texts to explicate the power relations that inform their structures. 
As shown below, I used some of these questions as a framework to study the portrayal of this war, 
with focus on the depictions of the actors involved and their actions as well as the intertextual 
relations of news texts which address the interaction between the reporters’ voices and the sources 
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they report. Also, I have drawn on some insights from Van Leeuwen (2008) and Chouliaraki 
(2006) to examine the visual representations of the military and the humanitarian aspects of the 
conflict.  
According to Fairclough (2003), intertextuality provides a useful analytical resource, particularly 
in news texts for the genre of the press depends on the distribution of information between the 
authorial voice and attributed voices. He proposes that analysing the intertextuality of a text allows 
to examine how the authors (e.g. reporters in news media organisations) incorporate the voices 
and the claims of others into their text. Then, intertextuality is a matter of recontextualisation, a 
process through which reporters texture different voices in a particular context to communicate a 
particular idea. For Fairclough (2003), contextualisation has something to do with framing: when 
a voice “is incorporated into a text, there are always choices about how to ‘frame’ it, how to 
contextualise it, in terms of other parts of the text” (p. 53). So, analysing intertextuality in news 
texts has something to do with how the sources are represented: whether they are quoted or 
constructed through nominalisation or metonymy and whether the information is attributed to 
identified sources or non-identified ones. Intertextuality concerns the ordering of voices. The way 
in which voices are ordered in relation to each other in a text may carry ideological significations; 
for example, the structuring of conflicting voices can help set or classify the good actors vs the 
bad ones (Fairclough, 2003). So, journalists participate in the framing of their sources, structuring 
the reported information and evaluating them. However, Michael Parenti maintains: “Like editors, 
reporters are granted autonomy by demonstrating that they will not use it beyond acceptable limits. 
They are independent agents in a conditional way, free to report what they like as long as their 
superiors like what they report” (as cited in Simon 2006, p 53). Moreover, in analysing news as 
discourse, I look at the features which characterise the news texts in terms of semantic and 
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grammatical relations as well as lexical choices and how these elements are articulated to represent 
the roles of actors involved and set the information within the borders of the political and cultural 
context in which the media operate. The analysis covers not only the verbal but also visual 
discourse. Van Leeuwen (2008) argues that verbal, written, or visual discourses are representations 
of social practices, which not only depict what is going on, but also “they evaluate it, ascribe 
purposes for it, justify it, and so on” (p.6). According to him, when looking at how images depict 
people, two questions should be asked: “How are people depicted?” and “How are the depicted 
people related to the viewer?”  and in this context, 
three dimensions are considered: the social distance between depicted people and the 
viewer, the social relation between depicted people and the viewer, and the social 
interaction between depicted people and the viewer. In all three cases, the relation is, of 
course, symbolic, imaginary: we are made to see the people depicted as though they are 
strangers or friends, as though they are “below” us or “above” us, as though they are in 
interaction with us or not, and so on, whatever the actual relations between us and those 
people, or those kinds of people (2008, p. 137-138). 
Analytical questions 
In the governance aspect, which deals with the framing of local and/or international support for  
the policies of each superpower in the war on IS, I address the following: what official voices from 
the US administration or the Kremlin are included and how these voices are incorporated in 
relation to other voices; how journalists construct the official or non-official voices which criticise 
the strategy of the US-led coalition or Russia; how the voices which support any of these actors 
are contextualised; and whether the reported sources are quoted or represented through metonymy 
or nominalization in their context. So, the analysis looks at the patterns that can be observed in the 
language (the semantic, grammatical, or lexical features) and the messages that are selectively 
promoted/ emphasised through the framing process. As mentioned above, the genre of press 
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reporting is based on how “reported texts and voices are re-contextualised within the reporting text 
– positioned and framed in relation to each other and in relation to the authorial voice” (Fairclough, 
2003, p. 61). Fairclough (2003) maintains that analysing intertextuality directs attention to the 
ordering of voices, and the lexical and grammatical choices which are made by the text author. 
The military aspect concerns the depictions of the military power and actions of the rival air 
campaigns. This includes their interaction in the skies and cooperation with their Syrian allies 
against IS. The analysis deals with the following:  
How the military voices are incorporated and textured in relation to other non-official voices and/or 
in relation to journalists’ voices. How reporters texture opposing military voices/claims; and 
whether non-official voices are used to support one side of the conflict rather than the other. Also, 
the analysis covers how journalists represent the actors (passive, active, individualised, groups) 
and their actions [attacks, gains, fallings] against IS. When addressing all these points, the analysis 
looks at the semantic and linguistic features which characterise the framing of the military 
sources/actions and how they are selectively structured to create particular patterns and 
communicate value judgments about the role of each intervention. According to Fairclough (2003), 
the representation of social actors (Participants) involves a number of choices, including 
activated/passivated, individuals/groups, named/classified, and exclusion or inclusion. These 
choices "are socially significant for instance with respect to the representation of agency” (pp.154-
155).  
Furthermore, the analysis of the military aspect addresses how the actors involved and their actions 
are visualised. It will show how the visual and verbal discourses interrelate. In this context, the 
analysis looks at whether the visual discourse relates to the verbal one via an indexical relationship, 
whether the verbal texts about military power/actions lack the power of pictorial presence, and 
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whether some other relationship holds. The visual analysis also addresses the framing of actors 
and their agency; and whether the fighters are shown as engaged in violent or non-violent acts, 
acting or acted upon, the distance and the gaze. 
In the humanitarian aspect, I examine how the reporters construct the role of each military 
campaign when depicting the human suffering in Syria. I address the following points: how the 
reports represent the identity of Russia and the US-led coalition as bombers, in the context of their 
support for their Syrian allies; how military sources are incorporated; how the sufferers are 
represented; whether impartial sources (experts or human rights organizations), are included, to 
emphasise the role of any of the bombers as an aggressor. The answers to these questions relate to 
the patterns that can be observed in the language of the news reports (semantic, grammatical or 
lexical choices) and the political/moral implications that can be read through these patterns. Like 
the military aspect, the analysis of the humanitarian aspect includes the visual discourse (the 
camerawork). For example, the analysis will show the framing of dead or injured people and how 
visuals relate to the verbal discourse to communicate the human suffering in Syria. It will also 
examine if the sufferers are filmed in groups or individualised and how they are related to viewers 
(their gaze) in the images. As Van Leeuwen (2008), argued through the camerawork, audiences 
are made to see the persons depicted as though they are strangers or friends, as though they are 
below or above them and as though they are in interaction with them or not. According to 
Chouliaraki (2006a), “choosing to capture the sufferers' gaze with the camera is also one of giving 
them a voice and humanising them” (p.89).  
I conclude this section by asserting that qualitative textual analysis is not fixed in advance and is 
a matter of interpretation and negotiation. This can be very challenging as the door is never closed 
on one interpretation or analysis, and each new interpretation can lead to a further critique. Besides, 
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researchers cannot look at all aspects when analysing texts; therefore, they need to focus on 
specific manifestations which help them answer their research questions. Then, the 
abovementioned framework will hopefully enable me to achieve the aim of this research. 
5.6 Researcher’s Position and Reflexivity  
In qualitative research like this study, the cultural background and the personal views of the 
researcher influence the way in which he or she conducts his/ her study (Berger, 2015). This 
includes how he/she gathers information, uses language, asks questions, analyses the collected 
data and makes meaning of them. That is to say, the analyst’s position in relation to the topic of 
research may shape the conclusions drawn from it. Therefore, qualitative researchers need to be 
reflexive. Reflexivity refers to “the active acknowledgement by the researcher that her/his actions 
and decisions will inevitably impact upon the meaning and context of the experience under 
investigation” (Horsburgh, 2003, p. 309). This means that scholars in qualitative studies are aware 
of their position as part of the question they investigate and know that their social, cultural, and 
political background affect the knowledge they produce, so they use reflexivity to monitor the 
effect of their involvement in their research (Frisina, 2006; Josselson, 2007).  
There are different strategies that qualitative researchers can use to maintain reflexivity and 
enhance the quality of their work. For Berger, “reflexivity is demonstrated by use of first-person 
language and provision of a detailed and transparent report of decisions and their rationale” (2015, 
p. 222). Also, it can be demonstrated by the identification of the research limitations, careful 
observation or prolonged engagement and use of a theoretical framework (Barusch, Gringeri, and 
George, 2011). 
In my case, I acknowledge that my cultural background as an Arab scholar affects the way I have 
conducted my study, particularly how I analysed and interpreted the news texts collected for this 
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thesis. However, I adopted some strategies that helped me monitor the effect of my involvement 
in this study. 
 My reflexivity as a researcher is demonstrated by using first-person language when I have 
provided details about my methodological approach and when I have written parts of the analysis, 
linking them to the introduction or the background of the study. Also, I have provided justifications 
for the decisions I made regarding the selection of the samples and the division of the analysis into 
three main themes [the governance, the military, and the humanitarian aspects]. Furthermore, the 
study is guided by a coherent theoretical framework, and the limitations of my research are 
identified. I analysed the news discourses, with careful observation of linguistic and visual 
patterns. In this context, because my mother tongue is Arabic, I can understand the news texts 
easily and notice their discursive patterns. My knowledge of both Arabic and English as well as 
my work experience enabled me to translate the news texts from Arabic into English. Finally, I 
quote Sword (1999) as saying: “no research is free of the biases, assumptions, and personality of 
the researcher and we cannot separate self from those activities in which we are intimately 










AJA’s coverage of the multi-sided war on IS in Syria 
This chapter looks at how AJA covered the military campaigns which the US-led coalition and 
Russia separately waged in the name of war against IS. I should recall that although Qatar is a 
member in the US-led coalition, the Qatari regime does not agree with the US Administration over 
the strategy of this war which started during the Arab Spring uprising in Syria. As mentioned 
previously, for the Qatari regime, the coalition is not doing enough to degrade IS (Sciutto, 2015). 
Qatar considers that the US-led campaign should expand beyond targeting IS and provide more 
support for the opposition factions. Also, Qatar stands against Russia’s intervention in Syria.  
Moreover, I recall that for Samuel-Azran (2013), AJA’s independence is limited by the boundaries 
of Qatar’s interests. So, I re-examine this claim as I trace how AJA reacted to the political context 
in which it operates and to the professional standards of journalism in the coverage of the multi-
sided war on IS.  
6.1 The representation of the US-led intervention against IS in Syria 
In what follows, I explore how AJA covered the US-led war throughout the governance, the 
military, and the humanitarian aspects to explicate the political agenda that informs the news 
discourse. 
The governance aspect of the US-led Intervention 
This section deals with the representation of local and international support for the US war strategy 
in Syria. So, the analysis looks at which voices from the US are included and how the voices of 
the White House officials are incorporated in relation to other critical or supportive voices and in 
relation to the journalists’ voices. Also, it examines how AJA contextualises international voices 
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that express reservations on the US war strategy and those that agree with it; this leads to explore 
how the news discourse is influenced by the context in which AJA operates.      
When contextualising the domestic reactions in the US to Obama’s anti-IS policies, AJA promoted 
official voices from the White House such as Obama, Carter, Kerry, Patterson and the Congress 
[the Republicans], in addition to non-official sources (experts). The White House officials were 
framed in a weak position in front of the Congress, and their messages were followed by critical 
voices that raised the need to change the war strategy. So, the structuring of sources followed a 
consistent framing of the situation in the US that was critical of the Administration policy. 
For example, AJA reported: “The Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter admitted the slow progress 
in anti-IS military operations and declared the US had sent 50 members of its special forces to 
support the Kurdish fighters in Syria. He attributed the reported little progress to the difficulty to 
find local groups that are willing to encounter IS.” Then, Carter was quoted as saying: “If they 
grow in size we will send more troops.” The voiceover mentioned: “The Assistant Secretary of 
State for the Near East Affairs, Anne Patterson, has admitted to the Congress that IS has gained 
more territories since the beginning of the war.” The reporter commented: “Yet, the Pentagon has 
asserted its so-called achievements, which include killing about 10000 IS fighters.” Then, an ex-
member in the US National Security Council, commented: “The war on IS should target not only 
IS but also Al Assad’s regime.” The voiceover commented: 
 The situation on the ground appears to operate in favour of IS since it managed to gain 
territories at the Turkish-Syrian borders. In fact, the mission of the coalition has become 
more complicated after the Russian intervention in Syria. According to Anne Paterson, 
90% of Russia’s strikes have targeted the Syrian opposition, and this has caused more 
disappointment to the Republicans. For some members of the Congress, Obama has no 
clear strategy to defeat IS (AJA, 12 November 2015).  
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This text is typical. Opposing US voices were quoted, allowing them to frame the debate. 
Considering the distribution of information, the way in which the voices of the White House 
representatives were ordered in relation to other voices carries an ideological signification since it 
shows contrast and contradiction between the White House’s statements and the Pentagon’s 
assessments of the results of the air campaign.  Also, the ordering of voices reflects that the US 
Administration’s preferred policy has met resistance from local officials/ non-officials, which 
means that it is not in control of the situation. This resistance can be noticed in all reports that 
addressed the domestic reactions to Obama’s war strategy, as shown in the next examples. 
One of AJA’s reporters framed Obama’s decision to send soldiers to Syria as a step to “calm the 
anger of the Republicans.” Then, Carter was quoted as saying: “We won't hold back from 
supporting capable partners in opportunistic attacks against ISIL or conducting such missions 
directly whether by strikes from the air or direct action on the ground.” The reporter estimated: 
“This step appears to be not enough, for the Republicans believe that the US faces problems in the 
world today because of the weakness of its Democratic President.” A member from the Congress 
was quoted as saying: “if I am Assad, this is a good day for me because America said it would not 
fight to change me, this is a good day for the Russians, the Iranians and Hezbollah as well since 
Al Assad does not face a real military challenge.” Then, the voiceover commented: “There are 
deep disagreements between the US government which has launched an air war and sent special 
operations forces to support its partners in their fight against IS on the ground, and the Republicans 
who call for a more decisive role in Syria against the Syrian regime and its allies” (AJA, 27 October 
2015). Similarly, AJA reported: “The US President asserted he agreed with his  French counterpart 
that the Russian move has reinforced Al Assad’s position and that Russia could help reach a 
ceasefire agreement in Syria.” The voiceover added that Obama and his guest “agreed on 
81 
 
information sharing and discussed the possibility of sending additional special forces to fight 
against IS.” Then, an American expert of strategic studies was quoted as calling for a more decisive 
role in Syria against Al Assad and Russia. He also called for supporting the Syrian opposition 
factions in their war against IS. He said: “It is important to demonstrate our capabilities to the 
Syrian regime and Russia, not because we want to target Russian pilots in the skies but because 
we should prove that we can protect the groups with whom we work” (AJA, 24 December 2015 ).  
Throughout these examples, critical voices from the US were selectively included and reported 
directly or indirectly. The direct quotations function in journalism as a device which allows to give 
the reported news a sense of immediacy, authority, and credibility and so convince audiences of 
the truthfulness of the messages which journalists seek to promote (Fairclough, 1992). Besides, 
AJA used non-specific sources, such as the “Republicans” that were indirectly reported. This 
imprecise language gives the impression that there have been widespread disagreements over the 
White House counterterrorism policies in the US. No voices from the Congress or the public were 
quoted while supporting Obama war strategy, throughout the sample. Instead, the reports focused 
on the critical views, showing that the White House had failed to get Congressional support in this 
war. 
A number of textual practices support these patterns of quoting. The reporters made negative 
lexical choices when contextualising the US Administration stance. They referred to “slow 
progress”, “the weakness of the US president,” “disappointment,” “deep disagreements” and 
“anger,” showing that the Republicans “call for a more decisive role in Syria against the Syrian 
regime and its allies.” The reporters used the verb “to admit” to communicate the claims made by 
Carter and Patterson, which gives the impression that the White House is in a defensive position 
since both officials acknowledge the limited effect of the war strategy, as shown in the first text. 
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However, when US military gains were contextualised, the reporter used another strategy, which 
is metonymy. The reported information was attributed to the Pentagon, and no official source from 
the Pentagon was quoted. According to Martin and Wodak (2001): “metonymies enable the 
speakers to conjure away responsible, involved or affected actors […], or to keep them in the 
semantic background” (p.58). AJA used the prefix “so-called achievements” when reporting the 
Pentagon’s story, and in this way, this channel distances itself from the Pentagon’s claim. Also, 
AJA used gerund “killing about 10000 IS fighters,” which does not need an agent. This 
contextualisation shows that AJA reporting emphasises the shortcomings of the strategy rather 
than its positive effects. 
The reported sources evaluated the US counterterrorism policy, after the intervention of Russia in 
Syria, negatively. These patterns emerge clearly in the evaluative language through which sources 
were framed and preferred meanings were established. Journalistic evaluations were added to show 
the inadequacy of Obama’s strategy, particularly after the Russian military move. As shown above, 
one of AJA’s journalists estimated: “the situation on the ground appears to operate in favour of 
IS” and “the mission of the coalition has become more complicated after the Russian intervention 
in Syria.” Similarly, AJA reported: “The American President Obama stressed once again that the 
US strategy in the war against IS would not involve pulling the US into a ground war. This view 
is shared by members of the coalition. They will provide military support and training for local 
groups who will fight IS on the ground.” Then, Obama appeared on the screen; he said: "We should 
not be drawn once more into a long and costly ground war in Iraq and Syria.” The voiceover 
commented: “Things in Syria got complicated given the intervention of Russia to the side of Al 
Assad, and the weakness of the opposition factions. So, to defeat IS, something needs to be done 
to change the equation” (AJA, 7 December 2015).  In this contextualisation, the reporter raised the 
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need for a more effective strategy to make progress as “things got complicated” after Russia’s 
involvement. Although AJA journalist mentioned that the US anti-IS strategy was approved by its 
partners, no state was named, and no official or non-official sources were quoted as showing 
support for the position of the White House, unlike the US critical voices that were quoted as 
criticising the war policy. So, the reporting style differed consistently depending on whether the 
story was supportive or critical of US strategy. 
Regarding the international responses to the US strategy, AJA quoted official voices when 
communicating messages that raise the need for more efforts to encounter IS. However, it used 
nominalisation or metonymy, without quotes when promoting messages that carry reservations on 
the US policies towards its local partners in Syria and the internal conflict in the context of this 
war. For example, AJA reported: “The US Secretary of Defence has praised the coalition members, 
particularly the Gulf countries for their commitment to increase their financial and military 
contributions to the war on IS.” According to the voiceover, “Riyadh offered to send ground troops 
to fight terrorism in Syria, provided the coalition leaders agree.” Then a Saudi official appeared 
on the screen; he said: “The Kingdom’s initiative to deploy forces in Syria, as well as, other 
military affairs were discussed” (AJA, 11 February 2016). Also, Carter was quoted as saying: 
“Today, we reviewed the war strategy and agreed on next plays in our campaign that will destroy 
IS in Mosul and Raqqa.” Then, Qatar’s defence minister Khaled Al Attiya was interviewed in the 
report; he said: “The current military counterterrorism efforts should be combined with political 
efforts and reform procedures to degrade terrorism” (AJA, 21 July 2016). Similarly, AJA reported: 
“The French President François Hollande said it was a matter of urgency to close the border 
between Turkey and Syria, to prevent the terrorists from reaching Europe.” Then, Hollande was 
quoted directly as saying: “We should destroy Daesh members wherever they are, dry up their 
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financing sources, hunt down their leaders, and recapture the territories they took.” Then the 
voiceover commented: “The French President and his US counterpart discussed the possibilities 
to increase the intelligence cooperation” (AJA, 24 December 2015). In the sample, no international 
voice was quoted directly or indirectly as criticising the US strategy. 
AJA used metonymical expressions to contextualise reservations from international actors on 
Obama’s strategy as shown in the following example,  
Washington adopts a view which is approved by several partners in the US-led coalition; 
this strategy is based on supporting local forces that are motivated to fight against IS on 
the front line and that can take control over the territories recaptured from the organisation, 
such as the Peshmarga, in north Iraq and the Kurdish People's Defence Units in north Syria. 
However, key members of the US coalition have reservations on this policy. For example, 
Baghdad government has concerns about the expansion of Peshmarga’s role in Al Mosel. 
Also, Turkey has concerns about the participation of Kurds in the war on IS. For Ankara, 
both IS and the Kurdistan Worker Party are terrorist organizations that should be 
encountered (AJA, 22 June 2016). 
Once again, AJA reported that several partners approved the US strategy, but it did not provide 
further information. It used metonymical expressions (Baghdad, Ankara) to communicate the 
reservations on Obama’s policy. The metonymical expressions in this example give further 
explanations; it helps the reporter provide information, without having to specify the source or the 
agent.  
Using the same strategy, AJA reported: “Being the leader of the anti-IS international coalition, the 
US has faced criticism from its allies in the NATO. France has rebuked Obama’s Administration, 
estimating that the US has not assumed its responsibility towards the Syrian crisis when Russia 
has tipped the military balance in favour of Al Assad while the supporters of the Syrian opposition 
have not taken any action.” Then the voiceover added: “This view traces the essence of things 
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based on the belief that the Syrian regime is the origin of the growth of groups categorised as 
terrorists” (AJA, 11 February 2016). Referring to the NATO and France, the reporter portrayed 
disagreements between the US and its partners over the situation in Syria and established a link 
between the internal conflict and the growth of IS, and the like. This framing emphasises the Qatari 
view which maintains that IS cannot be defeated as long as the Syrian regime is in power for Al 
Assad stands behind the expansion of terrorism (AJA, 2014). The reporter made negative lexical 
choices: “criticism” and “rebuke.” 
Nominalisation was used once to communicate reservations on the US counterterrorism policies.  
AJA mentioned: “Washington counterterrorism policy faces obstacles in Syria, as there has been 
Arab resentment towards the US ambiguous and sometimes indecisive policies vis-à-vis Al Assad” 
(AJA, 20 January 2016). Unlike the previous examples, where AJA quoted officials, allowing 
them to frame the debate, or used metonymy, in the above text, it used the phrase “Arab 
resentment.” In this context, one should take into consideration that not all Arab countries are part 
of the US coalition in Syria. According to Fowler (1991) nominalisation process helps authors 
delete agents and references to time since there is no verb to show the tense of the reported 
information. This technique of concealment is used in political news as it helps reporters 
background their voices and communicate information through imprecise language without 
agency.  
Thus, AJA used different strategies to construct political responses towards the US approach to IS 
crisis. Quotes, as well as, metonymy and nominalisation were selectively used in a way that 
promoted the need for changes in the US strategy, which operates within the limits of Qatar’s 
policies. Gans (1979) argues that political balance in news is “usually achieved by identifying the 
dominant, most widespread, or most vocal positions, then presenting ‘both sides’” (p. 175). 
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However, this balance risks being false as reporters may report one side of the story insufficiently 
or inaccurately or amplify its view, even if it represents a minority. In this way, they may provide 
an inaccurate picture of the question they report (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). Throughout the 
sample, the White House is always balanced by critique, leaving audiences with not much 
information about the voices that supported the White House policy, but plenty of critical ones. 
AJA quoted US voices that disagree with the White House over the war strategy and that call for 
action against IS as well as the Syrian regime. AJA quoted international voices that promoted the 
need for more counterterrorism efforts. Nominalisation or metonymical expressions, without 
quotes, were used when promoting messages that criticised the US policy towards its local allies 
and the internal crisis in the context of the fighting against international terrorism. So, viewers do 
not hear these critical messages precisely, and the agents turned into objects.  
Moreover, as shown above, the reporters made negative lexical choices such as “complicated,” 
“resentment,” “criticism,” “rebuke,” “reservations,” “deep disagreements,” and “anger” when they 
contextualised local or international official responses to the US anti-IS strategy. This negative 
tone invites Arab viewers to question the effectiveness of anti-IS operations.  
Generally, AJA news discourse is oriented to emphasise the need to take more actions in the 
context of the US-led war on IS. This framing contrasts with the coverage of the US-led war against 
Afghanistan, where AJA raised the need to take action to stop the war and tried to rally the Arab 
and Muslim streets against the US and Arab regimes, that were portrayed as collaborators and 
submissive to the Bush Administration. Jasperson and Kikhia (2003) reported that “Taysseer 
Allooni, al Jazeera's correspondent in Kabul on more than one occasion after viewing the havoc 
caused by U.S. bombing raids lamented that Afghans are looking towards brothers of faith for 
support, but will they find support in the hurried attempts by the Arabs and Muslims to satisfy 
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America's arrogance?” (p.126). In Syria, AJA discourse put the American intervention in the 
context of confronting IS. Furthermore, the Arab regimes, which were portrayed as collaborators 
with the US in AJA coverage of the war on Afghanistan, were not portrayed with the same negative 
image in Syria, throughout the studied sample. This shift in discourse raises the question of why. 
The study suggests that a key factor is Qatar’s involvement in the US-led coalition, which has 
influenced AJA reporting of the war on IS.  
The military aspect of the US-led intervention 
In what follows, I examine AJA coverage of US-led military actions against IS in Syria verbally 
and visually in the light of Qatar’s direct involvement in this conflict.  
On the verbal plane: 
This section looks at how AJA portrays the US-led air campaign and how it constructs the roles of 
the US-backed SDF and the Syrian opposition factions on the ground against IS. So, the analysis 
covers how the US forces and their local allies are represented in terms of action and agency and 
how their voices are incorporated in relation to other sources or in relation to journalists’ voices. 
It explores whether non-official voices are used to evaluate the US-led military actions and whether 
the military dimension is reported differently to the critically evaluated political one. Also, the 
framing of the interaction between the Russian and the US-led air forces in the skies of Syria is 
discussed.  
The analysis begins with the framing of the US-led coalition air strikes that was distanced but not 
highly critical. AJA reporters represented the US forces in positive terms, yet at the same time, 
they brought to viewers’ attention the limited effect of the US-led air campaign. Throughout the 
sample, the reports did not provide details about the type of munitions/bombs used by the US-led 
airpower to strike IS. American pilots were interviewed in one report, in the sample. On this 
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occasion, one of AJA’s journalists reported from US Aircraft Carrier, Harry Truman in the Gulf. 
He allowed two US pilots to express their voices and show the contribution of their country to this 
conflict. The journalist referred to the role of the US warplanes in targeting IS energy resources in 
north Syria, saying: “The US air forces have launched air strikes and intensified their manoeuvres 
in the region as they are the main power in the war against IS. The US naval forces stress that the 
air strikes have led to undermining IS ability to carry out attacks and contributed to drying up its 
financial sources." Then, an American pilot was interviewed; he said: “We carry out operations 
inside the Gulf to demonstrate commitment to our partners in the fighting against IS. 25% of our 
operations seek to support our allies on the ground.” The reporter commented: “The US air strikes 
contributed to drying up IS resources, but they are not the best option.” Another pilot was 
interviewed. He said: “This aircraft carrier can confront IS, but it is obvious that we need support 
on the ground from the members of the coalition. We provide our local allies with important 
information that enables them to carry out attacks against IS.” The reporter estimated: “ The air 
strikes have a limited effect on the ground, which makes the war on IS a difficult mission. This 
situation shows that the coalition needs to be activated through real contributions by its members.” 
He added: “The US air strikes on IS are painful but are not enough to win the battle. So, the fight 
against IS may need direct confrontations on the ground, but the US appears to be not enthusiastic 
about this option, at least at this stage” (AJA, 25 March 2016). 
In another report that covered the killing of Mohammed Emwazi2, by British-American air strikes 
in Al Raqqa, AJA quoted John Kerry as saying: “The terrorists associated with Daesh needs to 
know this: your days are numbered, and you will be defeated.” Then the voiceover commented: 
                                                           
2  Mohammed Emwazi, known as “Jihadi John,” was identified as being a member of IS. He was believed to be the 
person seen in several videos produced by IS, showing beheadings.  
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“According to experts, the effect of this operation is symbolic since IS is still able to expand in the 
world despite the US-led campaign.” The report described Kerry’s response as “unrealistic” for it 
reduces the power of IS to one person (AJA, 13 November 2015). 
So, in the above examples AJA framed the US-led efforts against IS critically. Similarly, other 
reports provided negative evaluations about the outcomes of the US-led coalition strikes against 
IS. One report revealed that AJA had access to IS records of oil revenues. The reporter commented: 
“Statistics showed an increase in the payments allocated to wells maintenance as a result of the 
US-led coalition strikes.” Nevertheless, he estimated: “More than 14 months into the US-led air 
campaign in Iraq and Syria, statistics show that the effects of the strikes are limited for IS has 
found alternative options to ensure the continuity of its oil production such as digging new oil 
wells or repairing the destroyed ones” (AJA, 14 December 2015). Moreover, one of AJA reporters 
commented: “Al Raqqa, the headquarter of IS in Syria, appears to be a safe place for IS. There are 
no ground forces that can attack the city. IS considers the US-led strikes as ineffective since its 
members are always able to avoid these attacks” (AJA, 23 November 2015). Another reporter 
estimated: “The US-led coalition has launched hundreds of air strikes against Manbij, yet, IS 
appears to be unaffected by the surrounding conditions. It is still able to concentrate in Al Raqqa 
and answer the needs of more than 200 000 inhabitants there, in spite of the cut of the supplies’ 
route that runs from Turkey” (AJA, 27 June 2016). 
In these examples, no specific official or non-official voices were quoted to evaluate the effect of 
the US-led air campaign on IS fighting capacity. Negative evaluations were attributed to non-
identified sources (experts) or statistics or provided by journalists. The use of imprecise language 
such as abstract entity (statistics) or non-specific sources enables journalists to background their 
voices, as they report information. IS at the same time was framed as an active agent that was able 
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to withstand the air strikes and answer the needs of people [not a source of human suffering]. As 
shown, the framing of the US-led air strikes was negative but not highly critical. AJA 
acknowledged that the “air strikes contribute to drying up IS resources, but they are not the best 
option,” and that they are “painful” but “are not enough to win the battle.” The reports also 
included negative lexical choices such as “limited” or “ineffective.” that reinforce this negative 
evaluation. 
Another central point in the analysis is the highly distanced framing of military cooperation 
between the US and the Kurdish-led forces, particularly the SDF against IS. Like the US pilots, 
the US special operation forces in Syria were given voice in one report throughout the sample, and 
the reporter used a critical frame when contextualising the cooperation between these forces and 
the Kurdish armed groups. AJA broadcasted footage showing US soldiers standing next to their 
Kurdish allies, and the voiceover commented: “These exclusive images show US soldiers who 
assist the Kurdish People’s Protection Units in the fighting against IS to recapture Al Raqqa’s 
countryside.” An American soldier was interviewed; he said: “I came to support the Kurdish forces 
and the SDF; I believe that the areas which they control are the key to peace in the Middle East. I 
came to support them in the war against IS.” A Kurdish fighter was quoted as saying: “We came 
from the Al Jazira area to liberate North Al Raqqa from IS.” The voiceover added: “The 
deployment of US forces in the Kurdish areas is not a newly-occurred event, but it has been no 
longer hidden. The US has already established Rumilan airbase to the west of Tal Abyidh city. 
Additionally, the commander of the US Special Operations, Joseph Votel visited Kobane last 
week.” The report estimated: 
 Showing images of American soldiers in Syria operates within the interests of the Kurds 
and the Americans. The US Administration seeks to prove itself as a partner in Al Raqqa 
ground offensive and so in the victory when IS is driven out of the city, while the Kurdish 
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People’s Protection Units aim at presenting themselves as a legitimate partner, although 
they have been designated as a terrorist organisation. 
It concluded: “The images of the US soldiers have raised questions about the US policy. 
Circulating such images may indicate the end of the US support for the moderate Syrian opposition 
and the shift towards another partner” (AJA, 28 May 2016). 
The framing of the US-Kurdish cooperation in Syria is metatextual as the reporter talks about 
images rather than just showing them. Genette defines metatextuality as “references of one text on 
another text” so it “unites a given text to another, of which it speaks” (1997, p. 4). By using a 
metatextual style, the journalist provided a distanced critical evaluation about the US policy 
towards its allies. As shown, AJA promoted the US and Kurdish voices, as they talk about their 
contributions to the war; however, the reporter brought to viewers’ attention the designation of the 
Kurdish armed groups as terrorists and the inconsistent policy of the US in Syria.  
The coverage of the military actions on the battlefield was striking in its focus on the description 
of both the SDF and IS perspectives on the fighting and the absence of the analysis seen above of 
US forces. Particularly in the representation of armed clashes between the US-backed SDF and IS, 
the journalists included opposing claims without providing information about the context, or 
evaluations from experts or the journalists themselves. That is to say, the framing of the events on 
the ground is episodic. Iyengar (1994) suggested that norms and standards within news 
organisations and news production favour episodic framing. This practice simplifies complex 
issues and represents them as isolated, without connecting them to political issues. Also, episodic 
framing better suits the constraints of the broadcast. For example, AJA reported:  
The SDF said they have been advancing towards IS positions in the centre of Manbij, with 
intensive air cover from the US-led coalition warplane, and they have killed members of 
the organisation. In the meantime, IS said it has retaken control over 6 villages in Manbij’s 
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countryside and it has killed soldiers from the SDF and destroyed their vehicles, according 
to IS news agency, Amaq (AJA, 4 July 2016).   
Similarly, another report read:  
The US-backed SDF have been advancing slowly towards the East of Manbij. Local 
sources reported that these forces recaptured IS-held positions in the north and the east of 
the city. But IS said that its members launched a counterattack against Awn Dadat village 
and killed soldiers from the SDF (AJA, 7 June 2016). 
As shown, AJA promoted opposing claims, equally, which gives the impression of political 
balance although the information was not attributed to specific voices. Also, deaths on both sides 
were represented equally through aggregation. The reports did not include a precise number of the 
killed fighters. The reported deaths were not personalised. No specific details about their identities 
such as names or ages were reported. 
This contrasted markedly with the reporting of the deaths of US personnel who were killed as they 
assisted the SDF, in the battlefield. On one occasion in the study sample, AJA referred to four US 
military advisors who were killed in a missile attack launched by IS in the north of Manbij. The 
voiceover reported: “In Manbij, the list of victims included 4 American military advisors who were 
targeted in a missile attack launched by IS, according to US media sources” (AJA, 21 June 2016). 
No military source was quoted to confirm the claim. The soldiers were personalised by referring 
to their nationality and rank; they were not reduced to numerical references. Interestingly, AJA 
used the term “victim”, which carries a positive value, representing the killed person as innocent 
[the Arabic equivalent term is ضحية]. This term is usually used to refer to non-combatants who 
suffer during conflicts. Such a term was not used by AJA when it portrayed the American forces’ 
military failings in the previous US-led wars. Even if this text included this term because it was 
reproducing a term used by the US media sources, AJA could be expected to distance itself as it 
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usually does when it uses qualifiers such as “so-called” before terms like “US war on terror” or 
“terrorism.” The use of the unqualified term “victim” is a striking case of how differently and more 
positively, US actors are represented than the SDF and of course IS fighters. 
As shown above, AJA promoted IS as a powerful enemy who can carry out counterattacks, and 
who was “unaffected” by the air campaign, which requires the US to review its war strategy. This 
was not the case in the coverage of the war on Afghanistan where, according to Jasperson and 
Kikhia (2003), AJA compared “the Taliban's antiquated arms with the modern  military of the 
United States” presenting “a vivid image of a foregone conclusion that it was going to be a one-
sided war that will end with the decimation of the Taliban” (p. 132). 
A noteworthy point in AJA coverage of the US-SDF cooperation against IS is that on more than 
one occasion, the reports linked the US-backed SDF’s activities to the Kurds’ attempts to establish 
a self-governing zone in northern Syria. No official sources or experts were used to comment on 
this issue. Raising this question in several reports carries an ideological signification since it shows 
that AJA news discourse has been shaped by Qatar’s regional concerns. The Qatari regime along 
with other Gulf countries as well as Turkey stand against the Syrian Kurdish autonomy. For 
Erdogan, the Kurdish-separatists in Turkey, as well as Syria, are terrorists. The Gulf countries led 
by Saudi Arabia also stand against the Syrian Kurdish move and described their attempt to 
establish democracy and federalism as “an attempt to split Syria” (Shaswar, 2016). Moreover, the 
progress of the SDF in north Syria would limit the expansion of the so-called moderate Syrian 
opposition groups that are close allies to Turkey and Qatar in these areas. In line with this view, 
AJA framed the US-backed SDF’s actions against IS in terms of their struggle for independence, 
rather than showing them as benefactors or liberators that aimed at helping their people. In this 
94 
 
way, AJA can contribute to mobilising Arab public opinion against the SDF for it gives the 
impression that these forces took advantage of the war on IS to advance their interests.  
For example, one report read:  
IS has exploded the bridge, which links between the banks of the Euphrates to prevent the 
SDF from crossing the river, yet these forces managed to reach the western bank, using US 
vessels. It appears that the SDF will not stop until they take full control over Aleppo 
countryside and link Afrin to Kobane in the context of a project which seeks to create an 
enabling environment to realize their autonomous aspirations in the region” (AJA, 24 June 
2016).  
Similarly, another report read: “Backed by US-led coalition air cover in addition to intelligence 
support from the US, the so-called SDF, which is dominated by the Kurdish fighters, launched an 
offensive to recapture Manbij, one of the main IS’s headquarters in Syria.” The journalist defined 
the goal of the offensive, saying: “This operation aims at cutting off the IS supply route to Al 
Raqqa and undermining its military capabilities.” Then, he estimated: “If the Kurdish-led forces 
manage to recapture Manbij, this will secure geographical continuity between the Kurdish-held 
cities Afrin and Ain Al Arab” (AJA, 1 June 2016). In this context, one of AJA’s reporters 
introduced the group’s name -the SDF- as “a new label which allows the Kurdish forces to hide 
their ambitions for expansion beyond their self-governance areas and which enables them to 
receive the US military assistance that was once allocated to the Syrian opposition” (AJA, 15 
October 2015). So, AJA framing is ideologically oriented since it emphasised that this armed group 
have a particular agenda which goes beyond destroying international terrorism. It should be 
highlighted that the SDF adopted the US war policy and did not target Al Assad’s forces, and this 
approach is not consistent with Qatar’s policies towards Syria. 
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Another key theme in this section is the representation of the interaction between the US and the 
Syrian opposition factions in the context of the war on IS.  
As was the case in the coverage of the SDF’s military actions in the field, AJA often relied on 
episodic frames when covering clashes between IS and the Syrian opposition factions. It relied on 
the journalists’ factual claims. But it also used indirect quotes attributed to the actors involved. So, 
AJA promoted various sources that have different views which is a standard of professional 
reporting. However, episodic frames do not help the audiences make informed judgments about 
what they watch since the events are reported in simple language, without context, as shown below. 
One report read: “The Syrian opposition factions have recaptured Dalha and Herjullah villages 
from IS yesterday. In this battle, the US-led coalition provided air support for the Syrian opposition 
forces, for the first time” (AJA, 22 Novmber 2015).  So, the reporter brought to our attention that 
the US-led coalition’s support was not available before. Another report read: “With modest support 
from the US-led coalition warplanes as well as Turkish fighter jets, Syrian opposition factions have 
entered Jarabulus after short-lasting confrontations with IS”  (AJA, 24 August 2016). In a third 
example, the voiceover referred to the progress of the opposition factions against IS despite the 
lack of the US support. It reported: “The village of Al Ghazal and Al Khirba, near the Turkish 
border, became under the control of Syrian opposition factions after fierce battles with IS. This 
progress has been made by the Syrian opposition despite the lack of the US-led coalition air support 
and the presence of Russian warplanes which targeted their positions” (AJA, 5 December 2015). 
Also, one report read: 
IS announced that it has arrested 8 members from the opposition factions, in Tulil Al Hissin 
village in the northern countryside of Aleppo, according to Amaq news agency. In the 
meantime, factions from the opposition announced their withdrawal from the villages of 
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Zitan, Al Khaldiya, and Barna in the western countryside, as they could not withstand the 
Russian-Syrian air strikes” (AJA, 10 April 2016). 
Reflecting Qatar’s view, throughout the above texts, the reporters made lexical choices that 
referred to the limited military support provided to the Syrian opposition, unlike the SDF that were 
backed by US forces, vessels, weapons, and air cover. The opposition factions were reported to 
have been able to make gains despite the limited US military assistance and their failing in front 
of IS was justified. The finding of this positive framing supports an argument that AJA aligns with 
Qatar’s interests, in this case, that the Qatari regime supports the Syrian opposition factions in their 
struggle against IS as well as Al Assad regime.  
The last point which this verbal analysis tackles is the framing of the US interaction with Russia 
in the context of the war on IS. After the military involvement of Russia in Syria, AJA emphasised 
the need for the White House to coordinate with the Kremlin to ensure the safety of the US 
coalition’s airmen. Official voices from both countries were quoted directly as expressing the US 
refusal to cooperate with Russia in the war against IS. One report read: “Russia has blamed the US 
for the lack of cooperation between the two sides in Syria.” Then, the Russian minister of defence, 
Lavrov was shown saying: “We are told they cannot send a delegation  to Moscow and cannot 
receive a delegation in Washington either. It seems that our American friends are interested only 
in steps that could help avoid accidents in the skies.” The voiceover commented: “Observers have 
raised concerns about the possibility of inadvertent incidents in Syria, and this appears to be the 
Americans’ primary concern.” Then, Carter was quoted as saying:  
Russia must act professionally in the skies over Syria and abide by basic safety procedures. 
We'll have another conversation with the Russians tomorrow on this subject. Those 
discussions are progressing. Nothing has been finalised. Even as we continue to disagree 
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on Syria policy, we should be able to at least agree on making sure our airmen are as safe 
as possible. 
The voiceover commented: “It appears that the Americans have not yet developed a clear strategy 
to deal with the situation in Syria after the Russian intervention” (AJA, 14 October 2015). This 
final comment of the reporter involved a negative evaluation for the US conduct as it gives the 
impression that the US has been unable to control the situation on the ground. In another text, AJA 
reported: “The Americans accept to coordinate with Moscow to make sure that the plans of the US 
coalition in Syria will not be affected, but they refuse to cooperate with the Russians there” (AJA, 
7 October 2015). A third report read: “Moscow showed its willingness to coordinate with the US-
led coalition to recapture Al Raqqa, but the US refuses any joint military operations with the 
Russians because they support Al Assad regime” (AJA, 24 May 2016). Then, AJA reports reflected 
the divergence between the US and Russia and provided justification statements for the US refusal 
to cooperate with Russia in Syria  
On one occasion, in the sample, AJA evoked the possibility of close cooperation between the rival 
interventions, but it referred to the US negative policy towards the Syrian opposition. When AJA 
reported about the recapture of Palmyra by the Syrian regime, the voiceover commented: “The 
representative of Syria to the UN, Bashar Al Jafari, has stressed his country has been ready to 
cooperate with the US in the context of the so-called international coalition against terrorism. The 
US Secretary of State hailed the recapture of Palmyra and said it was too early to evaluate the 
results of this operation.” The reporter questioned: “Will Washington continue to refuse Al Jafari’s 
offer?” and added: “The answer is no longer a definite No.” According to the report, “The US 
Secretary of State Kerry has visited Moscow recently, where he met with Russian officials in a 
cordial ambience.”  The reporter estimated: “The recapture of Palmyra may operate within the 
interest of Al Assad and Moscow, but what should not be ignored is that the Syrian opposition 
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factions have always asked their international friends for assistance in the war against IS but to no 
avail” (AJA, 28 March 2016). This framing involves an ideological position since the possibility 
of cooperation among the US, Russia, and the Syrian regime is not framed in terms of the potential 
positive impacts of such cooperation on the progress of the war against IS. Rather, it is framed 
critically in terms of the inconsistency of the US policy towards Syria, and particularly the lack of 
western military support for the Syrian opposition factions in the fight against IS, which is one of 
Qatar’s reservations on the US war strategy (Sciutto, 2015). 
In the light of the above discussion, it can be said that AJA’s coverage of the military aspect is 
consistent with the framing of the previously discussed political one for both emphasised the 
limited effect of the US-led air campaign and the inconsistency of the US policy on IS. The framing 
of the US-led military actions was not highly critical, and it reflected Qatar’s voice. AJA’s 
construed the legitimacy of the US-led intervention through promoting the role of the coalition in 
targeting IS positions and oil resources, but it showed that this military campaign was not doing 
enough. In their comments, AJA’s reporters evoked the need for more military involvement to 
degrade IS in Syria. The reporters raised the SDF’s connection to the YPG and their nationalistic 
ambitions in parallel with the war on IS. They also drew attention to the sufficient military support 
that the SDF have received from the US. Moreover, AJA showed that the Syrian opposition forces 
managed to make progress against IS in spite of the limited military support available to them. 
These evaluations were not confirmed by external sources. AJA reporting style relied on episodic 
framing when covering the armed clashes between the SDF or the opposition factions and IS. It 
promoted opposing claims made by the actors involved, including IS-affiliated sources. Overall, 
AJA adopted consistent patterns in terms of both the explicit evaluations and the textual features 
that accompany them. This reporting style in which audiences do not find different patterns is 
99 
 
expected since AJA and the like react to what happens in the political sphere. Throughout the study 
period, Qatar has not changed its policies on Syria. Then, the framing of the US-led military actions 
is consistent with Qatar's policies, which means that AJA aligns with Qatar in this crisis.     
On the Visual plane:  
In what follows, I show how visuals are related to the previously discussed verbal discourse, 
creating a coherent discourse across both planes. I show how the visuals focused on the precise 
bombing of IS energy resources and the intensive support for the SDF. Before proceeding into the 
visual analysis, it is noteworthy that AJA depended on local reporters in the coverage of the violent 
events inside the Syrian territories. So, in the news reports, these journalists used the visual 
materials which they filmed, but they also remediated images from the SDF media sources when 
they covered their military activities. Similarly, they used images from IS-Amaq news agency, or 
the Syrian opposition when they reported about their actions. That is to say, AJA reports included 
visuals from different sources.  
The first point in this analysis is that AJA contributed to legitimising the US-led war on IS when 
it broadcast images that illustrated the use of military technology to precisely identify and target 
IS oil fields as well as trucks that conveyed oil from IS held-territories to different places inside 
and outside Syria. As shown in figures [1, 2] oil delivery trucks are destroyed, while the 
accompanying voiceover refers to the efforts deployed by the US coalition to dry up IS energy 





    Figure 2 IS oil convoy destroyed by US-led coalition strikes 
                                                                                                            
Moreover, AJA broadcasted images from the US Aircraft Carrier Harry Truman in the Gulf. The 
US warplanes were filmed from different distances, and these various images dominated the whole 
report. While the voiceover referred to the power of the US aircraft carrier and its role in the war 
against IS, Arab viewers were invited to see American warplanes from a close distance, as if they 
were on the ship, so they could see things from the US side. Also, viewers could see precision 
munitions, which communicated the advanced military technology used by the US, being the 
leader of an international coalition against IS. This is a common strategy in wartime when reporting 
the in-group or ‘our’ military actions. Jasperson and Kikhia (2003) and Samuel-Azran (2010) 
Figure 1 Precise bombing of IS oil trucks 
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showed how, during the US-led attacks on Afghanistan in 2001, CNN focused on the advanced 
military technology of the US airpower and showed the precise bombing of Taliban targets, 
including fuel convoys.  
The US warplanes were shown taking off or flying in the skies. Moreover, AJA showed US pilots 
in their uniform while they were performing their duties. Two of them were interviewed and filmed 
from a medium distance. In figure [3] the pilot gazes at audiences while telling them about the 
mission of the US air forces against IS. This eye interaction between the pilot and viewers is helpful 
since it humanises him. Such images encourage viewers to distinguish between the US-led air 
campaign and Russia’s air campaign in Syria and to consider the US-led role in Syria as legitimate, 
though the voiceover, as noted earlier, emphasised the limited effect of the strikes.  
      
       Figure 3 US pilot on the Aircraft carrier Harry Truman 
As shown below [figure 4], on the US aircraft carrier, the warplanes are surrounded by 




Figure 4  US Aircraft Carrier Harry Truman 
In relation to the visuals of the US-led air strikes, in AJA reports, which portrayed these air strikes 
in north Syria, particularly in Al Hol, Manbij, Al Shaddadeh, and Jarabulus, viewers are invited to 
see panoramic views – wide long shots – in which neither the fighter jets nor their targets are clear. 
Arab audiences can see the smoke or the fumes which are resulted from the reported air strikes 
[figures 5,6]. The verbal texts which accompany both images link them to the US-led air support 
for the SDF in battles against IS. So, it is possible to say that such visual framing of air strikes 
gives the impression that these are sites where intense military actions take place. The absence of 
human agents in the scenes of air strikes, like the ones below, contributes to de-emphasising the 
responsibility of the US coalition in causing human losses. Of course, AJA reports have mentioned 
that the US-led air strikes have caused deaths in Syria, but such verbal references are not 




Figure 5 Smoke as a result of US-led air strikes 
 
Figure 6 Panoramic view of US-led air strikes 
Regarding the portrayal of the US special forces in Syria, these forces were shown on AJA’s screen 
while they were exchanging talks with Kurdish soldiers cordially. In figures [7,8] audiences are 
invited to see two US soldiers, hugging each other. As shown below in figure [7], an American 
soldier is filmed from a medium frontal position. He told the audiences: “I came to support the 
Kurdish forces and SDF. I believe that the areas which they control are the key to peace in the 




 Figure 7 An American soldier in Syria 
 
Figure 8 US soldiers hug each other 
 The images [7, 8] show US soldiers as if they were in a peacekeeping mission. These images 
reflect the soldiers’ humanity apart from their serious and hard mission and draw the viewers’ 
attention away from the human suffering for which the US-led coalition is responsible during this 
war. This is in contrast to AJA coverage of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq where the US forces were 
portrayed consistently as persecutors (Samuel-Azran, 2010). The voiceover which accompanied 
the visuals above described these images as worthy since such images revealed and proved the 
presence of the US forces in the Kurdish areas. At the same time, the voiceover raised questions 
about the US inconsistent policy towards its local partners. 
Furthermore, in this war, AJA did not foreground the vulnerability of the US forces. As I 
mentioned previously, throughout the sample of the study, one report revealed that four US 
military advisors who assisted the SDF in north Syria were killed by IS, but the images which 
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accompanied the voiceover showed material damage in Manbij. The report did not show ima ges 
of US deaths. Thus, the visuals did not reflect the verbal text. This practice is unlike the coverage 
of the war in Iraq, where AJA showed videos of dead US soldiers, lying face up and interviews 
with five others captured by the Iraqi armed groups (Samuel-Azran, 2010) and in Afghanistan, 
where it revealed that a US spy plane was shot by Taliban (Jasperson and Kikhia, 2003).  
Supporting the verbal discourse, the visuals portrayed the close military cooperation between the 
Kurdish-led forces and the US. The American assistance to the Kurdish-led forces was illustrated 
through visuals of military support provided to the SDF, such as the heavy weapons, armoured 








Figure 10 The DSF transfer heavy weapons to the western bank of the Euphrates 




Figure 11 The SDF cross the Euphrates by US vessels                                                  
 
     Figure 12 The SDF’s trainings in Syria 
The SDF appeared in groups in most images, but several soldiers were given voice and 
personalised in a few reports, as shown in figure [13]. The soldier here is framed from a medium 
distance, in his uniform. He is activated; his gaze engages us, and his name and profession appear 
on the screen while he addresses Arab viewers. The soldier’s gaze humanises him and may lead 
audiences to identifying with his anti-IS mission. 
 




    Figure 14 A member of the Syrian opposition 
Like the SDF’s member who appeared in figure [13], the Syrian opposition fighter, shown in figure 
[14] is framed from a medium distance, gazing at audiences. He told them about the opposition’s 
actions which helped put a limit on IS expansion in Syria. In most of the visuals throughout the 
sample, the opposition factions are represented in groups as shown in figure [15]. Also, the visuals 
reflected the lack of US support for the Syrian opposition on the ground, as shown in figure [16]. 
 
 Figure 15 Members of the Free Syrian Army 
 
Figure 16 Syrian opposition factions reach the entrance of Jarablus  
The visual representation of IS fighters accords them power. In most reports, they are portrayed as 
active agents, who have been able to carry out counterattacks and withstand the US-led war. 
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Throughout the sample, they were shown while they were holding their guns on the front line or 
moving in groups, but the goals that they targeted were not clear in the images. They did not wear 
a military uniform. AJA displayed images of IS military parade in north Syria. In such footages, 
viewers are invited to see trucks, which carry military hardware and/or IS members who hold the 
black Islamic State flags, moving along Al Raqqa streets while the voiceover reports the ability of 
IS to launch violent attacks and recruit members. The figures [17,18] below are examples of visuals 
which communicate IS military power. 
  
  Figure 17 IS military parade in north Syria 
 
   Figure 18 Vehicles loaded with IS members and weapons  
Moreover, AJA reproduced images from Al Raqqa, IS headquarter, showing public institutions 
established by IS. The visuals below [19, 20, 21, 22], give the impression that the situation is stable 
in Al Raqqa and Manbij. People walk in streets. AJA did not refer to any manifestations of human 
suffering, that were attributed to IS’s governance system, throughout the sample. Such a portrayal 
shows that IS is a powerful and organised religious community, and this might lead conservative 
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viewers to admire and welcome IS religious governance system (the Caliphate). The verbal texts 
which accompanied such images show that IS is strong enough to withstand the air strikes and 
evoke the need for ground forces to chase IS fighters. This verbal-visual framing is in contrast to 
how the Western media represented IS. For example, the US news media followed a typical 
reporting style that focused on IS’s brutality. They also focused on IS members’ lack of experience 
and training and emphasised the US military strength to confront the danger posed by this 
organisation (Colhoun, 2014; Zelizer, 2016). So, AJA news discourse reflects the Qatari 
reservations and supports the Saudi offer to send troops to Syria. 
 
Figure 19 A view of Manbij city  
 




Figure 21 Shops open in IS-held city of Al Raqqa 
 
       Figure 22 Administrative departments established by IS in Al Raqqa 
                      
The last point in this analysis is the visual representation of losses on the side of IS, the Syrian 
opposition, or the SDF. Throughout the sample of study, no images of dead fighters from these 
groups are found. In relation to the territories which were recaptured from IS in Syria, such as 
Manbij, Al Hol, Al Shaddadi, and Jarabalus, these areas are shown after the withdrawal of IS 
fighters, with focus on material damage as shown in figure (23). No images of IS losses in terms 
of weapons, logistics, or deaths were shown throughout AJA reports, unlike RT’s reports, as will 
be shown later.  
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         Figure 23 Material damage in Al Shaddadi after the withdrawal of IS members 
Thus, the visual framing of the military actions showed images of the local armed groups that 
fought against IS under the US-led coalition air cover but in ways that did not produce a narrative 
of violence. The objects which the military actors targeted were not displayed. They were not 
shown engaged in actual fighting. AJA showed the precise bombing of IS targets by the US-led 
coalition warplanes. That is to say, the US coalition was not framed as a military power that 
targeted non-combatants intentionally in Syria, in contrast to the coverage of the war on 
Afghanistan where, according to Jasperson and Kikhia (2003), AJA framing of the military aspect 
concentrated on the question: “Why is the U.S. targeting civilians who have nothing to do with al 
Qaeda or bin Laden?” (p.127). 
The humanitarian aspect of the US-led intervention 
As I mentioned previously, in wartime, political actors seek to be represented by the media 
positively, in a way that suppresses their responsibility for human suffering and justifies their 
violent actions. So, they need to regulate how viewers see the sufferers and the persecutor. 
According to Butler, “to produce what will constitute the public sphere […] it is necessary to 
control the way in which people see, how they hear, what they see. The constraints are not only on 
content — certain images of dead bodies in Iraq, for instance, are considered unacceptable for 
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public visual consumption — but on what ‘can’ be heard, read, seen, felt and known”, as cited in 
(Chouliaraki, 2005, p. 145).  
AJA is known for its focus on human suffering in areas of conflicts. According to Jasperson and 
Kikhia (2003),“al Jazeera earned the reputation as one of the very few mediums ‘bearing witness’ 
to social and political injustice in the region” (p.128); they quoted Nic Gowing, a presenter on 
BBC, who maintained that the US bombed al Jazeera's offices in Kabul deliberately because "it 
was ‘bearing witness' to events the U.S. would rather it did not see" (p.128). For el-Nawawy 
(2006), in the coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, AJA adopted what Wolfsfeld, Frosh, 
and Awabdy (2005) refer to as the ‘victims mode’ of conflict reporting, when civilian casualties 
and losses occur, in areas that lay within the reporter’s cultural worldview. In the coverage of these 
circumstances, the “weaker antagonists who have been victimised will talk about ‘massacres’ and 
‘war crimes’” (Wolfsfeld et al., 2005, p. 404). This applies to AJA coverage of the wars on 
Afghanistan and Iraq, where the reporters showed the wide scale of destruction and loss of civilian 
lives. It gave voice to the sufferers to demonise their persecutor, which raised questions about the 
US moral justifications of these military interventions. So, AJA coverage was different from CNN 
coverage in that CNN presented a clean or a sanitised image of the US-led military actions, with 
minimal civilian losses (el-Nawawy, 2006; Iskander and El‐Nawawy, 2004; Jasperson and Kikhia, 
2003). For example, in the Iraqi city of Falluja, AJA covered the death of 6000 civilians in US 
strikes, showing commitment to human rights. In response, US officials accused the AJA of being 
the main source of anti-Americanism and endangering the lives of the US soldiers (Samuel-Azran, 
2010).   
I highlight that unlike the previous US-led wars, AJA’s sponsor, Qatar, is part of the US-led 
coalition against IS in Syria, so one may question if AJA would adopt the highly critical 
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humanitarian discourse for which it is known when covering the humanitarian situation in Syria 
in the context of the US-led air campaign against IS. To put it differently, will AJA focus on images 
of casualties and allow the sufferers, particularly children and women, to express themselves and 
demonise the bomber? 
On the Verbal plane 
The analysis will examine how AJA reporters construct the role of the US-led coalition in inflicting 
human suffering in the context of the war against IS in Syria. This includes how the voices of the 
military sources and the civilians are incorporated and how they are portrayed in terms of action 
and agency, to explicate the political or moral implications that are involved in this framing.  
The analysis begins with the representation of the identity of the US-led coalition forces as 
bombers. When covering the humanitarian situation in the areas where the coalition warplanes 
launched air strikes, AJA adopted a reporting style which backgrounds the agency of the coalition 
forces as persecutors. Their identity as bombers was constructed in non-human terms throughout 
the sample.  
AJA’s reporters used metonymy, nominalisation and passive constructions to refer to the coalition 
forces. For example: “The SDF backed by foreign forces have launched an offensive to recapture 
Manbij from IS. Over 300 civilians were killed during this battle, in US-led coalition air strikes” 
(AJA, 8 August 2016). In this example, the reporter used a passive structure, putting the object 
(civilians) in subject position and used metonymy to refer to the agent. Also, the reporter used a 
preposition that helps blur the responsibility of the US-led coalition for human suffering, as 
civilians were reported to have been killed during clashes and in [not by] US-led air strikes against 
IS. This language choice gives the impression that these people were killed unintentionally. In this 
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way, AJA helps mitigate the involvement of US-led coalition in inflicting human suffering in 
Syria.  
This reporting style was common. Another report read: “US-led aerial bombardment, as well as 
ground battles, resulted in more than 400 civilian deaths while dozens were injured. Half of the 
deaths were killed in a US-led air strike on Manbij” (AJA, 12 August 2016). In this text, the 
reporter used nominalisation and passive voice to background the identity of the involved forces. 
One text stood in contrast as AJA used the strong language of “massacre” while reporting about 
civilian deaths caused by the US-led coalition. The voiceover reported: “The death toll has reached 
more than 450, of whom 220 were killed as a result of the US-led coalition’s air strikes. The biggest 
massacre was in Tukhar Kabir village where more than 200 civilians were killed” (AJA, 11 August 
2016). This was the only occasion throughout the sample when AJA used the negative term 
“massacre.”   
It is noticeable that AJA referred to the sufferers’ identity as “civilians” which is a collective 
reference, that demilitarises these sufferers and emphasises their status as illegitimate targets in 
this conflict. However, the sufferers (deaths, injuries) in the abovementioned examples were 
dehumanised since they were aggregated to a form of numbers (450, 220). They were represented 
as a homogenous group, with no reference to their names or specific personal identities (such as 
age and gender); these specifications if added would help generate more sympathy towards them 
as humans. The above-mentioned verbal references to deaths were not supported by visuals. It is 
noteworthy that AJA’s framing of civilian casualties resulting from the US-led coalition’s 
airstrikes was less critical than the representation of deaths caused by Russia in Syria. That is to 
say, the casualties resulting from Russian air strikes were personalised and visualised. So, viewers 
115 
 
can find information about the sufferers’ identities, such as their names, gender, ages, origins. [the 
coverage of Russia’s role in Syria will be discussed later]. 
AJA mentioned that children and women were killed in US-led air strikes only on one occasion, 
throughout the sample. The voiceover reported: “More than 30 civilians, including children and 
women, were reported to have been killed in US-led air strikes on the towns of Al Ghandora and 
Rabita in Manbij.” The voiceover added: 
IS-affiliated Amaq news agency has broadcast images showing the results of the strikes, 
but AJA refrains from displaying such images fully for they are horrific. The US central 
command announced it opened an investigation in relation to reports about victims targeted 
by an air strike near Manbij, but it has not received any confirmations in this regard yet 
(AJA, 29 July 2016).  
In this text, AJA referred to the sufferers’ specific identities as women and children and used a 
lexical choice that reflected their vulnerability, being “civilian victims.” This contextualization 
contributes to humanising the sufferers and helps raise the moral demand to take actions to 
alleviate the suffering of the Syrians. Nonetheless, the report brought to viewers’ attention that the 
US reacted responsibly and opened an investigation concerning this event. This involves a classic 
move to soften responsibility for deaths – it opens up the possibility that there might be a 
reasonable explanation (even if there is no evidence for that possibility). Furthermore, the 
voiceover reported that AJA chose not to remediate Amaq’s images which show the results of US 
bombing for reasons that have something to do with public decency. However, it is noteworthy 
that AJ, on both its Arabic and English channels, broadcast reports showing horrific images of 
deaths who were reported to have been killed by chemical weapons used by Al Assad regime. AJ’s 
journalists warned audiences that such reports contained distressing images. These reports 
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included, for example, images of dead people or children who were stripped off and who struggled 
for breath in hospitals (AJ, 2016).  
Another event which is reported in a way that softens the responsibility of the US-led coalition for 
human suffering is the death of civilians in US-led coalition air strikes on Manbij, where AJA 
reported:  
A few days ago, the US-led coalition warplanes killed dozens of civilians in Tukhar. 
According to local sources, civilian casualties occurred because the SDF had intentionally 
provided the US-led coalition with misleading information about IS positions, with the aim 
to get rid of the Arab population in the village; however, the SDF denied such accusations 
and said that IS used civilians as human shields (AJA, 23 July 2016).  
In this example, although the first sentence established a causal link between the US-led coalition 
and the death of civilians, the next sentence provided an explanation that helps relieve the coalition 
of such a moral responsibility. On the one hand, the SDF was blamed, by locals, for causing this 
death toll intentionally after providing misleading information about IS positions. On the other 
hand, IS was accused by the SDF of using civilians as human shields. AJA showed evidence of 
balance as it incorporated conflicting truth claims; in the light of these claims, the US-led coalition 
was not held responsible for intentionally killing civilians. The report did not include civilian 
testimonies which blamed IS, the SDF or the coalition forces for the reported deaths. Also, no 
images of deaths were shown in the report. 
In contrast to its typical reporting style that shows commitment to human rights and focuses on 
suffers’ voices in conflict zones, AJA did not give the civilians in the areas where the US-led 
coalition operated much space to show their suffering and demonise the bomber. Refugees from 
these areas were interviewed in two reports throughout the sample. In one of these reports, the 
voiceover commented: “Most residents of Al Shaddadi, who are estimated at 40,000 people, have 
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fled the town as the US-led coalition warplanes have begun to target the city; the displaced people 
wish to return to their homes safely after the end of the military operations.” Then, a young man 
was interviewed; he said: “People fled to Thahara and Rabia” (AJA, 10 March 2016). 
 In the other report, the voiceover commented: “According to local sources in Manbij, the 
humanitarian situation has been aggravated due to the ongoing clashes as well as the siege imposed 
on the city by the SDF.” Then, an old man addressed the viewers saying: “The situation is 
miserable, people suffer from hunger and fear” (AJA, 29 July 2016). These sufferers complain 
about the situation in general; what they say can be said about the humanitarian situation in other 
places such as Yemen or Iraq. They did not talk about the particularity of their suffering, and they 
did not refer to their persecutor. Also, the interviewees are unknown; the reports did not tell 
anything about their personal characteristics. As the sufferers have not blamed the US coalition or 
its allies for their misfortune, this limits viewers’ identification with their suffering. Also, such a 
portrayal does not suggest any way of engagement with the reported misfortune. Generally, it is 
safe to say that, throughout AJA reports, the suffering of civilians in the context of the US-led war 
was addressed but consistently softened.  
Beside causalities, a similar textual strategy was apparent in the way AJA showed the material 
damage resulting from the US-led coalition air strikes which paved the way for the SDF to progress 
in north Syria. The reporting of material damage recurred in many news texts in the sample. As 
shown in the following examples, AJA used nominalisation in the subject position which 
backgrounds the identity of the aggressor. It reported: “The US aerial bombings caused huge 
material damage, resulting in the destruction of 7 schools, 9 mosques, 3 central hospitals, bakeries 
as well as most of the bridges in the city” (AJA, 12 August 2016). Another report read: “The living 
conditions of about 100,000 people in Manbij is becoming increasingly difficult after the closure 
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of bakeries due to the US-led coalition air strikes” (AJA, 24 June 2016). In these texts, AJA 
established a causal link between the damage caused to civilian infrastructure and US-led air 
power, but it used nominalisation to background the bomber’s agency.   
Throughout the sample, the Syrian opposition forces were not blamed for human suffering when 
AJA communicated their military actions against IS, and no civilian voices were given access to 
express their suffering. In terms of material damage, AJA reported that the damage occurred in IS-
held positions. One journalist took the position of an eyewitness, reporting: “We entered some 
villages which were recaptured by the opposition factions from IS, and we saw IS positions that 
got destroyed as a result of the coalition air strikes. IS left mines everywhere, and the inhabitants 
are waiting for the opposition factions to remove them” (AJA, 9 June 2016). 
 In this text, the destroyed areas were specified as IS-held positions. Unlike the SDF, that were 
reported to have provided the US coalition with misleading information, and they were accused of 
causing civilian deaths, the Syrian opposition factions were represented as benefactors who help 
the displaced return safely to their homes. Similarly, one report read: “Tens of civilians have 
started to return to Jarabulus after the opposition factions had recaptured the city. Locals said 
preparations have started to receive the refugees who wish to return from Turkey” (AJA, 27 August 
2016). Then, the US-backed Syrian factions which are allies of Qatar were not blamed for human 
suffering in the course of the war on IS, as far as the sample provides evidence for. 
Thus, in contrast to AJA’s longstanding discourse of demanding accountability for human 
suffering and its focus on identifiable victims, who were given space to tell their stories in the 
coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, this news channel adopted a softer tone vis-à-vis the 
US-led coalition in Syria. The bomber is dehumanised through the use of metonymy or 
nominalisation. In many reports, AJA used the passive voice, so the subject [the bomber] was 
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delayed. The sufferers were represented through collective references in most stories: even those 
who were interviewed and individualised did not hold the coalition accountable for their suffering. 
The soft tone towards the US-led intervention can also be noticed in the way the human suffering 
was visualised as will be discussed below. 
On the visual plane 
Throughout the sample, when AJA reported about civilian deaths resulting from the US-led 
coalition air strikes, these verbal references lacked the power of pictorial presence. This is to say 
the reports did not show images of dead people. According to Zelizer (2005), the political and/or 
cultural context in which news organisations operate determines how they deal with images of 
deaths. She recalls: 
It's perfectly acceptable, if not mundane, to show piles of skulls in Rwanda or a skeletal 
and swollen-bellied African baby on the verge of death. . . . Except last year, when the 
bombs were crashing down on Iraq and houses were flattened, their inhabitants incinerated, 
the very same networks and newspapers [in the US] that proclaimed their high moral 
ground and concern for reader sensibilities refrained from running pictures of the civilian 
casualties (Zelizer, 2005, p. 10).   
This argument can be applied to AJA framing of the human suffering inflicted by the US-led 
coalition, which includes Qatar, in Syria.  
In contrast to its common reporting style in conflict areas, AJA did not show deaths when it 
reported, for example, that the US-led coalition warplanes had killed dozens of civilians in Tukhar 
village. The accompanying images showed a group of men digging in the rubble, without 
specifying whether they were digging bodies out or searching for possessions. As shown in figure 
[24] men are filmed from a long distance, and most of them are filmed with their backs to the 
camera. So, they are passive, as they do not have eye interaction with Arab viewers. This limits 
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viewers’ engagement with their suffering. However, in the footage, there are some indications of 
human suffering, such as images of blood drops on a mattress [figure 25].  Zelizer (2005) maintains 
that by hiding images of deaths in wartime, news organizations can obscure “the more problematic 
finality of death itself. No surprise, then, that images are used in the news with varying degrees of 
detail” about what is reported (p. 14).   
  
      Figure 24 Men dig through rubble in Nawaja village 
      
     
    Figure 25 Blood on a mattress 
As mentioned above, the verbal texts which anchored these images reported that the bombardment 
of residential areas occurred because the SDF had intentionally provided the US-led coalition with 
misleading information about IS positions in the village to get rid of the Arab population, according 
to local sources. This justification contributes to relieve the US-led coalition of the responsibility 
for killing civilians intentionally or carelessly. 
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Moreover, when the voiceover reported about “a massacre” in which the US-led coalition air 
strikes killed about 200 civilians in Manbij, the images which appeared on the screen have nothing 
to do with these verbal references. The report did not include visuals of deaths or injuries. This 
contrasts with AJA’s coverage of the US-led war in Afghanistan. For example, when AJA reported 
that 200 Afghans had been killed in US-led air strikes, this channel broadcast scenes “from the 
village of Ismarzi where 200 of its 1500 inhabitants died. The dead had to be interred in mass 
graves and the remaining inhabitants had to leave and seek shelter because no structure remained 
standing in the village” (Jasperson and Kikhia, 2003, p. 128). 
As discussed previously on one occasion AJA has given an excuse for choosing not to show deaths, 
as a practice of decency and good taste censorship. In parallel with the voiceover, audiences are 
invited to see the material damage resulting from the bombing, such as the image shown below 
[figure 26]. However, as mentioned above, AJA showed shocking images from Syria, when Al 
Assad has been accused of using chemical weapons against his people. 
 
 Figure 26 Burning truck as a result of US-led air strikes 
Moreover, throughout the sample, AJA did not broadcast images of people who lamented the loss 
of their family members to support the verbal texts that refer to the responsibility of the US-led 
coalition for killing civilians. This softened framing is in contrast to AJA coverage of the war in 
Afghanistan where, according to Jasperson and Kikhia (2003),  
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Some of the most disturbing videos of the campaign were those that specifically dealt with 
the personal lives of Afghanis that lost loved ones (…) One such image was presented of 
an Afghani who had lost fifteen members of his family in a bombed building in Kabul… 
Video footage showing the man searching for his relatives in the rubble was enough to 
make viewers empathize with his pain” (p.128). 
A news report included images of injuries that were reported to have occurred as a result of clashes 
between IS and the SDF (not in air strikes). Also, it showed men carrying a dead body, and the 
voiceover mentioned that IS, and the SDF exchanged accusations about the responsibility for the 
casualties. In figures [27, 28], the injured do not look at the camera. In figure [29] audiences do 
not see any part of the body of the dead person. They do not know anything about the identity of 
these casualties. This portrayal tends to dehumanise them and again distance viewers.  
 
    Figure 27  Injured man in north Syria 
 




    Figure 29 A civilian killed in confrontations in north Syria 
As mentioned earlier, the Syrian opposition factions were not blamed for inflicting human 
suffering, according to the sample.  
Another important point in the visual analysis is the portrayal of the displaced people: when AJA 
represented these sufferers, they were portrayed in groups. That is to say, their personal and 
individual identities were assimilated into a collective one as shown in figures [30,31,32]. In figure 
[30], the sufferers are filmed with their back to the camera as if they are not aware of being filmed. 
In some images like figure [31] they are filmed frontally, but there is no zoom on their faces. Also, 
the images [30,31,32] do not show active interaction among the sufferers themselves or the 
surrounding environment. So, although they are visible on the screen, these sufferers lack the 
appellative power to communicate their misfortune. 
 




     Figure 31  People flee their villages in Manbij 
 
   Figure 32 Panoramic view of internally displaced persons in Syria 
As I mentioned previously, only in two reports, sufferers were interviewed. They are filmed from 
a medium distance as shown in figures [33, 34]. In their testimonies, these people talk about 
difficult living conditions in Syria in general. 
 




Figure 34 A refugee from Manbij 
Also, AJA broadcast images showing streets in Manbij as well as other places empty, after their 
inhabitants had to flee, as shown below in figures [35,36].  
 
  Figure 35 Empty streets in Al Shaddadi 
 
 Figure 36 Empty areas in Manbij      





Figure 37 Material damage as a result of US-led air strikes in Northern Syria 
 
 
Figure 38 Material destruction caused by US-led coalition air strikes in Manbij 
When AJA reported that the US bombardment hit civilian infrastructure, including 7 schools, 9 
mosques, 3 central hospitals, and bakeries, the accompanying images did not show destroyed 
hospitals, schools, or mosques. So, the surveyed losses lacked the power of pictorial presence. 
Again, this contrasts with its reporting from Afghanistan where “Al Jazeera's footage showed the 
impact of U.S. bombing on mosques. The footage depicted destroyed mosques and pictures of torn 
Qurans laying amidst the rubble.” Also, AJA “aired video footage of the destruction of radio 
transmitters' antennas, burning Red Cross depots' housing grain and other food supplies, as well 
as many dead and wounded civilians” (Jasperson and Kikhia, 2003, p. 127). 
Thus, the sample provides evidence that in the visual framing of the humanitarian aspect of the 
US-led war in Syria, AJA exercised the power of excluding imagery of casualties as well as 
material losses in medical centres, or religious places that were hit by the US-led air strikes. The 
127 
 
taking sides, in line with Qatar policy, connects to the way AJA combined the verbal and visual 
elements to introduce the identity of the sufferers and their persecutors to the public. On the one 
hand, the bomber is consistently represented in non-human terms such as metonymic expressions, 
nominalisation. On the other hand, the sufferers are dehumanised and reduced to numbers. 
Generally, the sufferers lacked the appellative power. This may limit the potential for emotional 
engagement with the suffering of the Syrians and the denunciatory feeling against the bomber. 
Like the deaths, the sufferings of families, particularly, the widowed and orphans were concealed 
according to the sample. AJA did not take the audiences to homes, hospitals, or shelters where 
sufferers may tell their stories and blame the US-led coalition for their calamity. Finally, I would 
like to mention that this research is not intended primarily to compare AJA’s framing of the US-
led war in Syria with its coverage of the previous US-led wars, but I used Jasperson and Kikhia’s 
study on AJA’s coverage of the US-led war on Afganstan to show evidence of AJA dependence 
on its government. Due to Qatar’s involvement in the US-led coalition against IS, the US-led 
intervention in Syria was represented, by this channel, less critically than the US-led war against 










6.2 The representation of Russia’s military intervention in Syria   
It was mentioned in the background of this study that when Russia declared war on IS in 
cooperation with the Syrian regime, Qatar was among the countries that criticised the Russian 
strikes on Syria. In what follows, I examine how AJA covered Russia’s military intervention in 
the light of Qatar’s policy. 
The governance aspect of the Russian intervention  
In this section, I discuss how AJA represented local and international support for the Kremlin’s 
intervention in Syria. So, the analysis will look at which voices are quoted from Russia, and how 
the Russian official claims are incorporated in relation to other sources and in relation to 
journalists’ voices. It shows how the international voices that support the Russian intervention are 
incorporated, how those which criticise it are textured, and what messages are promoted through 
the news texts.  
When representing the Russian stance, AJA quoted the voices of the Russian President, Putin, and 
the minister of foreign affairs, Lavrov. The reports referred to consensus among the Russian 
official institutions on intervention in Syria.  However, in all reports that tackled the Russian policy 
throughout the sample, the voices of the Kremlin officials and their Syrian allies were followed by 
critical messages which evaluated the Russian cooperation with the Syrian regime in the name of 
the war on IS negatively or contested the Kremlin’s claims. That is to say, AJA followed a typical 
ordering of voices when structuring the news texts and incorporating Russian and Syrian sources 
in relation to other sources. It is noteworthy that this is same reporting strategy which AJA used 
to promote dissent in the US regarding the White House war policy; I showed previously how the 
voices of the White House officials were followed by dissenting local voices.  
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In the following examples, the way in which the Russian and Syrian voices are ordered in relation 
to other voices in the news texts gives the impression that there is an ‘antagonist–protagonist’ 
structuring which effectively sets the out-group -Russia and the Syrian government- versus the in-
group- politicians from around the world. 
One of AJA reports read: “President Putin obtained the parliament’s approval to use of military 
power abroad in response to a request by the Syrian President for urgent support. Then, Russia 
launched air strikes in Syria. The Russians said they targeted eight IS-held positions with twenty 
air strikes.” Putin was shown saying: “We will not become mired in the Syrian conflict. This 
military operation is limited in time. The Russian Air Force will help Al Assad's army in the war 
against the terrorist organisations. There will be no boots on the ground.” The voiceover continued: 
“Russian officials say the strikes are intended to support the Syrian president against IS. Kerry 
warned that the fight against IS should not be confused with support for the Syrian President 
Bashar Al-Assad.” Then, Kerry was shown saying: 
 We have also made clear that we would have grave concerns should Russia strike areas 
where ISIL and al Qaeda affiliated targets are not operating. Strikes of that kind would 
question Russia's real intentions-fighting ISIL or protecting the Assad regime. Most 
countries are aware that IS will not be defeated as long as Al Assad remains the President 
of Syria. 
 The voiceover added: “Like the Americans, the French and the British appear to have doubts about 
the true intentions of the Russian move” (AJA, 1 October 2015). In this contextualisation, Kerry’s 
statement was framed as a warning which involves a negative response from a powerful or 
authoritative person. AJA’s reporting style shows balanced coverage since the reporter promotes 
the voices of the superpowers equally. This framing portrays Russia as ‘other’ and reinforces the 
position of the US whose view was reported to have been shared by other Western countries.  
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In another news text, the voiceover reported: “Russia called for the formation of a broad 
international coalition under the auspice of the UN to fight against IS and said this effort should 
be accompanied by a political process that ensures the survival of Al Assad regime in Syria.” Then, 
Lavrov was shown saying: “We support Dimestora’s efforts, and we will support a political 
process that involves representatives from all parties. There is a need for a comprehensive 
counterterrorism plan which involves the USA, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, the 
UAE, Jordan and the EU.” The voiceover commented: “The Americans replied that the US-led 
coalition is already active, and there is no need for the Russian suggestion.” Kerry was shown 
saying: “If Russia’s recent actions and those now ongoing reflect a genuine commitment to defeat 
that organisation, then we are prepared to welcome those efforts;" he added: "But we must not and 
will not be confused in our fight against ISIL with support for Assad." After that, the Syrian 
minister of foreign affairs, Walid Al Mua’lim was quoted as saying: “Those who seek to encounter 
terrorism need to coordinate with the Syrian government.” His voice was followed by the Qatari 
voice. The minister of foreign affairs of Qatar commented: “We express our concerns and 
condemnation for this unjustifiable action. We invite the countries which intervene militarily in 
Syria to take the side of the Syrian people against the regime which has committed more crimes 
than the terrorist organisations” (AJA, 3 October 2015). 
The structuring of voices in this text sets the in-group [the US and Qatar] versus the out-group 
[Russia and the Syrian regime]. AJA shows that Qatar and the US hold a similar stance in Syria 
and reports precisely their shared critical views regarding Russia’s cooperation with the Syrian 
regime.  
Both examples follow the same ordering of voices in which the Russian officials were quoted in 
the first part of the report and the US officials in the following part. In this contextualisation, the 
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Russian and Syrian officials were framed critically by others, inviting Arab audience to see them 
as part of a ‘them’ category rather than ‘us.’ 
This pattern was repeated in other reporting on Russian actions involving other countries. In 
particular, the critical Saudi stance towards the Russian move was promoted. AJA reported: “Saudi 
officials have expressed concerns about the Russian military operations in Syria and have insisted 
on the departure of Al Assad.” The Saudi foreign minister was shown saying: “We will continue 
to support the Syrian opposition.” Then, Lavrov said: “We are required to increase military and 
intelligence cooperation.” The voiceover commented: “This diplomatic visit has taken place while 
Russia has intensified its strikes against the opposition-held areas.” A political expert was also  
quoted in the report, giving further credence to the Saudi view: “The Russian move aims to change 
the situation in favour of the Syrian regime. The Russian strikes increased when the Syrian army 
and its allies from Hezbollah and Iran resumed their military actions. But it is not clear if Russia 
will succeed in that effort” (AJA, 12 October 2015). The quoted voices raised concerns about 
Russia’s role in the Syrian internal conflict while the reporter stated clearly that the Russian strikes 
targeted the opposition factions.  
Also, indirectly quoted voices were reported to promote dissent for Russian-Syrian cooperation. 
The voice of the Syrian opposition was incorporated along with international actors in criticising 
Russia’s intervention upon the request of the Syrian regime. AJA reported: “Moscow says it has 
destroyed IS infrastructure and supply routes. Russian officers have reported that hundreds of IS 
fighters fled their territories, trying to return to Europe.” Then the voiceover added: “But, the 
British minister of defence highlighted that only one in 20 Russian air strikes in Syria targeted IS. 
The British Prime Minister has considered the air strikes as a terrible mistake since they have 
supported what he described a criminal regime, asserting that such strikes hit areas where IS targets 
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were not operating.” The voiceover continued: “The opposition factions affirmed that their 
positions were targeted by Russian strikes” (AJA, 4 October 2015).  
Throughout the previous examples, a wide coalition is implied as AJA promoted a negative 
opinion climate about Russia’s role in Syria. The US, the UK, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
opposition factions criticised Russia’s cooperation with the Syrian regime, so it can be said that a 
commonsense position is constructed where everyone who is not on the regime and its allies’ side 
agrees. In this way, AJA may help unintentionally reinforce the US position as a global power and 
to reproduce a US-dominated worldview, inviting audiences to align with that world order which 
has been destabilised after the Russian involvement in Syria and other crises around the world. 
According to Weimann and Winn (1994), the media report stories about terrorism in a way that 
reproduces power relations in their societies and maintains the existing world order. The analysis 
of AJA’s reporting of Syria supports this critique. 
Dissent was also represented in some reports in the sample, through metonymy and nominalisation 
to communicate international criticism and reinforce the established political blocs. For example, 
AJA reported: “The Russian President visited the Elysee as tensions between his country and 
France have flared, due to Russia’s decision to bombard Syria and accusations by Paris that this 
intervention is aimed at strengthening Al Assad regime only” (AJA, 2 October 2015). In this text, 
Russia was reported to have bombed Syria not IS. This framing gives the impression that Russia 
has led war against the Syrian people not IS targets. Moreover, unlike the previous examples where 
AJA quoted certain officials, allowing them to frame the debate, in the above example, the reporter 
used metonymy and nominalisation, but no official source was quoted as directing accusations at 
Russia. As mentioned previously, nominalisation enables reporters to avoid agency and time when 
reporting information for there is no verb that can communicate the time of the event; also, 
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nominalisation makes the news language imprecise and turns people’s talk into objects and so 
beyond questioning. In the next example, the reporter also used metonymy and nominalisation to 
refer to Western reservations towards the Russian military involvement in Syria. According to the 
report: “Paris accepts the need to cooperate with Moscow on three conditions: Bombing IS and al 
Qaeda affiliated targets exclusively, ensuring the safety of civilians, and launching a political 
process that leads to the removal of Al Assad.” However, the journalist provided her evaluation at 
the end of the text, accusing the Russian forces openly of having intervened in Syria to ensure the 
survival of Al Assad regime primarily rather than fighting IS. She says: “The third condition cannot 
be attained since the Russian army have already moved to ensure the survival of Al Assad regime 
above all” (AJA, 13 October 2015). So, the journalist chose to add a comment that reflected the 
voice of the ruling elites in Qatar.   
A clear pattern emerges that AJA communicated critical responses towards Russia and Syria. That 
picture is reinforced by the absence, in these examples, and throughout the sample, of quotations 
from supportive voices like Iran or Hezbollah. To delegitimise the role of Russia, the voice of 
civilians and their suffering in Syria were instead employed as a political force to raise the moral 
demand to stop the Russian action, and this is part of the strong humanitarian discourse for which 
AJA is known when reporting conflicts. In one of the reports, a Syrian activist was filmed while 
he was addressing a crowd of people who participated in a protest against Russia’s military 
intervention. The activist who called for fighting against Russia said: “I will carry my soul in my 
hand and throw it in the valleys of death. It is either a life that makes a friend happy or a death that 
makes Russia angry.” Then the voiceover commented: “This is the response of the residents of 
Ma'arat al-Nu'man towards the strikes launched on their city by Russian warplanes. The residents 
organised a demonstration to condemn the crimes committed by the so-called ‘new killers.’ The 
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demonstrators have emphasised the war on IS is a pretext to kill their children” (AJA, 2 November 
2015). In this text, the term “residents,” as a collective reference, implies that all the people in 
Ma'arat al-Nu'man stand against Russia’s military intervention. So, the reporter used imprecise 
language and spoke for all the residents, rather than showing different views from the Syrian 
society. The exclusion of supportive voices in this example and throughout the sample carries an 
ideological signification. By suppressing these voices, AJA helps reinforce the stance of Qatar and 
its allies towards the Russian intervention and justify their concerns about the motivations of 
Russia, in Syria. The reported demonstration is framed as a reaction against Russia’s military 
campaign. The reporter made lexical choices that carry negative values such as “to condemn,” 
“crimes”; this framing involves a discourse of denunciation which portrays Russia as a persecutor. 
He distanced himself from the term “new killers.” The voice of civilians is reported non-
specifically to frame the Russian war as a ‘pretext’ to kill Syrian children. This contextualisation 
puts Russia in the position of a criminal, and it mobilises Arab public opinion against it particularly 
when audiences hear that Russia has been accused of killing children in the name of the war on IS.  
Moreover, AJA chose to promote protests organised by people in different countries against the 
Russian actions in Syria, as the voiceover reported: “The London-based Syria Solidarity Campaign 
organised a protest in front of the Russian embassy. The protesters condemned the bombing of a 
hospital run by Doctors Without Borders, calling on the UN to put an end to the suffering of 
civilians in Aleppo. In the capital of the Netherlands, dozens gathered in front of the Russian 
embassy in solidarity with Aleppo which has been targeted by Russian as well as Syrian warplanes. 
In Istanbul, Turkish and Syrian people participated in a sit-in, protesting against the massacres 
which are committed against the innocent people in Syria and the silence of the international 
community towards such massacres” (AJA, 13 April 2016). The text includes lexical choices that 
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hold Russia accountable for human suffering in Syria, and it makes the Russian intervention 
morally questionable. The references to attacks on a hospital which has nothing to do with IS 
targets as well as massacres against “innocent” civilians encourage Arab audiences to identify with 
the Syrian people and identify with the protesters themselves, who were reported to have 
condemned and stood against the military actions led by Russia and its allies in Syria. Then, AJA 
invites audiences to take a position against Russia and its allies (through the discourse of 
denunciation which establishes clearly the identity of aggressors and victims). It is noteworthy that 
there is no Russian response cited in the report. So, in contrast to the reports that include Russian 
claims, the civilians’ claims are not followed by Russian counterclaims. This reporting style 
recurred in many reports in the sample. The multiplicity of place, as the report refers to mass 
protests in different countries, reflects an international opinion climate that rejects Russia’s 
intervention in Syria.  
So, in the light of the above mentioned, it is clear that AJA’s reporters used official and non-official 
voices as well as metonymy and nominalisation to communicate a climate of dissatisfaction over 
Russia’s policies. It emphasised that the war on IS is a pretext under which the Russian forces 
attacked Syria to ensure the survival of Al Assad above all. It can be said that this portrayal is in 
line with international coverage (outside Russian or its allied media).  
Comparing AJA framing of the governance aspects in relation to the riva l interventions, the 
analysis showed that AJA reflected internal dissent in the US over Obama’s counterterrorism 
policies in Syria. It promoted voices that referred to the inadequacy of the US war strategy and 
called for a more active role against Al Assad and his allies as well as IS. Nominalisation and 
metonymical expressions were used to communicate disagreements between the US and its Arab 
and Western partners over the war policy. The voice of civilians was not used throughout the 
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sample to raise the demand to stop the US-led war. In the portrayal of the Russian intervention, 
the claims made by Russian or Syrian officials were followed by voices that criticised Russia’s 
move in Syria. Nominalisation and metonymy were also used in this meaning-making process. 
The reporters made negative lexical choices when representing the Russian role in Syria. AJA used 
the voice of civilians to frame the Russian actions in terms of human suffering. So, whereas AJA 
discourse raises the need for the US-led coalition to do more to encounter IS, it evokes the need 
for an action to stop Russia’s “crimes” in Syria. This discourse, which operates within the 
boundaries of Qatar’s policy, contributes to mobilising Arab viewers against Russia since it gives 
the impression that this superpower waged a war on the Syrian people. 
The military aspect of the Russian intervention 
In what follows, I discuss how AJA used verbal and visual elements to construct the Russian and 
Syrian military roles in the light of the Kremlin’s claim that its military campaign targets IS and 
Qatar’s critical stance towards this move. 
On the verbal plane   
In this section, I examine how AJA portrays the Russian air campaign in Syria and reports the anti-
IS operations that are conducted by Syrian governmental forces, backed by Russia. So, the analysis 
covers how the Russian and Syrian troops are represented in terms of actions and agency and how 
their voices are incorporated in relation to other sources or in relation to the journalists’ voices. It 
explores whether non-official voices are used to evaluate the role of the military actors involved 
and whether the military dimension is reported differently to the negatively evaluated political 
aspect.  
The analysis begins with the framing of the Russian air campaign. AJA framed the military power 
used by Russia, in a way that raises questions about the legitimacy of that campaign.  
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In this meaning-making process, the Russian claims are followed by counterclaims, attributed to 
rival military sources, or non-official sources, or factual claims provided by AJA’s reporters, 
deemphasising Russia’s role in the war against IS. Moreover, AJA emphasised the use of 
internationally prohibited bombs by the Russian forces in Syria and framed their military actions 
in terms of human suffering.  
For example, a Russian officer was shown, saying: “We have accomplished all the combat 
missions assigned to us, and we have not targeted any civilian objects.” Then, the voiceover 
commented: “Sources from the Syrian opposition factions revealed the air strikes hit areas far away 
from IS positions and have resulted in civilian deaths, including women and children.” It added a 
nominalisation: “Indications show that Russia has intervened in Syria for different reasons and 
that its military operations, which concentrate currently in the North and West of Syria, very far 
from IS-held positions, may become part of more comprehensive military operations with long 
term goals” (AJA, 8 October 2015). Like the framing of the governance aspect, in this text the 
structuring of voices invites viewers to see the Russian forces as part of a ‘them’ category rather 
than an ‘us’: the Russians “said” they targeted IS while the Syrian oppositions “revealed” the 
complicity of Russia in targeting areas where IS fighters did not operate. The reporter used 
nominalisation to add information that supports the claims made by the opposition factions without 
that support having to be made explicit.    
Similarly, in another report, the spokesperson of the Russian ministry of defence Igor 
Konashenkov was shown saying: “I would like to highlight that we have not targeted civilian 
infrastructure,” but immediately the reporter said: “But images circulated by Syrian civilians tell 
a different story; the goal of Russia’s military campaign is to protect Al Assad under the pretext 
of fighting IS”  (AJA, 2 October 2015). The Russian version is not only contrasted but explicitly 
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contradicted, using a metatextual reporting style. The reporter not only shows images but also talks 
about them. 
Also, AJA reported: “Five civilians were killed as a result of Russian air strikes in Talbisa and 
Ghirnata, in Homs countryside. In the meantime, Russian warplanes targeted the old city in Latakia 
countryside and Jisr Alshughur town in Idlib. There were no IS targets operating in these areas. 
All the targeted positions were under the control of the opposition factions and the Free Army.” A 
soldier in the Free Army was interviewed; he said: “We repositioned our forces and moved away 
from residential areas.” Then, the voiceover added: “The Syrian news agency, SANA, reported the 
Russian defence ministry as saying its warplanes had targeted 20 positions held by IS in different 
areas, including Ma'arat al-Nu'man city.” Nonetheless, the reporter commented: “This is one of 
the misleading claims circulated by Russian and Syrian sources. Ma'arat al-Nu'man is more than 
150 km away from IS positions in Idlib” (AJA, 4 October 2015). Moreover, AJA reported: 
“Russia’s warplanes have continued to target different places, in Syria, particularly the 
countrysides of Homs, Idlib, and Latakia, using new bombs. Activists circulated images showing 
Russian jets dropping bombs whose type has been unknown yet. The bombing resulted in dozens 
of deaths among civilians as well as the Free Syrian Army personnel and caused huge material 
damage.” The voiceover added: “The Russian air campaign appears focused on civilian targets as 
well as the positions held by the Syrian opposition to ensure the survival of Al Assad. However, 
few strikes have targeted IS-held territories, but they hit empty areas where there are no IS training 
camps or headquarters” (AJA, 6 cotober 2015). Five days after the start of the Russian intervention 
in Syria, one reporter commented: “For the first time, Russian air strikes have targeted positions 
held by IS in the north and west of Al Qaryatain town, causing civilian casualties” (AJA, 4 October 
2015). This contextualisation implies that the air strikes that occurred before that attack did not 
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target IS. Also, this anti-IS operation is contextualised in terms of human suffering, rather than 
showing its effect on IS. 
In the above texts, AJA reporters incorporated opposing truth claims as an indication of balanced 
coverage, but they added negative evaluations about Russia’s role. They used impersonal reporting 
style [indications or images show] to background their voices as they report information, which 
deemphasises Russia’s contribution to the war against IS. AJA’s reporters referred to the human 
suffering resulting from Russia’s strikes or described the spatial characteristics of the targeted area 
as being away from IS positions, showing that Syrian and Russian sources provide “misleading 
information.” Also, the visual narrative works against the Russian claims as I will explain later. 
So, the Russian actions were contextualised in terms of human suffering and hostility towards the 
Syrian rebels primarily, and the Russian claims were undermined in every story that their bombing 
was discussed throughout the sample. Only one text stood in contrast as will be shown below.  
 In response to the Russian air strikes, IS was portrayed as an active actor that was able to expand 
after the Russian intervention. For example, one report read: 
Russia has announced that its air campaign seeks to destroy IS, yet after the Russian 
military intervention, the organisation has captured strategic areas in Aleppo. According to 
SANA, the Russian ministry of defence said it had launched 60 strikes against IS positions, 
but it also said the organisation took control over strategic areas in the northern countryside 
of Aleppo (AJA, 9 December 2015).  
This was the only occasion in the sample when a Russian claim was not followed by a 
counterclaim. Another reporter commented: “Russia’s air strikes have provided an opportunity for 
IS to reposition its members and to expand. IS fighters have taken control over several villages 
and towns between Izzaz and Mare” (AJA, 26 November 2015).     
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In the context of delegitimising Russia’s air campaign, AJA promoted information about the types 
of weapons used by the Russian forces in Syria; the reporters brought to audiences’ attention that 
Russia used internationally prohibited bombs. In this framing, it incorporated the voice of human 
rights organisations and activists as well as international media sources. For example, one report 
read:  
Activists showed images of incendiary bombs fired by Russian warplanes in Khan Al 
Assal. Moscow has denied this accusation, but Russian media broadcast footage of Sergei 
Shoigu, the Russian defence minister, visiting Hmeimim airbase in Latakia and showed a 
pilot standing next to a strike fighter which carried bombs. Experts confirmed to the UK 
Daily Telegraph that these were incendiary bombs. 
To further delegitimise the Russian role in Syria the voiceover continues: “Human Rights Watch 
confirmed this accusation and revealed that these bombs were known as RBK-500” (AJA, 23 June 
2016). Here, the humanitarian organisation is given greater authority than the Russian minister.  
Another news text read: 
A report by Human Rights Watch referred to the use of internationally prohibited cluster 
bombs by Russia. This information was confirmed by local sources which reported Russian 
warplanes dropped such internationally prohibited bombs on Kafer Aleppo, which is under 
the control of Syrian opposition factions, and different places in Syria (AJA, 11 January 
2016). 
In this contextualisation, AJA invites Arab audiences to see Russia as persecutor and a war 
criminal, particularly when this transnational news channel reported verbally and visually that the 
Russian forces used internationally prohibited weapons.  
The voice of an international human rights organisation was reported to demonise Russia whose 
voice was represented through metonymical expression (Moscow). This pattern cannot be 
explained as normal AJA reporting practice, for the voice of human rights organisations was not 
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used to evaluate the US-led military actions or comment on them throughout the sample. 
Furthermore, AJA provided details about the advanced warplanes used by Russia in Syria and 
therefore the military power being deployed. For example, one report read:  
There are 13 types of military equipment currently in service in Syria: SU-34 costs about 
US$50 Million. It was used to bombard north Homs. Its top speed reaches 2,000 km/1 h) 
and its highest altitude reaches 18,000 km. Its range is about 4,500 km, and its maximum 
weight is 44 tonnes. SU-30 is the most advanced strike fighter, with a top speed of (2,000 
km/h), maximum high altitude at 19.000 km and range up to 3,000 km. It can hit more than 
one target at the same time. There are 28 SU-30s at Hmeimim airbase in Latakia” (AJA, 
25 October 2015). 
Such details about Russia’s military equipment contribute to making Russia seem a threa tening 
power.  
Another central theme in this section is the framing of the military actions led by the Syrian forces 
backed by Russia, against IS. The claims of the pro-regime Syrian forces were followed by 
counterclaims or critical messages, as was the case in the contextualisation of Russian military 
sources by AJA. For example, one report read: 
Syrian governmental forces said they had recaptured positions from IS in the vicinity of 
Palmyra, which IS denied. IS has published photos showing Russian soldiers that were 
reported to have been killed while providing support for Syrian forces, west of Palmyra. 
The deaths include a Russian military advisor, called Mikhail Bogdanov (AJA, 18 March 
2016 ).  
It is noticeable that one of the deaths was personalised with reference to his name and rank. Unlike 
the US military advisors who were reported to be killed by IS in Syria, the dead Russian advisor 
was named, and his body appeared on the screen without showing his face. Another report read:  
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SANA news agency reported that the Syrian army took control over the old Palmyra castle 
and most of the city’s neighbourhoods. Media sources allied to the Syrian regime said that 
Syrian forces started to enter the city and recaptured several areas as they have advanced 
towards the military airbase of Palmyra, which has been denied by military sources inside 
the city. Local sources have asserted that armed clashes are still taking place (AJA, 15 
March 2016).  
Moreover, AJA reported: “Syrian governmental forces recaptured a key supply route in the 
countryside of Aleppo from IS, according to Syrian media sources. IS said its fighters killed dozens 
of the Syrian government forces in these clashes.”  Also, when AJA covered the recapture of Al 
Qaryatain town, by the Syrian regime, it reported: “Backed by Russian air strikes, Syrian 
governmental forces announced the recapture of Al Qaryatain from IS after several days of 
fighting. Recently, the Syrian regime has recaptured Palmyra, east Homs, as well.” The voiceover 
estimated: “The Syrian regime is not the most powerful actor that encounters IS in Syria, but its 
army seized the opportunity of the truce held across Syria and deployed thousands of soldiers, 
according to observers, to make this progress” (AJA, 3 April 2016). The reporting of Syrian and 
Russian military failings helps portray the active agency of IS and show that the Syrian regime is 
still weak, even after the Russian military intervention. In this context, some reports, provided 
details about military losses on the side of the government, relying on IS sources only. For 
example, one report read: 
After clashes with Syrian governmental forces that were supported by more than 60 
Russian strikes, IS fighters managed to cut Athreya-Khanaser highway, the only supply 
route owned by the Syrian regime into Hama. IS managed to take control over 9 villages 
to the north of Khanaser, as well as, Al Hamam, Al Hamam mountain, and Al Zarror tower.  
The organisation also seized 3 tanks, in addition to missiles and guns. IS said that it had 
killed more than 20 soldiers from the Syrian governmental forces and destroyed their 
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vehicles on the Salmiya-Athreya road, as well as shut down a Russian scouting jet (AJA, 
23 Febraury 2016). 
 Another report read:  
After 3 days of clashes, IS announced that it took control over Al Shaer area and its oil 
fields. Also, it seized a huge quantity of weapons, including 20 tanks and Grad missiles, 
and killed dozens of soldiers from the pro-regime forces and their allies. IS seeks to show 
that it is still able to make gains although it had lost important positions in Palmyra and Al 
Qaryatain (AJA, 5 May 2016).   
Similarly, AJA reported: “IS reported that its fighters launched attacks at positions held by Syrian 
governmental forces, west of Deir Ez-Zor province. As a result, it seized 4 T-72 tanks, 350 rockets, 
BMB armoured vehicles, 100 Cobra missiles, 3 Cannons, 400 RPGs, in addition to tonnes of 
munitions and heavy weapons” (AJA, 16 March 2016).  
This kind of details magnifies the vulnerability of the Syrian government. I recall Entman’s (1993) 
argument: “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in 
a communicating text.” Most frames are “defined by what they omit as well as include” (pp.52-
54). No Russian or Syrian sources were incorporated to comment on the reported military failings, 
to help the viewers make more informed decisions. This reporting style contributes to emphasising 
the vulnerability of the Syrian army despite the Russian intensive support. 
The framing of the Russian and Syrian actions against IS is episodic. This reporting leads to 
fragmented, decontextualised reporting that lacks explanatory power and so draws in a simple 
picture of the conflict, but as mentioned previously, episodic frames better suit the constraints of 
broadcast (Iyengar, 1994).  
In the light of the abovementioned, the analysis showed that AJA coverage used the voice of 
activists, international human rights organisations, members of the opposition, as well as Western 
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and Russian media sources to delegitimise Russia’s actions. AJA demoralised Russia’s air 
campaign, by promoting its use of prohibited weapons against objects that have nothing to do with 
IS. In most reports, the Syrian regime’s army was framed in a weak position in front of IS. The  
Russian and Syrian claims were followed by critical messages or counterclaims. It is noteworthy 
that the framing of the rival interventions is similar in that AJA has promoted IS voice and showed 
this organisation as an active agent against its local enemies who are supported by international 
superpowers. Also, when reporting events on the battlefield, AJA relied mainly on episodic 
framing. AJA emphasised the military failings of the Syrian regime. The reports drew attention 
that the Syrian government forces have been vulnerable in spite of Russia’s support, while the 
opposition factions were reported to have made progress against IS with modest military support 
from the US. Qatar is among the countries which criticised Russia’s intervention, and it has always 
called for the removal of Al Assad regime as mentioned previously. This shaped AJA’s coverage 
of the Russian and Syrian actions in IS-held territories.  
On the visual plane: 
The visual representation of the Russian-Syrian military actions reinforced the verbal discourse, 
by showing Russia’s air superiority and the prohibited bombs it used in Syria. The visuals also 
reflect the vulnerability of the Syrian army in spite of Russia’s air support. The analysis begins 
with the visuals of the Russian military power. AJA broadcast images showing Russian warplanes 
in their air base, flying over the skies of Syria, or launching strikes [figures 39,40,41]. However, 
the accompanying voiceover did not support an idea of a powerful, high-tech and accurate 
bombing of IS positions. Instead, it reported the use of internationally prohibited bombs in 




Figure 39 Russian warplanes in Syria 
 
Figure 40 Russian warplanes launch strikes 
.   
Figure 41 A Russian warplane in the skies over Syria 
AJA showed images of incendiary bombs in addition to unguided munitions used by Russia in 
Syria [figures 42, 43, 44]. Such images were used to support the critical frame placed on Russia’s 
military campaign, representing it as immoral and accountable for human suffering through the 
use of excessive force. This framing contrasts with AJA’s coverage of the military power of the 
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US-led coalition. As mentioned previously the AJA showed the precise bombing of IS targets by 
the US-led air campaign.  
 
  Figure 42 Prohibited bombs used by Russia 
 




 Figure 44 Unguided bombs used by Russia 
When AJA reported Russian air strikes on IS targets, viewers are invited to see images of smoke 
and civilian infrastructure that were destroyed [figures 45 and 46]. The voiceover framed Russia’s 
strikes in terms of human suffering, referring to civilian deaths and injuries. Children were shown 
next to destroyed houses, which emphasised Russia’s responsibility for human suffering rather 
than its role in the fight against IS as the visual and the verbal texts did not show the effect of the 
strikes on IS [figure 47].  
 






Figure 46 Material destructions as a result of Russian air strikes 
 
Figure 47  Children stand near destroyed homes 
The Russian soldiers were given voice in AJA reports. As shown below [figure 48] a soldier is 
framed in a close shot, gazing at audiences. His name and tittle are shown on the screen; he appears 
in his military uniform. He tells audiences that Russia has intervened against IS. However, as 
mentioned in the analysis of the verbal discourse, the Russian claims were followed by 
counterclaims from rival sources or non-official sources. 
        
         Figure 48 A Russian soldier in Syria 
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Also, Russian soldiers are represented in groups as shown below.  
         
            Figure 49 Russian soldiers in Syria 
AJA remediated images of a Russian military advisor who was reported to have been killed while 
assisting the Syrian government forces in battles in Palmyra. By remediating images of Russia’s 
losses from the IS news agency, Amaq, AJA draws attention that the consequence of the Russian 
involvement in Syria is the death of its soldiers while IS has been able to withstand the air strikes 
and launch counterattacks. Also, AJA showed the omnipresence of Russian forces that operate in 
the skies and on the ground. As mentioned previously, throughout the sample, there are no images 






Regarding the visualisation of the military actions led by Syrian governmental forces against IS, 
the Syrian army was not shown engaged in actual combat activities. It was portrayed in a 
vulnerable situation; its military camps and equipment were destroyed; its munitions and weapons 
Figure 50 A Russian military advisor was killed by IS 
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were seized. In addition, AJA showed images of soldiers who were reported to have been killed 
by IS fighters. Through montage, the reporters often juxtapose several shots that show losses on 
the Syrian side, which emphasises the weakness of the regime. According to Kuleshov, a Soviet 
filmmaker, the way shots are assembled, in parallel with other information affects how audiences 
will attach a specific meaning or emotion to them; this is known as the Kuleshov effect  (Erik, 
2015). For example, the figures [51, 52] were assembled, when reporting information about the 
military failings of Syrian governmental forces. Similarly, the figures [53,54] appeared together in 
another report, showing weapons seized by IS. Graber (2001) supports Birdwhistell’s argument 
that people make sense of a particular situation through assessing different aspects or factors which 
are present in that situation. So, for Graber, in television news, the sequencing of images as well 
as the words and their relation to the visuals affect the way the audiences interact with what they 
watch. 
 
Figure 51 A camp of Syrian government forces attacked by IS 
 




Figure 53 Weapons sized from Syrian government forces by IS 
 
Figure 54 Members of Syrian government forces killed by IS 




Figure 55 The spokesman of the Syrian government forces  
 
Figure 56 Syrian governmental forces in group 
In terms of military gains made by Russian and Syrian forces, AJA broadcast images from Palmyra 
and Al Qaryatain after the withdrawal of IS. The images show lifeless and destroyed places as 
shown below. Audiences do not see civilians or the Syrian army celebrating its victory. 
 




Figure 58 Palmyra empty after being recaptured by the Syrian regime  
IS fighters were represented as active agents, moving from one place to another, using guns, or 
conducting artillery attacks.   
 
Figure 59 IS fighters in Syria 
 
Figure 60  A member of IS stands near a tank 
AJA showed various types of heavy military equipment and armoured vehicles owned by IS or 
seized from the Syrian regime, in an indication of its power. Thus, the visual and verbal portrayals 
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reinforced each other when AJA represented the excessive force and the military failings of Russia 
as well as the losses of its Syrian ally. AJA did not show IS’s losses, unlike RT (discussed below). 
In fact, Russia was framed as an aggressor which deployed its advanced military technology and 
prohibited weapons to kill civilians in busy places like mosques and markets as shown in the next 
section. 
The humanitarian aspect of the Russian-led intervention 
In what follows, I examine how AJA represented the impact of the Russian campaign on the 
humanitarian situation, in Syria, where the Kremlin acted upon the request of the Syrian 
government. The analysis covers the verbal and visual elements and touches on the political and 
moral implications of AJA’s humanitarian discourse.                                
On the verbal plane  
This section examines how AJA employs verbal elements to represent the human suffering 
inflicted by Russia and its Syrian ally on the Syrian people. This includes how the voices of the 
military actors involved and the civilians are incorporated and how they are portrayed in terms of 
action and agency. 
The analysis begins with the representation of the identity of the Russian Air Force as a bomber. 
Based on the study sample, the identity of the Russian forces as persecutors of the Syrian people 
was constructed through both human terms (Russians, Russian pilots) and non-human terms such 
as metonymy or nominalisation. Also, in some reports the bomber was represented in the active 
voice, in other reports, the priority was given to the sufferer, while the subject [the bomber] was 
delayed. That is to say, AJA used multiple strategies when portraying Russia as a persecutor. In 
more details:   
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There are three texts, in the study sample, which portray the Russian bombing of civilians in terms 
that foreground the human actors involved and therefore foreground the culpability of Russian 
forces for the death and destruction. In the first text, AJA reported: 
Residential areas in Jisr Al Shughur have been targeted by Russian air strikes which 
resulted in civilian casualties, including children and elderly people. Food stores, 
humanitarian relief organisations, and vehicles have been hit as well. It appears that 
Russian pilots consider these facilities as IS targets (AJA, 29 November 2015).  
Another text read: “The Russians continue to bomb Aleppo, killing children and women” (AJA, 
12 June 2016). A third text read: “Hospitals were overflowing with injured civilians; many of them 
are children, women and elderly who were targeted by the Russians’ fighters” (AJA, 6 May 2016). 
In the rest of the reports that covered the impact of the Russian actions on civilians, the bomber 
was referred to in non-human terms (metonymy and nominalisation) as shown in the following 
examples. 
 AJA reported: “Russian warplanes have continued to conduct air strikes against residential areas 
in Homs under the pretext of fighting IS” (AJA, 21 October 2015). Another report read: “Russian 
warplanes launched three missiles on a field hospital in Aleppo” (AJA, 27 April 2016). AJA 
reported elsewhere: “Russian air strikes have killed dozens of civilians, most of whom are women 
and children in Al Ghouta in Damascus” (AJA, 2 December 2015). In these examples, the identity 
of the bomber is represented through metonymy. Some texts include both metonymy and 
nominalisation, for instance: “Russian warplanes targeted the town of Thahrat Awad with 
phosphorus munitions. The bombing resulted in massive material damage” (AJA, 26 June 2016). 
By using human terms such as Russian pilots or Russians, AJA constructs the bomber as an active 
agent who should be brought to justice and held accountable for killing people in Syria. Also, the 
reference to internationally prohibited weapons, such as phosphorus munitions communicates the 
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brutality and the immorality of Russia’s air campaign, since its military power is placed in the 
context of attacks against civilian targets. As mentioned in the previous section, AJA 
communicated the voice of Russian military officials who denied targeting civilians; however, the 
reports promoted impartial voices [activists, human rights organisations] and showed visuals that 
confirmed the use of prohibited weapons by Russia in Syria.  
This critical humanitarian framing is made stronger through lexicalisation used to characterise 
Russia’s actions in Syria as a crime or massacre: AJA repeatedly used the term “massacres” when 
reporting the impact of the Russian military actions on the people, as shown in the following 
examples: 
“In Bab Al Al Hadid neighbourhood, a massacre took place when Russian warplanes launched 4 
air strikes, killing a family, of whom only a child survived” (AJA, 28 April 2016). Or again: “In 
Talbissa town where IS does not operate, a massacre occurred when civilians including children 
and women were killed, as a result of Russian air strikes” (AJA, 4 December 2015). The reporter 
uses the term massacre and mentions that IS has no positions in the targeted area, which makes 
Russia’s intervention morally questionable. As I have mentioned in the previous section, AJA’s 
journalists reported that Russia’s air strikes hit areas where IS targets did not operate, which helps 
mobilise Arab audiences against Russia. Moreover, one of AJA’s reporters commented: “The 
systematic killing of civilians by Russian warplanes has continued in Aleppo. However, no one 
has taken action to save these innocents. Massacres have continued in the neighbourhoods of Al 
Qataterji, Al Mashhad, Al Maghyir, Alsakhor, and other places” (AJA, 29 April 2016). In this text, 
the reporter referred to the identity of Russia as a persecutor using the strong language of 
“massacres” and “systematic killing” against “innocents.” Besides, AJA reported: “a new massacre 
has been committed by Russian warplanes in the Eastern Ghouta in Damascus” (AJA, 4 December 
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2015). By portraying Russia’s actions as "massacres," AJA evokes the moral need to stop the 
Russian air campaign. The term "massacre" implicates the use of excessive force against non-
combatants and constructs clearly an identity pair of the aggressor versus the victims (who were 
humanised, with references to very vulnerable groups, as explained below), raising the moral 
demand for action to protect civilians. 
This is very different to the reporting of US actions. Referring back to the portrayal of the 
humanitarian aspect related to the US-led war, the identity of the US-led coalition as a bomber was 
not represented in human terms.  
Regarding the portrayal of sufferers, in the context of Russia’s war in Syria, AJA humanised the 
civilians who were reported to have been targeted by Russian warplanes. That is to say, the 
reporting style of the human frame of Russia’s air war followed the common humanitarian 
discourse for which AJA is known and which was used in the coverage of the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq where the sufferers were personalised and given voices. The humanisation of sufferers, 
in Syria, occurs in different ways. One way is that the sufferers were referred to as civilians, with 
some personal specifications. So, in the reports, viewers can find not only numbers which portray 
the suffering as a collective experience and the sufferers as a homogenous group but also 
references to the sufferers’ personal characters (age, gender, name, place of origin). Referring back 
to the examples which I have already mentioned above, the reporters indicated that women and 
children were among the casualties. In the texts below, I show how the sufferer is humanised, 
using multiple identification references such as names, profession, or family relations. One report 
read: “Riham and her mother were killed, and her brother was injured as a result of Russian air 
strikes on Izzaz” (AJA, 31 December 2015). In another text, AJA reported: “Hundreds of air strikes 
have been conducted against Aleppo and its countryside by Russian warplanes. The ongoing aerial 
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bombing of the city has resulted in dozens of civilian casualties. Children, women, and old people 
are victims of the Russian strikes. Sara, a child who lost her mother, is one of these victims” (AJA, 
30 May 2016). So, the sufferers were personalised, as victims with reference to their relational 
status, gender, age and/or name. Through such personalisation of the sufferers as vulnerable 
categories in Syria, AJA discourse plays a role in generating sympathy towards civilians and 
demonising Russia. 
 In the next two examples, the sufferers were personalised based on their professions/age/name: 
“Dozens are killed and wounded, including 2 civil defence members and a child as a result of 
Russian air strikes” (AJA, 11 July 2016). Also, AJA reported: “Khaled Al Harh, a civil defence 
member, was killed by a Russian air strike a month ago while he was digging to remove a child 
from the rubbles” (AJA, 19 August 2016). By identifying civil defence members as targets of 
Russian military actions, AJA brings to viewers’ attention that even the local agents, the 
benefactors, who help the sufferers were attacked and persecuted. Representing a range of 
categories of sufferers (children, women, rescuers), AJA shows that no one has been safe in Syria, 
and this portrayal raises the moral demand for a humanitarian response to protect civilians. In the 
representation of the US-led role in Syria, AJA, in the analysed texts, referred to the sufferers in 
terms of numbers or as civilians without much focus on their personal characteristics.  
Another way in which the sufferers were humanised is through giving them a voice. In line with 
its popular reporting style which focuses on the sufferers and gives them voice to demonise their 
persecutor in conflict areas, AJA gave a chance to civilians in Syria to express their misfortune 
and refer to their persecutor. The reporters interviewed injured people at hospitals, refugees, old 
men and women who lost their families. In these reports, the civilians were personalised through 
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specifications such as name, place of origin, or age, and they gazed at the camera while they were 
talking about their suffering, as shown in the following texts selected from the sample: 
One report read: “Displaced people in Syria recall sad stories about their loved relatives who were 
lost.” Then an old woman was interviewed. She said: “I am from Maskana. Russian strikes killed 
my sons and my husband was injured” (AJA, 26 May 2016). In another report, a woman who was 
introduced to audiences as Um Mohammed from Aleppo said: “My son was killed by a Russian 
air strike. My daughter died as well, and I have to take care of her son. Russian and Syrian 
warplanes are always in the skies. I cannot reach the health centre to get some medicines” (AJA, 
2 May 2016). Moreover, children were given voice: in one of AJA’s reports, Sara, a little girl who  
was reported to have been injured by a Russian air strike was shown on the screen crying: “I want 
my mother. I want my mother” (AJA, 30 May 2016). Similarly, another child grieved for his sister 
who was reported to have been killed by a Russian air strike. He cried: “My sister, Rimas, come 
back” (AJA, 23 August 2016). Furthermore, AJA interviewed injured people at hospitals. For 
example, AJA reported: “More than 1500 civilians were injured in Russian and Syrian air strikes 
against Aleppo.” The reporter took the viewers to a hospital where he interviewed some of the 
injured. One of the patients was introduced as Abu Ali. He said that he had lost two limbs after 
being targeted by a Russian air strike. Another amputee whose name is Abdulkarim said that he 
was injured as a result of air strikes near al Quds hospital (AJA, 12 May 2016).  
So, AJA represented the sufferers in the context of the Russian campaign as active agents. They 
referred to their persecutor. AJA reported personal stories of children, mothers, and fathers who 
lost their families, inviting audiences to question Russia’s agenda in Syria and identify with the 
civilians. This highly activated human frame is similar to AJA framing of the humanitarian 
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situation in Afghanistan during the US-led war. According to Jasperson and Kikhia (2003), AJA 
showed Afghanis who lost their relatives in moments of grief. 
Regarding material damages caused by Russian air strikes, this aspect is constructed through space 
and time articulations which give the impression that Russia has killed civilians intentionally, a 
discourse that morally condemns its role in Syria, as shown below. 
 Throughout the sample, AJA showed the impact of the Russian military actions on civilian 
infrastructure that provides essential services, in different places across Syria. Also, AJA’s 
reporters brought to audience’s attention that the attacks on civilian infrastructure occurred during 
rush hours.  
The bombing of markets is a recurring message in AJA coverage. This message was articulated in 
a way that emphasised the responsibility of Russia and the Syrian regime in inflicting the suffering 
in Syria. The reporters humanised the sufferers and showed symbolic images of damaged 
vegetables mixed with civilian blood. 
For example, AJA reported: “Russian and Syrian warplanes target vegetable markets in Aleppo 
daily. Last week, five busy markets were hit. Most of the victims were children and women as 
usual” (AJA, 23 August 2016). Similarly, it reported: “Russian and Syrian warplanes targeted 
several vegetable markets in Al Sakhor neighbourhood, killing civilians among whom children 
and women. The vegetables were mixed with civilian blood due to the bombings” (AJA, 24 April 
2016). Additionally, the voiceover reported: “In Tariq Al Bab neighbourhood, Russian and Syrian 
warplanes fired 3 missiles on a market, where goods were mixed with civilian blood”  (AJA, 23 
April 2016). In addition to humanising the sufferers, in the above texts, AJA used a strong language 
to describe the brutality of Russia and the Syrian regime. When using an image of contrast such 
as “goods were mixed with civilian blood,” AJA’s journalist reports casualties and activates 
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viewer’s imagination, drawing a picture of a horrible situation where civilians were 
indiscriminately targeted in a “busy” place, and blood could be seen everywhere. Furthermore, 
when using adverbs such as “daily” and “as usual,” AJA reporting gives the impression that the 
bombing of crowded civilian infrastructure by Russian and Syrian warplanes is not an incident that 
occurred rarely or by mistake. AJA tells audiences that such Russian and Syrian behaviours are 
typical and characterises the Russians and their Syrian allies as killers of innocents. The 
abovementioned verbal texts were supported by visuals of damaged markets and vegetables as 
well as rescue operations.  
Another recurring message is the bombing of hospitals in Syria. For example, AJA reported: 
“Russian warplanes have destroyed 12 hospitals in Aleppo and its countryside recently, in addition 
to 2 hospitals in Hama countryside and 2 others in Al Hakam village in Dara’a” (13 May 2016). 
Another report read:  
Russian air strikes have concentrated on hospitals and medical centres. They targeted 7 
medical facilities in Aleppo city, including Al Bayan hospital, Al Daqaq hospital, Al Zahra 
hospital, Al Hakam, hospital and a blood bank. In the countryside of Aleppo, medical 
facilities in the towns of Hreitan, Al Atareb, and Kofor Hamra were targeted (AJA, 24 July 
2016). 
The use of the verbs “concentrated” and “targeted” in this text directly accuses Russia of attacking 
hospitals on purpose. Similarly, AJA reported: “Russian warplanes hit a field hospital supported 
by Doctors Without Borders in Aleppo repeatedly, causing casualties, among whom were women, 
children, and medical staff.” The voiceover added: “The Hospital of Ma'arat al-Nu'man was also 
targeted by Russian strikes, which resulted in civilian casualties and massive material damage”  
(AJA, 15 February 2016). Beside surveying damaged hospitals in Syria, AJA reporters 
incorporated the voice of human right organisations. AJA reported:  
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Russia’s air forces have continued to target medical facilities in Syria. Amnesty 
International has issued a report, saying Russian and Syrian forces appear to have 
deliberately and systematically targeted hospitals and other medical facilities over the last 
three months to pave the way for ground forces to advance on northern Aleppo. Hospitals 
appear to have become part of their military strategy. The organisation said there were no 
military vehicles, checkpoints, fighters or front lines near the hospitals that were attacked 
and that the hospitals were exclusively serving their humanitarian function (AJA, 3 March 
2016). 
In addition to markets, and hospitals, AJA showed the impact of Russia’s air strikes on bakeries, 
mosques, and relief centres during rush hours. For example, one report read “In Aleppo 
countryside, Russian warplanes targeted hospitals in Hreitan, Al Atarib, and Kofor Hamraa. Also, 
they targeted bakeries during rush hours” (AJA, 24 July 2016). It also reported “In Talbissa town, 
Russian warplanes hit a mosque which was full at the time for Friday prayers” (AJA, 19 February 
2016) A third report mentioned: “Russian warplanes fired two missiles on a relief centre which 
offers Iftar meals to fasting people in Ramadan.” According to the voiceover, “Russian strikes 
have continued during the holy month of Ramadan, and they have increased at the time of Iftar” 
(AJA, 18 June 2016). So, AJA showed that Russia’s strikes hit holy places during holy and rush 
hours, which gives the impression that the Russian attacks are deliberate and are intended to kill a 
large number of people indiscriminately and sacrilegiously. Taking into consideration that AJA’s 
primary audiences are Arabs and Muslims, the abovementioned articulations of space and time 
elements, in addition to other lexical choices such as killing, deaths, massacres, prohibited bombs, 
invite these audiences to think of Russia’s war as an aggression against their Syrian brothers and 
sisters.  
Thus, the multiplicity of places [busy markets, medical facilities, and mosques were reported as 
sites where strikes occurred] and the multiplicity of voices that shared stories about ongoing 
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Russian attacks (reporters, sufferers, human right organisations) help turn news reports into 
witnessing texts. Such texts enable audiences to witness the suffering in far places through live 
transmission of events, including the voices of the sufferers (Frosh, 2006). This highly critical 
framing of human suffering is part of AJA’s common humanitarian discourse in conflict areas. 
However, it is also influenced by Qatar’s stance towards Russia’s policies in Syria, since AJA did 
not use that highly critical frame when reporting the human suffering resulting from the US-led 
air strikes.  
AJA’s role, in this context, is not limited to being an eye-witness, which involves descriptive 
reporting of what happened in Syria. AJA’s coverage of the impact of Russia’s military campaign 
involves practices of bearing witness against Russia in Syria. Tait (2011) argues that “under the 
conditions of mass mediation, to bear witness describes the act of appealing to an audience to share 
responsibility for the suffering of others” (p.1233). According to her, central to this process is the 
attempt to influence the audience’s emotions and to elicit affect. Bearing witness also includes 
“hearing the appeal, being affected by it, and translating that affectedness into emotions that 
moralize public action” (p.1233). By constructing Russia’s identity in human as well as non-human 
terms, giving voices to men, women, and refugees who blamed Russia for their suffering in front 
of the camera and transmitting testimonies from humanitarian organizations, as discussed above, 
AJA invites Arab audiences to react and show empathy towards the Syrian people. According to 
Tait (2011), empathy for the sufferer may be displaced by hatred for the perpetrator [Russia and 
the Syrian government], reproducing the mechanisms of violence. Rentschler argues that bearing 
witness as practices through which the media portray human suffering “is never innocent of 
politics; it is always constitutive of who is ‘us’ and who is ‘them’” (Rentschler, 2004, p. 298). That 
is to say, the representation of human suffering in Syria is a selective process which reflects the 
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voice of the ruling power. I have already shown how AJA adopted a softer tone when covering the 
suffering caused by the US-led coalition, which includes Qatar. The next section addresses how 
the human suffering inflicted by Russia is portrayed visually.  
On the Visual plane 
In all the reports that cover Russian attacks on civilian targets, AJA provided visuals that confirm 
and support the verbal account. In these visuals, AJA took Arab audiences to streets, homes, and 
hospitals. It showed images of deaths, injuries and people who lost their relatives, as well as 
images of destroyed houses, markets, and hospitals, with rescue missions at the scene. That is to 
say, AJA enabled an involved observation of the suffering, in which the sufferers were shown in 
different situations (deaths, injuries, rescuers, refugees) and in different contexts (streets, homes, 
hospitals, markets). Also, it showed images of children and old people who grieve for their dead 
relatives. This visual discourse contrasts sharply with the reporting of the human suffering 
resulting from the US-led coalition strikes. 
The first point in this discussion is that the AJA showed images of people who were reported to 
have been killed or injured by Russian air strikes. The verbal texts identified these sufferers, 
through referring to their age, gender, place of origin, or name, so they were presented as humans 
whom we are asked to relate to; some were shown from a close distance, and others were shown 
from a medium or long distance. Some bodies were covered while others were not. Figure [61] 
shows a dead baby filmed from a close distance, which may encourage viewers to identify with 
him and his parents. In figures [62,63,64] deaths are filmed from a medium distance, and in figure 
[65] the sufferers are shot from a relatively long distance, as they bury their dead relatives. 




Figure 61 A dead baby (close shot) 
 
Figure 62 A young man killed in Russian air strikes (medium shot) 
 




 Figure 64 A dead body in a hospital (medium shot) 
 
Figure 65 People bury their relatives (wide shot) 
Also, AJA showed images of injured civilians at hospitals. As shown in figures [66,67], injured 
children were filmed at hospitals from a medium distance. They have eye interaction with 
audiences, their gaze involves an appellative power, which encourages AJA’s viewers to identify 
with them and engage with their suffering.     
 




Figure 67 Children injured in Russian air strikes 
 
Figure 68 An amputee interviewed at a hospital 
Moreover, AJA’s reports showed the suffering of the displaced people and allowed those who 
lost their relatives to tell their personal stories in front of the camera [figures 71,72]. 
 
       Figure 69 Displaced people in Aleppo countryside 
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      Figure 70 A Displaced child 
 
Figure 71 An Old man talks about his personal suffering   
 
Figure 72 A displaced woman interviewed by AJA  
In figure [72] an old woman is filmed from a medium distance. She accuses Russia of her suffering. 
So, she has a voice, and she gazes at audiences, who are invited to relate to her and feel her pain. 
The woman says: “I am from Maskana. Russian strikes killed my sons and my husband was 
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injured.” She refers to her persecutor, which raises a moral demand to take action to protect the 
Syrians.  
Furthermore, all the reports which cover Russia’s attacks on hospitals, markets and mosques 
include visuals which show that Russian warplanes hit crowded facilities that provide basic 
services such as food or medicines, or holy places as shown below.  
 
Figure 73 A hospital damaged by Russian air strikes 
 




Figure 75 A mosque hit by Russian strikes in Talbissa 
    
Figure 76 A vegetable market targeted by Russian warplanes in Idlib 
 




Figure 78 Fire and heavy smoke as a result of Russian strikes 
 
Figure 79 A house targeted by Russian air strikes 
As shown in figures [76,77,78,79], civil defence members, as well as other rescuers, are at the 
scene, trying to put out fire and rescue civilians. This kind of imagery appeared in many reports 
throughout the sample. In these visuals, the viewers can see structural opposition of victims and 
domestic benefactors versus warplanes, strikes, fire, and destruction. Some reports include images 
of Russian warplanes, followed by images of casualties, establishing verbal and visual discourse 
that juxtaposes the persecutor and the sufferers on the screen, and in this way, AJA reporting 
emphasises Russia’s responsibility for human suffering.  
Thus, AJA’s coverage of the humanitarian situation in Syria is oriented to draw distinctions 
between Russia’s war and the US-led war there. Arab viewers are invited to witness the suffering 
caused by Russia from a close position compared to the distanced human suffering inflicted by the 
172 
 
US-led coalition. The identity of Russia as a bomber was constructed through human and non-
human references to emphasise its agency. The sufferers were humanised, verbally, as they were 
represented in terms of groups, with reference to their personal identities (name, age, gender, or 
origin). Some sufferers were interviewed and represented individually. Throughout sample, 
civilian casualties caused by Russia and those who lost their families and/ or houses were shown 
on the screen. AJA allowed civilians to tell their personal stories and blame Russia for their 
suffering. Children, men and women have an appellative power, calling on the people around the 
world to morally engage with their suffering and help them. The negative impacts of the Russian 
military actions on civilian infrastructure such as mosques, hospitals, and markets were shown 
verbally and visually on AJA’s screen. In contrast, the linguistic references to human losses and 
material damage caused to hospitals or schools as a result of the US-led coalition strikes in Syria 
lacked the power of pictorial presence. I recall that the discourse of suffering is a selective process, 
which is shaped by a dichotomous view that draws boundaries between the in-group and the out-
group (Rentschler, 2004). Therefore, one should consider the influence of Qatar’s negative 
response to Russia’s intervention in Syria on AJA’s news discourse when watching this channel. 
At the end of this chapter, I highlight that the above analysis sought to explore how AJA responded 
to its political context and its professional standards when shaping the meaning of the rival military 
campaigns. In this context, I cannot claim that the sample of the study is completely exhaustive; it 
is a selection from an overall output of news reports that are available on AJA’s YouTube channel 
during the period of the study. Since my approach is thematic and comparative, the news stories 
used for the purpose of this research are helpful to trace the media-state relationship and then show 
similarities and differences in how the media under study covered the multi-sided war on IS in 




RT’s coverage of the multi-sided war on IS in Syria 
As mentioned in the first two chapters, the Syrian internal conflict has influenced the conduct of 
the war on IS. Then, the US and Russia have fought against their common enemy in two separate 
military campaigns. The Russian President Putin called for the formation of a broader coalition to 
destroy IS. He stressed the need for the international community to cooperate with the Syrian 
government and its allies to achieve this goal. So, this chapter seeks to examine how RT Arabic 
responded to the Kremlin’s policies as well as basic principles of professionalism when 
representing the rival campaigns to Arab audiences. 
7.1 The representation of the US-led war in Syria 
Below, I examine how RT represented the US-led intervention throughout the governance, the 
military, and the humanitarian aspects. Before I proceed with the analysis, I draw attention that 
RT uses the term “Daesh” to refer to IS.  
The governance aspect of the US-led intervention 
The analysis of the governance aspect examines how RT covers local and international support for 
the White House’s counterterrorism policy on IS. So, it looks at which sources from the US 
government are promoted and how their voices are textured in relation to other local and 
international voices, and/or in relation to RT journalists’ voices. It shows how RT represents the 
voices which criticise the US war strategy and those which support it, and what messages are 
communicated through these voices. This leads to exploring how RT coverage is influenced by 
Russia’s policies.      
Based on the sample studied, RT emphasised the ineffectiveness of the US counterterrorism policy 
on IS and the need for a global strategy to face international terrorism. It is noteworthy that the 
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representation of the US management of IS crisis has something to do with the ordering of voices. 
RT incorporated voices from the White House, such as the US President, the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Defence, but the statements made by these officials were followed by critical 
messages from the Republicans or political experts in the US or by international voices raising the 
need for a more effective strategy. 
The analysis of this aspect begins with the situation in the US. In the framing of the American 
counterterrorism policy as ineffective, a typical strategy is to interview or quote specific critical 
voices from the US alongside spokespeople for the Obama Administration. The critical responses 
are at the same time further emphasised through the reporters’ explanatory comments, as shown 
in the examples below. 
RT reported the US Secretary of Defence Carter as saying: “I have met with representatives of 40 
countries that participate in the US-led international coalition fighting ISIL, and I have asked them 
to increase their contributions. This includes military equipment such as strike fighters and 
scouting jets, in addition to training services.” Then, the voiceover added: “Carter’s statements 
have not led to tamping down internal criticism of the war policy.” Senator John McCain was 
shown saying: 
The threat is growing fast. The weakness of our Administration’s strategy can be attributed 
to two reasons: first, we thought that time was on our side, but it was not. And it is still not 
on our side, particularly after the attacks that happened in Sinai, Paris and San Bernardino. 
Second, we thought we should not deploy ground combat forces. 
 The reporter commented: “Although the US-led coalition has conducted thousands of air strikes 
against Daesh’s positions, the US Secretary of Defence has admitted that Daesh threat has not been 
contained yet. This admission will provoke new criticisms regarding the US counterterrorism 
strategy.”  (RT, 12 October 2015). So, in the above text as well as in the next two examples, the 
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claims made by the White House officials were followed by critical messages which refer to the 
failure of the US to contain IS threat. In their comments, RT’s reporters have emphasised the 
critical views which were expressed by the reported sources. This ordering of voices is noticed in 
all reports that tackle the US policy on IS. In one of these reports, RT quoted the director of the 
CIA, John Brennan, as saying: “The coalition managed to destroy Daesh’s financial resources, but 
unfortunately despite all our efforts, we have not undermined the organisation’s capacity yet.” 
Then the voiceover commented: “Brennan’s statement is a straightforward admission that the 
coalition has failed to stop Daesh from launching terrorist attacks.” In the report, a political expert 
commented: “This is a clear admission that the US has not succeeded in defeating terrorism.” 
Then, the reporter questioned: “How can this organisation which has started to change its tactics 
be defeated if the coalition continues to pursue its current strategy?” (RT, 17 June 2016).  
Similarly, RT quoted Obama as saying: “So far more than 8000 air strikes have been conducted 
against Daesh positions. These strikes in addition to the operations conducted by our partners on 
the ground have resulted in killing key leaders in Daesh organisation and recapturing lands in Iraq 
and Syria.” The reporter then commented: “Obama has stressed that he will continue to pursue his 
counterterrorism strategy which has not led to driving Daesh back yet.” Also, an American 
political expert was shown saying: “Some observers raise questions about alternative plans if this 
strategy failed. Should we change it?  Should we send ground troops? But this requires more 
efforts. I am not sure if the President or the US military know what should be done.” The reporter 
concluded: “It is noticeable that Washington stands on the edge of the war on terror. It is not 
decisive enough in fighting terrorism, and it does not leave this question to other actors that can 
eliminate such a threat” (RT, 26 October 2015). 
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It is noticeable that RT reporters made negative lexical choices such as “not decisive enough” and 
“new criticisms.” So, RT news discourse raised concerns about the situation on the ground and 
brought to Arab viewers’ attention that things were going from bad to worse. Within RT context, 
this contextualisation may lead to the inference that Russian intervention is needed.  
In addition to quoting critical voices from the US, RT used non-identified sources [observers] to 
contextualise the US counterterrorism policy negatively, showing the representatives of the White 
House in a defensive stance.  
For example, RT reported: “Carter said that the US would provide more support for the local forces 
fighting against the so-called Daesh in Syria. He stated that the US government might send more 
than 50 soldiers to Syria.” The voiceover commented:  
The US Administration’s attempts to defend its strategy have provoked severe 
Congressional criticism as some senators call for deploying thousands of ground troops 
while others call for supporting Syrian forces. Such disagreements between the US 
Administration and the Congress affect the US-led counterterrorism efforts negatively, 
according to observers (RT, 2 December 2015). 
In another report, RT quoted Obama as saying: “So far, 13,000 US-led air strikes have been 
conducted in Iraq and Syria. Daesh has lost many of its leaders; we have killed more than 120 
fighters. Our message is clear: if you target the United States and its allies, you will be held 
accountable.” Then, the voiceover commented: “Observers read Obama’s statements as an attempt 
to defend his counterterrorism strategy, which has not led to degrading Daesh so far” (RT, 15 June 
2016). In these two examples and the next one, RT journalists used the verb to defend to frame the 
US Administration’s position. RT relied on non-identified sources. Collective labels (observers/ 
experts) which refer to non-identified news sources are often used in news texts to imply the 
truthfulness of the reported information; this strategy helps journalists background their voices and 
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report news without having to provide precise sources or claims (Publitz and Bednarek, 2009). 
This kind of sourcing practice is often used in RT reports through the sample. 
 This channel reported: “The spokesman of the White House has defended Washington’s recent 
decision to send special forces to Syria, though the US Administration has repeatedly stressed that 
it will not deploy troops there.” Then the US official was directly quoted as saying: “The US troops 
will support and train the local forces that fight against Daesh.” The voiceover commented: 
“However, the White House says that this step does not mean that its war strategy has changed. 
The US Administration seems to lack any clear counterterrorism strategy, according to some 
observers” (RT, 31 October 2015).  
Furthermore, RT’s journalists used the same reporting strategy to raise the need for global unity 
to encounter international terrorism as shown in the following texts:   
RT reported: “Kerry mentioned the US-led military campaign would continue to prevent oil 
smuggling from IS territories. According to observers, this step is not enough as there is a need for 
a global strategy to destroy terrorist groups.” Then the voiceover commented: “Daesh has 
increased its attacks in Iraq, Syria and Europe, so united efforts are required to face the growing 
threat of transnational terrorist movements” (RT, 19 November 2015). Similarly, RT quoted Brett 
McGurk, the US Special Envoy for the international coalition as saying: “Daesh has lost territories 
in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, the organisation will seek to inspire lone wolves to carry out attacks. 
And this danger will continue for a long time.” The report added: “According to experts, such 
challenges cannot be faced without a consensus counterterrorism strategy” (RT, 29 June 2016). 
By using non-identified sources that raised the idea that IS, and the like, cannot be defeated 
“without a consensus counterterrorism strategy,” RT reporters distance themselves while they 
emphasise Putin’s call for the formation of a global coalition against IS. One can say that by 
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promoting the voices of US officials alongside non-identified sources, RT shows evidence of 
balanced coverage. However, this balance risks being false since it promotes competing voices as 
if they have equal weight (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). When RT reporters attribute information 
to “observers” or “experts” who are unknown to audiences and use imprecise language to 
contextualise the reported stories, they do not provide an accurate picture of the situation in Syria, 
so the viewers cannot make informed judgements.  
In this context, RT adopted the same reporting style when framing the US-led coalition members’ 
responses to the US war policy. It quoted specific US voices which were followed by critical voices 
that are not identified (observers). For example, RT reported a meeting which gathered the foreign 
ministers of more than 30 countries involved in the US-led coalition. The US Secretary, Kerry, 
was quoted as saying: “The coalition is resolved to defeat Daesh in Syria where the organisation’s 
capacity has been undermined, but its members are concentrating in Al Raqqa.” Then Carter was 
reported as saying: “The coalition campaign seeks to wipe out the cancer of Daesh in Syria as well 
as Iraq, since this organisation threatens not only the Iraqis or the Syrians but also our citizens 
around the world.” The voiceover added:  
Observers say that this meeting has not produced any new results, as there are 
disagreements among the members of the coalition on how to encounter terrorism. Also, 
observers estimate that the US strategy does not cope with the new tactics of Daesh which 
no longer seeks to control new territories in Iraq and Syria. Instead, it has started to carry 
out attacks in Europe (RT, 22 July 2016).  
This recurring reporting style involves vague criticisms. No member of the US-led coalition is 
named; also, no official source is quoted as expressing reservations on the US war strategy. So,  
this style does not show evidence of accurate reporting. It is inadequate as it does not help 
audiences to understand the situation in Syria.   
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RT used specific quotes, metonymy, as well as non-identified sources when contextualising 
regional voices that call for more military involvement in Syria.  By using these techniques, RT 
sought to show evidence of accurate reporting. So, unlike the previous example which included 
non-identified sources and vague criticism, the following texts included specific voices from the 
Gulf. These voices raised the need for more military actions against IS in Syria. This reporting 
style is more likely to gain audiences’ trust, because of the greater specificity in attribution. 
RT promoted the willingness of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to send ground forces to degrade IS in 
Syria. It reported: “The Saudi military advisor, Ahmed Assiri, has said that Riyadh is ready to send 
ground forces to fight against Daesh in Syria, provided the US coalition agrees.” Then, the report 
added: “Some observers raise questions about the progress reportedly made by the US-led coalition 
against Daesh, in the light of the Saudi offer to deploy ground troops” (RT, 5 February 2016). 
Another report read: “The UAE will participate in any ground offensive to be launched in the 
future in Syria. According to Emirati sources, the UAE will help the Syrian opposition forces 
recapture Al Raqqa, the main headquarter of Daesh.” The reporter interviewed a political analyst 
who considered the current manoeuvres, known as the ‘Thunder of the North’, that are led by Saudi 
Arabia, as a simulated military operation in Syria. The interviewee said: “This is a warning 
message to the leading powers which have not taken the Syrian question seriously. The situation 
in Syria is unbearable.” The reporter commented: “Observers consider the huge manoeuvres 
organised by Saudi Arabia in cooperation with other counties, as serious preparations for a ground 
offensive in Syria” (RT, 15 February 2016). In addition to quoting specific voices from the Gulf, 
as well as non-specified sources, RT used metonymy, that is, “Saudi Arabia”, “Riyadh” and “the 
UAE.” The comments attributed to observers give the impression that the Gulf countries that 
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participate in the US-led coalition are dissatisfied with the US war policy. Throughout, the sample, 
no voices were quoted as showing support for the US strategy.   
Thus, it is possible to say that RT framed the governance aspect of the US-led war in a way that 
consolidates the Russian policies toward Syria. The reports emphasised the shortcoming of the US 
counterterrorism policy. RT represented the US government in a defensive position; the White 
House officials admitted the limited effect of the air campaign. This news discourse encourages 
the targeted viewers to think of the Russian military action as a necessary move to change the 
situation. Also, RT news discourse emphasised the need for global unity. The call for global efforts 
to respond to international terrorism creates the inference that the US Administration and its allies 
cannot eliminate Daesh by themselves. So, Russia and its allies should be partners of the US-led 
coalition in this war rather than being excluded. Souleimanov and Petrtylova (2015) argue that 
Russia considers IS as an outcome of the failure of the US strategies in the region and has benefited 
from the emergence of this armed organisation to expand in the Middle East and advance its 
interests.  
In terms of journalistic practices, RT reporters tried to give the impression of  a balanced coverage, 
using various sources with different views. In all the reports, throughout the sample, the voices of 
the US Administration’s representatives were followed by critical voices from the Congress or 
statements made by US experts who raised questions about Obama’s war strategy. Also, RT relied 
on non-identified sources to show the shortcoming of the US war strategy and raise the need for 
global cooperation to face IS. This resulted in promoting unknown sources and gave the impression 
that such non-identified voices and the quoted official sources have equal weight. RT used quotes, 
metonymy, as well as, non-identified sources to promote regional demands for a ground offensive 
in Syria and reflect regional dissatisfaction with the US policy, particularly in the Gulf. In their 
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comments, RT reporters evaluated the US counterterrorism policy on IS negatively and raised the 
need for a global strategy to defeat international terrorism. As they often relied on non-identified 
sources, the journalists used imprecise language and reported vague criticisms; this does not help 
viewers make informed judgments about the US-led war.  
The military aspect of the US-led intervention  
In what follows, I examine how RT employed verbal and visual resources to portray the US-led 
military intervention against IS.  
On the verbal plane: 
This section discusses how RT portrays the US-led air campaign and how it constructs the roles 
of the US-backed SDF and the Syrian opposition factions on the ground against IS. So, the analysis 
covers how the US special forces and their Syrian allies are represented in terms of action and 
agency and how their voices are incorporated in relation to other sources or in relation to RT 
journalists’ voices. Also, it looks at the framing of the interaction between Russia and the US 
coalition in the skies over Syria. Then, it explores whether the military dimension is reported 
differently to the negatively evaluated political one. 
The first point in this analysis is the framing of the military power of the US-led air campaign. RT 
coverage brought to viewers’ attention the advanced military technology used by the US-led 
coalition but did not provide details about the type of machines deployed in Syria. This channel 
covered the US-led military actions from the perspective of the US and its ally, the SDF, allowing 
them to show their roles in the war against IS. This is to say RT did not use IS sources or 
incorporate opposing claims throughout the sample. RT reporters made positive lexical choices 
when contextualising the military operations conducted by the US-backed SDF. In many texts, the 
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reporters used non-identified sources to distance themselves when framing the US-led intervention 
positively, as shown in the following examples:  
One of RT reports read: “The US-led coalition warplanes are always in the skies over Ain Issa 
town. Equipped with advanced weapons, the US-backed SDF have driven Daesh fighters out of 
the town.” Then, a member of the SDF was interviewed; he said: “Daesh will be defeated in the 
coming days; we have received modern weapons from the US coalition, and now we can degrade 
Daesh.” The voiceover continued: “In this military campaign, US special forces have supported 
the Kurdish-led SDF, in battles against Daesh. The US forces in Syria act in coordination with the 
coalition airmen to guide the Syrian ground troops, that advance towards Daesh positions.” Then, 
an American soldier was shown saying: “We provided the SDF with military equipment to enable 
them to fight on the front lines.” The voiceover commented: “According to experts, with these 
new military supplies, which include heavy weapons, the SDF have become ready to attack Al 
Raqqa as well as other Daesh-held areas” (RT, 24 May 2016). In this text, the reporter used positive 
terms as he referred to the US military support for the SDF from the sky and on the ground. The 
military machines deployed in Syria were represented as “heavy” and “advanced” and the US-led 
coalition warplanes were reported to have been “always in the skies” over Syria.  
In another text, RT covered the US Commander General Joseph Votel’s visit to North Syria. The 
voiceover reported that his visit sought to deploy more Arab and Kurdish fighters in the context 
of the coalition’s preparations for a ground offensive to recapture Al Raqqa. Votel was quoted as 
saying: “I came to meet with leaders from the SDF. We discussed the situation in the battlefield. 
The movements of the enemy on the front lines affect our operations.” The voiceover added: “It 
has been reported that the US-led coalition warplanes have dropped warning leaflets, calling on 
civilian residents of Al Raqqa to stay away from Daesh positions. Observers consider such 
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American tactics as part of the warfare against Daesh” (RT, 22 May 2016). Like the previous one, 
this example shows the close cooperation between the US-led coalition and the SDF and draws 
attention that their actions have been conducted with due regard for the safety of civilians.    
Besides, RT reported: “The US-led coalition warplanes have conducted precision bombings 
against Daesh targets in Manbij and its countryside. In the meantime, US soldiers have provided 
logistics support to the SDF and removed mines from the areas recaptured from Daesh.” Then a 
member of the SDF said in front of the camera: “We are now advancing towards Manbij.” The 
soldier pointed at the sky, saying: “These are the coalition’s strikes which target Daesh positions 
to pave the way for us.” The reporter commented: “Military experts say most of Daesh fighters 
have fled to Jarablus and Al Raqqa” (RT, 8 June 2016). RT showed the US forces in Syria as active 
agents, who prepared for ground offensives, removed mines, and provided logistics support. Also, 
the US coalition was framed as a responsible agent that used precision bombs and so take actions 
to minimise or avoid collateral damage. No critical messages were promoted.   
Moreover, a news report, showing a member of the US special forces in Syria, read: “This 
American soldier is one of many foreign fighters who support the SDF in driving the terrorists out 
of Manbij.” Then the soldier was interviewed. He said: “I am proud to be one of the American 
soldiers who fight for freedom and democracy. The world should support the SDF in this war.” 
The reporter commented:  
The US-led coalition warplanes are in the skies over Manbij, and heavy clashes are taking 
place in different areas in the city. Although Daesh fighters have placed mines in Al 
Assadiya neighbourhood, we managed to enter the positions which were recaptured from 
the organisation, where we found records of oil, gas and agricultural products in addition 
to other funding sources (RT, 2 July 2016). 
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 So, many reports throughout the sample showed the positive role of the US forces as part of the 
US-led coalition against IS. Concerning journalistic practices, RT reported the anti-IS operations 
as if there was no other side and as if there were no opposing or critical views. It incorporated 
military sources as well as non-official sources, that evaluated the US-led actions positively. Then 
the sample provides evidence that RT reporting is not balanced in perspective or portrayal. 
What is true of the US-led forces is also true of the SDF. On the ground the SDF fighters were 
represented always as active agents who carry out attacks, recapture lands, and seize equipment 
from IS, as shown below. RT reported:  
A special unit of the SDF has penetrated the village of Madnah after the soldiers involved 
got instructions from their leader, Rujha, on how to accomplish this mission. Madnah is 
the last remaining territory under Daesh control, south of Manbij. The military council of 
Manbij have recaptured strategic positions in the area (RT, 13 August 2016). 
Another report read: “The SDF have gathered fighters from all provinces to face Daesh.” A fighter 
from the SDF was interviewed; he said: “We, Arab and Kurdish fighters, are here to defend Syria.” 
The voiceover commented: “The SDF’s members who managed to enter the city will participate 
in clearing the mines which Daesh left behind. According to experts, Daesh has booby-trapped 
many buildings” (RT, 10 June 2016). Similarly, RT reported: “After 10 days of heavy clashes, the 
military council of Manbij and SDF, backed by US-led strikes, stormed Manbij while Daesh 
fighters retreated to Al Raqqa, Maskana and Al Bab.”  The voiceover added: “The SDF managed 
to cut IS supply route between Al Raqqa and Aleppo. They have taken control over Al Etihad 
University and a TV station” (RT, 2 August 2016).  
 So, the SDF were always framed as active agents that were reported to have recaptured strategic 
positions, stormed cities, cleared means, cut off IS routes, while IS fighters were passive. Their 
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voice was not reported while their territorial losses were promoted.  Moreover, RT promoted IS's 
losses in terms of equipment, for example:  
One report read “The military council of Manbij and the SDF have recaptured strategic positions 
and seized military equipment from Daesh.” A fighter from the SDF appeared on the screen 
showing communication devices, which were reported to have been taken from Daesh. “We seized 
8 small devices and a big one which Daesh used to communicate with its members in Turkey” 
(RT, 13 June 2016). RT also reported: “Having advanced weapons, a special unit of the SDF 
managed to seize bombs made by Daesh and penetrate neighbourhoods in the centre of Manbij” 
(RT, 26 July 2016). As shown in the previous examples, the framing is simple and episodic. It tells 
the story from the point of view of the SDF fighters and shows their gains against IS. In this way, 
RT gave the impression that it was going to be a one-sided war. IS voice was excluded in all RT 
reports throughout the sample.    
Moreover, the SDF’s identity was constructed through a discourse of heroism in a few reports. 
This discourse was established through lexical choices made by the reporters, presenting the SDF’s 
fighters as liberators who were resolved to defeat IS and who sacrificed their lives to save their 
people. In the following texts, RT reporters used the verb “to liberate” to describe the goal of 
SDF’s operations against IS. For example, one report read: 
The SDF assert that they are ready to face the terrorist organisation, Daesh, in Manbij, 
Jarablus, and Al Raqqa. They will liberate these territories in cooperation with all the 
Syrians who can fight for their country. So far, Daesh fighters have retreated as a result of 
the SDF’s military attacks (RT, 6 May 2016). 
Another report read: “According to military experts, there are tunnels leading from Manbij to 
Jarablus and Al Bab. These tunnels are used by Daesh to send military supplies to its members.” 
A member of the SDF was interviewed. He said: “We progress slowly because of IS landmines 
186 
 
and tunnels.” The voiceover commented: “The liberation of Manbij city in northern Syria near 
the Turkish border, is not an easy mission. The slow progress made by the SDF reflects their resolve 
to liberate the city” (RT, 12 August 2016). In a third news text, the voiceover commented: 
Ongoing clashes are taking place between the SDF and Daesh fighters who committed 
crimes against civilians. The SDF’s members are resolved to drive Daesh out of Manbij 
and Al Bab, and they have deployed additional members to face Daesh-led counterattacks 
in Manbij (RT, 13 September 2016). 
By representing the US-backed SDF members as liberators, RT legitimises their actions and invites 
the audiences to identify with them. Furthermore, RT represented the SDF’s members who were 
killed in battles against IS fighters as heroes who sacrificed their lives to defend their country and 
protect civilians. One report read: “In the battle for Manbij, the SDF have lost some of their 
members, but they managed to liberate 250 000 civilians from Daesh” (RT, 7 August 2016). Also, 
RT reported: “The SDF and Daesh have sustained huge losses in terms of fighters and materials. 
However, the SDF are resolved to pursue their military operations until they drive the terrorist 
organisation out of Manbij and all territories that remain under its control.” A soldier from the 
SDF was interviewed in the report. He said: “We will get rid of Daesh. We will follow them to Al 
Bab and Maskana. We will liberate Syria” (RT, 12 Septmber 2016). In a third example, the 
voiceover reported: “The SDF have lost many soldiers but took control over new areas such as the 
squares of Al Dalla and Saba Bahrat” (RT, 4 July 2016). 
 So, the losses of the SDF were put in the context of their good intentions towards their people and 
their progress against IS on the ground. That is to say, the reported military failings were not 
framed negatively and attributed to the inadequacy of the US war strategy which has been 
described in the previous section as unlikely to succeed. In the light of the examples mentioned 
above, RT framing of the US-backed SDF activities seems to be unbalanced because it does not 
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contextualise the news critically. According to basic principles of professional war reporting, 
journalists are required to report the conflicting sides fairly, which is not the case in RT coverage 
of the war on IS in Syria as noticed throughout the study sample.  
In the framing of Daesh’s military role, RT has focused on Daesh fighting tactics, particularly 
underground smuggling tunnels, mines, booby-trapped vehicles, and suicide bombers but the 
organisation voice was not heard, as shown in the following examples:  
  One report read: “According to experts, more than 150 suicide bombers from Daesh are ready to 
carry out attacks against the SDF, using booby-trapped vehicles, in Manbij” (RT, 18 June 2016). 
Another report read:  
Daesh has reportedly prepared its members for armed confrontations that may last for 
weeks. Daesh snipers, booby-trapped cars, and smuggling tunnels are obstacles which 
affect the SDF’s progress. According to experts, there are networks of tunnels leading from 
Manbij to Jarablus and Al Bab to convey military supplies to Daesh members.  
 The reporter interviewed a soldier from the SDF who said: “We are advancing slowly since there 
are tunnels and mines; clashes are still taking place” (RT, 25 July 2016). Similarly, RT reported: 
“According to military experts, 1750 fighters from Daesh were deployed in the centre of Manbij. 
Street fighting is taking place; Daesh lined the streets of Manbij with snipers and mines.” A 
member of the SDF was quoted as saying: “The mines restrict our operations.” The journalist 
commented “The SDF have removed more than 6000 landmines so far” (RT, 6 August 2016). 
As shown above, RT showed Daesh’s resistance and various tactics. The SDF’s sources, non-
identified sources in addition to the journalists’ comments were structured in a way that 
communicates the serious efforts of SDF and the difficult missions they lead on the front lines to 
defeat IS.  
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Another central point in this analysis is the portrayal of the anti-IS operations which were led by 
the Syrian opposition factions, with US-led coalition air support. In all the reports which covered 
these actions, the role of the opposition factions was contextualised in terms of shared interests 
between Turkey and these factions which need to cooperate to prevent IS and the Kurdish-led 
forces, from progressing in north Syria. In the reports, there was no reference to the US-led 
coalition warplanes although the coalition and Turkey provided air support for the opposition 
forces in their operations against IS. For example, one of RT reports read:  
Turkey has intensified its military deployment along the border with Syria, near Jarablus 
to fight Daesh. This operation which seeks to recapture the city appears to be a starting 
point for an offensive in which Ankara supports its allied Syrian opposition factions, 
according to official sources. Locals said that dozens of Turkish tanks and armoured 
vehicles crossed the Syrian territories to support the Free Army, that managed to drive 
Daesh back. According to the Turkish defence minister, this operation has no time limit as 
Ankara will not allow the Kurdish forces to take control over the territories recaptured from 
Daesh (RT, 25 August 2016). 
In the report, a political expert said: “The aim of this operation is not only to drive Daesh out of 
Jarablus but also to clear the area of all the terrorist organisations which threaten Turkey.” The 
voiceover commented: “Establishing an area, where neither Daesh nor the Kurdish forces operate, 
allows the Syrian opposition factions to concentrate in the north of Syria, according to analysts” 
(RT, 25 August 2016). So, the Syrian opposition factions, backed by Turkey, were framed as 
fighters who take a role in the war against IS to achieve their self-interests primarily, unlike the 
SDF fighters who were represented as liberators who fight to save the Syrian people from IS. 
In another text, RT reported: “Syrian opposition factions supported by the Turkish army have 
expanded and recaptured more positions from Daesh.” The voiceover reported the Turkish foreign 
minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu saying: “The Kurdish organisations must withdraw to the East of 
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Euphrates.” Then a Turkish political expert said: “The Kurdish organisations are the biggest threat. 
Therefore, the Turkish actions concentrate on them, while Daesh is an external threat.” The 
voiceover commented: “Turkey will not keep its forces in northern Syria, it seeks to transfer the 
control over these territories to its allied Syrian opposition factions, which serves their interests” 
(RT, 12 September 2016). Also, RT reported: “After the Turkish army and its allied Syrian factions 
had taken control over Jarablus, clashes occurred between the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army 
and Kurdish forces.”  The Turkish President was reported as saying through a translator: “We are 
resolved to clear the region from the terrorist organizations, and we support any party that 
participates in this effort.” The voiceover continued: “Experts say the fast progress of Turkey’s 
allies against Daesh and the Kurdish organisations helps the Turkish government achieve its aims” 
(RT, 25 September 2016). 
So, RT’s reporters promoted official Turkish voices and messages from non-official sources to 
show that the opposition factions and Turkey pursue a selfish agenda in the context of the war on 
IS. This framing contrasts with the portrayal of US-backed SDF that were shown on RT’s screen 
as liberators. RT excluded the fact that the US-led coalition warplanes have provided air support 
for the Free Army. Also, the voices of the Syrian opposition and IS were absent. Then, this channel 
did not follow the professional standards of war reporting, but it invited Arab viewers to question 
the role of the Syrian opposition factions and underestimate their efforts against IS.  
The last point in this section is RT’s framing of the interaction between the US-led coalition and 
Russia in Syria. In this aspect, RT supported the policy of its country by representing the 
development of the US war strategy as a reaction to Russia’s military move while the US refusal 
to cooperate with Russia in Syria was always framed as a contradictory position.  
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One of RT reports read: “After the Russian intervention in Syria, the US has reviewed its strategy 
in the war against Daesh.” Carter was quoted as saying: “We will not hold back from supporting 
our partners by conducting air strikes or sending special forces.”  Then, the voiceover commented: 
“This change in the US vision is motivated mainly by the Russian move” (RT, 28 October 2015). 
In another text, the Russian minister of foreign affair Lavrov was quoted as saying:  
Only when our Air Forces conducted strikes in Syria and destroyed Daesh oil trucks, did 
the US-led coalition warplanes start to bomb Daesh fuel conveys. The US-led coalition 
warplanes have been operating in Iraq and Syria for more than one year. I am sure they 
have already observed these IS targets.  
Then, the reporter estimated: “The US-led coalition has failed to destroy Daesh so far” (RT, 27 
November 2015). In terms of the coordination of military operations in the skies over Syria, RT 
framed the US refusal to coordinate with Russia, in Syria, except for the safety of the coalition 
forces, as a contradictory position. This framing relates to the ordering of voices. The voices of 
the US or the Russian officials were followed by messages from non-identified sources criticising 
the US stance, as shown below.   
One of RT reporters commented: “The US Secretary of Defence Carter has stressed that the US 
will not cooperate with Russia as long as the latter supports the Syrian army, describing Russia’s 
strategy as a mistake.” Carter was reported as saying: “The strategy that Russia pursues is a 
mistake since its strikes hit areas beyond Daesh targets. We will not cooperate with them as long 
as they are pursuing that strategy.” The reporter commented:  
Carter has also stressed that Washington maintains a channel of communication with the 
Russian military, to ensure the safety of the aircrews in Syria. Observers describe Carter’s 
statements as contradictory, recalling that the US-led coalition has not managed to 
undermine Daesh’s ability to recruit more fighters (RT, 3 December 2015). 
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Moreover, RT reported: “After communications with Washington and Riyadh, Moscow has 
realised that the US-led coalition is unwilling to cooperate with Russia in Syria to destroy Daesh’s 
headquarters.” Lavrov was quoted as saying: “We asked the US-led coalition forces to provide us 
with information about the terrorists’ positions, as well as the areas where the opposition factions 
are operating, but they refused.” The voiceover commented: “According to observers, Washington 
seeks to delegitimise Russia’s campaign given the US-led coalition failure to degrade Daesh, but 
such a negative response to Russia’s move contradicts with Washington’s counterterrorism goals 
in Syria” (RT, 12 October 2015). So, non-identified sources were used to show that Russia is open 
and ready to cooperate with the US-led coalition and that the coalition failed to degrade IS.  
In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that the military aspect of the US-led war is reported 
differently to the political one. RT journalists relied on non-identified sources (observers, experts) 
when framing the US war strategy as ineffective, and they used this kind of sourcing practices 
when reporting positive evaluations about the progress of US-backed SDF against IS. Then, it is 
noteworthy that RT’s war discourse involves contradiction. That is to say, the negative portrayal 
of the US war strategy contrasts with the positive representation of the military actions led by the 
US-backed SDF. These forces were reported to have made gains against IS, with US-led coalition 
air support. One point that can explain why RT framed the US-led military actions positively is 
that Russia, like the US and other European countries, was attacked by IS. As noted previously, 
Yarchi et al. (2013) maintained that if a country has experience with terror, its media are more 
likely to frame counterterrorism actions taken by other countries positively.  
RT reporting is oriented to draw distinctions between the roles of the US-backed armed groups 
[the SDF and the opposition factions] in the fight against IS in Syria.  
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The SDF were represented as heroes who sacrificed their lives to defend Syria and its people 
against IS. This positive framing is consistent with Russia’s policies, since these forces target the 
common enemy, IS, only. The US and the SDF are not involved in military actions against Russia 
or its ally, the Syrian regime.  
A significant point that shows the taking of sides in RT coverage of this war is the way the Syrian 
factions, that fight against Al Assad regime and its allies, in parallel with the war on IS, were 
framed. Their anti-IS actions which were backed by US-led air strikes, were not put in the context 
of the US-led war on terror. RT reporters emphasised that the opposition factions fight against IS 
in cooperation with Turkey to serve their interests. The reporters often used episodic frames to 
cover events in the field. The analysis showed that RT did not follow professional standards of 
journalism, for it reported the military actions from the limited perspective of the SDF and their 
US allies. IS and the Syrian opposition factions’ sources were absent throughout the sample. Also, 
RT did not give access to official or non-official voices that criticise the US-led actions.  
On the Visual plane 
This section shows how the visualisation of the US-led coalition military actions relates to the 
verbal framing discussed above. RT represented the SDF’s soldiers in control over the situation 
and visualised the weapons they seized from IS. Also, RT took viewers inside tunnels which were 
reported to have been cleared of IS. The SDF’s members appeared next to dead IS fighters. It is 
noteworthy that RT did not use any visuals from IS media sources in its reports throughout the 
sample. It relied on the visuals filmed by its local and embedded reporters.   
The analysis begins with the visualisation of the US soldiers and the SDF’s members. These forces 
were not shown engaged in actual military operations. They appeared in their uniform, and they 
were filmed mostly from a medium distance. Throughout the sample, some of them were 
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interviewed and shown individually. Below, [in figures 80,81,82,83] soldiers are filmed 
individually while they are talking about their military roles against IS. Their active agency is 
communicated visually through their gaze as they have direct eye contact with audiences.  
 
Figure 80 An American soldier in Syria 
In the above image [figure 80], an American soldier who is filmed frontally as he expresses his 
proudness of being a fighter against IS in Syria. He calls on the world to support the SDF in their 
counterterrorism efforts.  
  
Figure 81 A member of the SDF points at US-led coalition strikes  
In this image [81] a member of the SDF points at US-led coalition strikes, telling audiences that 
the US-led coalition warplanes, in the skies of Syria, pave the way for the SDF to advance towards 
Manbij. As shown, he appears in his uniform and gazes at the camera. So, we are invited to 
associate ourselves with his subject position and see the war from his point of view.  
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In the following image [82], a soldier, called Ahamed, appeared on the screen. He addresses 
audiences, showing the SDF’s commitment to free Syria of IS. Such direct eye contact with 
audiences reflects his active agency and encourages RT’s viewers to identify with him.  
 
Figure 82 Ahmed, a soldier in the SDF’s offensive against IS in Manbij  
Similarly, in the image below [83] a Kurdish fighter is filmed from a medium distance. She smiles 
as she shows the resolve of the SDF to degrade IS. She addressed the camera, saying: “We want 
to liberate Manbij, so the civilians can return to their homes and live peacefully.”  
 
Figure 83 A Kurdish soldier on the front line 
This kind of visual-verbal framing in which the fighters are individualised and shown on the front 
line emphasises the efforts led by the US-backed SDF against IS. The visuals humanise the fighters 
and encourage audiences to relate to the US soldiers and the SDF. 
In addition to showing some soldiers individually, in the reports, the US soldiers and the SDF’s 
members were represented collectively. In figures [84.85] soldiers are shown as a homogenous 
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group while the voiceover refers to their military actions, which aim at destroying IS and liberating 
civilians who suffer from the organisation’s persecution.  
 
Figure 84 US soldiers in Syria 
The above figure [84] shows a group of US soldiers who are reported to support the SDF in their 
fighting against IS. 
 
Figure 85 Members of the SDF in Manbij 
This figure [85] shows a group of the SDF that are reported to have recaptured villages from IS. 
The soldiers are shown wearing uniforms and holding their weapons. This helps introduce them to 
viewers as a regular army and legitimise their actions against IS. However, as I have mentioned, 
the soldiers were not shown engaged in actual combats.  
Another point in this analysis is the visualisation of the air strikes. RT showed panoramic views 
(wide-long shots) of the US-led coalition strikes. In parallel with such images, the voiceover 
reported the precise bombing of IS positions. In the images below, the Arab viewers are invited to 




Figure 86 heavy smoke after US-led air raids 
 
 Figure 87 US-led coalition air strikes in Manbij 
 
Figure 88 Smoke and fumes resulting from US-led air strikes in Syria 
This kind of image, which recurred throughout the sample, involves what is called “strategies of 
sublimation” (Chouliaraki, 2009, p. 520). The scenes of flames and heavy smoke may activate 
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emotions of horror and awe, which limits the viewers’ engagement with human suffering in Syria  
(Chouliaraki, 2006b, p. 173). The viewers do not see or hear about casualties, and they may find 
the attacks justifiable since the voiceover defines the targets as IS-held positions.  
Furthermore, RT portrayed the military gains of the SDF. This includes military equipment, such 
as communication devices and bombs, as well as, documents that were taken from IS positions.  
 
Figure 89 Communication devices taken from IS headquarters 
 




Figure 91 Bombs taken from IS positions 
 
Figure 92 documents collected from IS headquarters   
Additionally, RT showed IS smuggling tunnels, booby-trapped vehicles, and mines.  
 




Figure 94 IS tunnels in Al Shaddadi 
 
Figure 95 A member of the SDF points at a bobby trapped vehicle  
 
Figure 96 Explosive devices made by IS 
Showing the equipment and documents collected from IS headquarters and taking audiences inside 
tunnels establish a classic iconography of victory. Such images tell viewers that the areas where 
the US-backed SDF operate have been cleared of the enemy.     
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The reports that covered the military actions led by the opposition factions against IS included 
panoramic scenes, showing military deployments or smoke as a result of Turkish air strikes. 
However, the Syrian opposition factions and the Turkish forces were not visualised.  
 
Figure 97 Turkish military deployments in Northern Syria 
 
Figure 98 Turkish air support for the Syrian opposition 
Finally, in terms of military failings, RT did not show military losses on the side of the SDF. It 
broadcast images, showing bodies of IS fighters who were reported to have been killed in battles 
with the SDF, in few reports. For example, RT quoted a member of the SDF as saying: “we will 
avenge from Daesh fighters and we will follow them to Manbij, Al Bab, Dir Ez-zor, and Jarablus. 
We will clear Syria of the whole organisation” (RT, 10 June 2016). At the scene, as he was talking, 




Figure 99 A member of IS killed in Manbij    
 
Figure 100 Members of IS killed in clashes with the SDF in Syria 
In conclusion, the visuals of the military frame support the verbal discourse, by showing the active 
agency of the US-backed SDF and the military failings of IS. The verbal texts which refer to deaths 
on the side of the SDF lack the power of pictorial presence. Throughout the sample, RT allowed 
the SDF and US soldiers to relate to viewers through the camera, but it did not give access to the 
Syrian opposition factions. As this research seeks to explore how RT as an international news 
channel responded to the policies of its country when it covered the multi-sided war on IS in Syria, 
it can be argued that the exclusion of the voice, as well as the visuals of the Syrian opposition, is 
an indication of taking sides in this conflict. By rendering the Syrian opposition factions irrelevant 
to the scenes of the war on IS and framing their military activities in terms of the common interests 
between them and Turkey, RT news discourse deemphasises contribution of the Syrian opposition 
to the war against international terrorism. RT reporting gives the impression that liberating the 
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Syrian people from IS is not the primary goal of these anti-regime rebels. This leads to conclude 
that when rivals fight against a common enemy, news media outlets may tend to support their 
countries of origin by deemphasising the role of the rivals that have greatly dissimilar policies, 
while the actors, that have less dissimilar policies, the SDF in this case, are represented positively. 
The humanitarian aspect of the US-led intervention  
In what follows, I discuss how RT framed the humanitarian situation in the context of the US-led 
war in Syria verbally and visually.   
On the verbal plane  
This section concentrates on the verbal framing of the impact of the US-led war on the 
humanitarian situation in Syria. It examines how the identities of the military actors involved and 
civilians are constructed. I have shown, in the previous section, that the US-backed SDF were 
represented on RT screen as liberators who seek to clear Syria of IS. So, in line with this positive 
portrayal, RT framed the US-led military operations in cooperation with the SDF as a humanitarian 
response to help the people in IS-held areas. To build this frame, RT focused on IS’s brutality 
against civilians and relieved the US-led coalition and the SDF of their responsibility in inflicting 
human suffering in this war. So, RT coverage provided a simple representation, setting boundaries 
between the liberators or the benefactors [the US-led coalition including the US-backed SDF] and 
the persecutor [IS].   
This discussion starts with the representation of IS identity. RT portrayed the violence committed 
by IS against civilians, such as deliberate killings, imposing a strict dress code on people, 
particularly women, or taking them as human shields. RT’s reporters allowed civilians who fled 
IS-held territories to tell stories about IS’s oppression, but the organisation voice was not 
represented throughout the sample. 
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For example, RT reported: “Thousands of civilians, who have escaped from Daesh-held areas in 
Manbij and Maskana, are sitting in the shade of olive trees to avoid sunburn. These women, elderly 
people, and children ran from Daesh’s persecution.” Then, a young man from Manbij said: “Daesh 
killed our families. The SDF are here to liberate us” (RT, 5 June 2016). Another report read: “In 
addition to imposing ultraconservative dress code on civilians under their control, Daesh members 
kill and kidnap those who do not obey their orders.” Then, a woman said: “Daesh forces us to 
cover our faces and hands. They do not allow us to move freely.” The reporter commented: 
“Civilians are seeking shelters in the areas controlled by the Military Council of Manbij.  They 
wish to return to their homes after the withdrawal of Daesh” (RT, 16 June 2016).  
This framing involves a clear distinction between the victims and their persecutor. Giving civilians 
a voice in this context operates “as a powerful means of introducing moral argument in the news, 
insofar as it communicates the people’s authentic experience of their suffering as a call for action” 
(Chouliaraki, 2015, p. 107). In the same context, RT reported: 
Local sources have reported that there are more than 300 people, under siege in Daesh 
areas. Women are the most vulnerable group that have suffered from Daesh inhuman 
practices. Some of them have been separated from their husbands while others have been 
exposed to sexual harassment and slavery.  
In the report, a woman was quoted as saying: I have been besieged in Daesh’s areas for 2 months. 
I want to join my husband; he is Kurdish” (RT, 10 August 2016). Also, one of RT journalists 
reported:  
According to local sources, Daesh has been under pressure, as the residents of Manbij 
organised protests, demanding the organisation withdraw from the city. Daesh members 
have killed several protesters, while thousands of women and children have managed to 
flee the city. Women took off the black veil imposed on them when they left Daesh-held 
territories, celebrating liberation from the organisation’s restrictions.  
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In the report a displaced woman said: “Daesh have humiliated our families. We are starving under 
their siege.” A family man said: We were under threat of being killed by Daesh, but we survived 
fortunately” (RT, 20 June 2016). Furthermore, RT reported: “Daesh has killed entire families while 
they were trying to escape from the village of Alnawaja.” A survivor said: “Daesh has planted 
mines everywhere. Many women had lost their lives when they stepped on Daesh’s landmines.” 
The voiceover added: “Civilian residents, particularly women and children, in IS-held areas, have 
been living in very hard conditions” A young man said: “We have been under siege. We have been 
starving. I have no money to buy milk for my daughter” (RT, 11 July 2016).  
So, RT used civilian voices to show the tyranny of IS. The reporters portrayed different aspects of 
suffering for which Daesh only was blamed. The abovementioned testimonies showed IS as an 
aggressor that does not care about the safety of those who live in the ‘Caliphate territories.’ Arab 
viewers are told that people are starving and are humiliated. RT reporting gives the impression that 
civilians fled their homes because of IS persecution only, not because of the US-led coalition 
strikes or the ongoing armed confrontations between the US-backed SDF and IS. RT showed how 
women have been persecuted and how they have taken off the black veil imposed on them by 
Daesh after they fled IS-held territories, which is a marker of freedom from IS. So, civilians in 
these examples and throughout the sample are used as a source of information about what happens 
in IS-controlled territories. Their voice helps legitimise international interventions against IS in 
Syria.    
In respect of the representation of sufferers and the structuring of RT’s audience relationship with 
them, the findings are mixed. In some texts, RT represented the sufferers in terms of statistical or 
collective references (such as civilians, thousands) and humanised them with reference to their 
personal characteristics such as gender or age, for example:  
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- “Thousands of civilians, who have escaped from Daesh-held areas in Manbij and Maskana, are 
sitting in the shade of olive trees to avoid sunburn. These women, elderly people, and children ran 
from Daesh’s persecution” (RT, 5 June 2016). 
- “Local sources have reported that there are more than 300 people, under siege in Daesh areas. 
Women are the most vulnerable group who have suffered from Daesh inhuman practices (RT, 10 
August 2016).  
- “Civilian residents, particularly women and children, in IS-held areas, have been living in 
very hard conditions” (RT, 11 July 2016). 
Besides, the sufferers were personalised in several reports. In the following examples, civilians 
were identified by name and place of origin; also, they were allowed to express themselves and 
blame IS for their suffering.  
One report read: “Abu Abdulla and his family are among dozens of civilians who have managed 
to leave the centre of Manbij. They took a dangerous adventure to escape from Daesh.” Then, Abu 
Abdulla addressed audiences, saying: “Daesh besieges many families. They tried to prevent us 
from leaving the city, but fortunately, we left.” The voiceover commented: “These practices are 
part of the organisation’s oppressive rules which are stricter than the law of the jungle” (RT, 8 
August 2016). The report also told the story of Um Khaled: “Um Khaled is an old woman from 
Manbij whose son was killed by Daesh because he refused to join the organisation.” Then, she 
said in front of the camera: “My son has 6 daughters and two sons. He was killed by Daesh. They 
burned my heart.” Another report read: “Daesh planted mines in Al Haj Awwad’s farm. One of 
his grandchildren has lost his hand, after a mine exploded.” The grandfather commented: “Daesh 
planted landmines in the farm. This is dangerous. These explosive devices can cause deaths.” His 
relative, Jassim, added: “Daesh’s mines exploded when our children stepped on them. One lost his 
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hand, and the other lost his leg.” The voiceover commented: “Dozens were killed by Daesh’s 
mines, and hundreds of besieged civilians have been under threat of being killed by the terrorist 
organisation” (RT, 26 July 2016). Furthermore, RT reported the story of Ibrahim Al Azzawi whose 
relative was killed by IS. According to the voiceover, “Ibrahim Al Azzawy has witnessed the 
execution of his cousin by Daesh in Al Jazira Square.” Al Azzawi said: “They had slaughtered my 
cousin and crucified his corpse, here, for 4 days” (RT, 17 September 2016). 
RT reporters contextualised their stories in a way which emphasises the brutality of IS. Not only 
do RT’s audiences hear the story, but also, they imagine it as they see Al Azzawi showing the 
place and the way in which his relative was crucified. Also, they can see the tears of Um Khaled, 
who cried in front of the camera. In the light of the examples mentioned above RT emphasised the 
agency of IS as a persecutor; this news discourse is morally rich to justify the use of military power 
in Syria through a human discourse which establishes clearly the identity of the aggressor and the 
victims.  
Another central point in the framing of the US-led intervention as a legitimate action is that RT 
always emphasised that the US-led military operations were conducted with due regard for the 
safety of the non-combatants in Syria. Furthermore, RT showed the US-backed SDF’s members 
as benefactors who assisted the displaced people. This portrayal of good conduct during the war 
on terror suppresses the identity of the US-led coalition as a persecutor. In this meaning-making 
process, the voices of the SDF, as well as civilians, were promoted. For example, one report read:  
Arab and Kurdish fighters came from Al Hassaka, Aleppo and Idlib to Minbij in response 
to the appeals of civilians who suffer from the tyranny of Daesh. Manbij is not their final 
destination. They will drive Daesh out of Jarablus, Izzaz and Al Bab. As the US-backed 
SDF have been advancing towards Manbij, they have continued to provide humanitarian 
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assistance to displaced people. In the village of Tal Ursh, the Military Council of Manbij 
provides humanitarian aid to civilians (RT, 16 June 2016). 
Another report read: “The SDF have been slowly advancing. More than 85% of Manbij’s territories 
became under their control. However, they face difficulty in recapturing the whole city as they try 
to avoid casualties.” Then, a member of the SDF said: “We came to help our brothers and sisters 
in Manbij.” Another soldier said: “We managed to liberate some innocent civilians who were taken 
as human shields by Daesh” (RT, 21 July 2016). The voiceover continued: “The US-led coalition 
warplanes strike Daesh’s positions and have occasionally caused civilian casualties” (RT, 21 July 
2016). The use of the word ‘occasionally’ reduces the impact of the statement; it gives the 
impression that the coalition tries to minimise the human costs of the air strikes, but there are 
unavoidable incidents that occur occasionally. In another report, the voiceover commented: “The 
US-led coalition dropped warning leaflets, asking civilians to leave Al Raqqa. Therefore, hundreds 
of people flee to the Kurdish-controlled areas daily.” A displaced person said: “They say that the 
US-backed Kurdish forces will attack the city. People are afraid and want to leave Al Raqqa, but 
Daesh has prevented them” (RT, 5 June 2016). 
Likewise, one of RT’s journalists reported: “When the SDF resumed military operations against 
Daesh in Manbij, they made efforts to avoid civilian causalities. So, they negotiated with Daesh, 
presenting three initiatives to protect the residents who remained in the city, but to no avail”  (RT, 
10 August 2016). The abovementioned reports represented the US-backed SDF as responsible 
fighters who care about the safety of civilians, in contrast to IS that used them as human shields, a 
contrast which emphasises the humanity and morality of the US-backed SDF versus their enemy.  
The last point in this section is the framing of material damage. RT framed the damage which 
resulted from the US-led air strikes and the ground offensives led by the SDF as collateral, that is, 
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as unintended since it occurred in areas where IS targets operated. RT incorporated voices from 
the SDF’s members and civilians who emphasised the SDF’s positive role in Syria. For example, 
one report read: “US-led coalition air strikes and armed clashes between the SDF and Daesh have 
resulted in huge material damage in Manbij. The central market has been burned to the ground by 
Daesh.” A soldier from the SDF said: “This is Manbij’s market. Daesh ordered civilians to 
evacuate the market and burned it then. Daesh’s mission is to destroy everything” (RT, 21 August 
2016). 
Another report read: “The residents of Manbij have started to return gradually to the city where 
the US-led air strikes against Daesh have resulted in material destruction. The SDF’s members 
assisted the returnees. Daesh logos can be seen everywhere in the city.” A member of the SDF 
said: “We liberated Manibij for our people and now we exert efforts to help civilians as they return 
to their homes." A young woman said: “We are happy we returned to our city safely.” The 
voiceover commented: “Dozens of residents returned to the city after they lost some of their 
relatives who were kidnapped or killed by the terrorist organisation” (RT, 13 September 2016). 
This framing invites audiences to consider the material damage caused by the US-led coalition 
strikes in Manbij as justifiable since the mission was accomplished and IS was degraded.  
Hence, RT employed the verbal discourse to show the suffering inflicted on the Syrians by IS 
while the US-led coalition and the SDF were framed as benefactors of the Syrian people. As was 
the case when framing the military aspect of the US-led intervention, RT covered the humanitarian 
situation of the conflict from the perspective of the US-led coalition, particularly, the SDF. The 
sufferers’ voice supports the claims made by the US-backed SDF. RT reporters did not provide 
different views or critical messages. The sufferers were personalised and given the opportunity to 
refer to their persecutor. The humanitarian situation was not raised in the reports that covered the 
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anti-IS operations that were conducted by Syrian opposition factions throughout the sample. As I 
have mentioned earlier, their role was framed in terms of the common interests between them and 
Turkey in northern Syria. Below, I discuss the visual framing of the humanitarian aspect of the 
US-led intervention. 
On the visual plane 
The visual discourse reinforced the verbal one, showing images of sufferers, including women and 
children, who were reported to have been persecuted by IS. As on the verbal plane, IS fighters 
were not visualised. RT reported that the US-led air campaign caused casualties occasionally. The 
visuals showed material damage, but no civilian deaths were reported or shown.  
The analysis starts with the visualisation of the displaced people, who fled IS-held areas. As shown 
in figure [101] a displaced family sit in the shade of olive trees, while the accompanying voiceover 
tells audiences that these people fled IS’s oppression. In the image, the children look at the camera 
which gives them agency and invites RT’s viewers to identify with them.  
 




Figure 102 A displaced child from Manbij 
In figure [102] the sufferer is individual. A displaced child is filmed frontally siting in the shade 
of a tree. This sufferer has an appellative power; his gaze touches the hearts of viewers and evokes 
the moral demand for actions to help the refugees who escaped IS-held territories.   
 
  Figure 103 Displaced children 
In this figure [103], a group of displaced children look happy, while the voiceover reports that 
these sufferers and their families feel safe, as they have managed to leave IS-held territories, and 
that the Military Council of Manbij offered assistance to them. This framing invites viewers to 




Figure 104 A child who lost his hand because of a landmine planted by IS 
In the above figure [104], an amputee child is seen. He was reported to have lost his hand as a 
result of the explosion of a landmine planted by IS. The child is filmed frontally, from a medium 
distance, and he has direct eye contact with audiences who can see and relate to his suffering. This 
image evokes the moral demand to save children, in Syria, whose future is under threat because of 
IS brutality. As RT viewers see this child who has become disabled, they are invited to bear witness 
and denounce IS brutality. This kind of images contributes to moralising the US-led military 
actions. 
In addition to the images of children, RT repeatedly showed images of women who told audiences 
about their suffering and blamed IS for their misfortune. The image below shows a woman who 
was liberated by the SDF. She said she was held captive by IS for two months.   
 




Figure 106 A young woman persecuted by IS 
In the above image [figure 106] a young woman appears along with other civilians. She looks sad 
and tired, and she removed the black veil after she fled IS territories. She has eye contact with the 
audiences, who are asked to relate to her. The accompanying voiceover reported that women were 
exposed to sexual harassment and captivity by IS. Also, the civilians whose personal suffering was 
reported like Abu Abdulla, Um Khaled and Ibrahim Al Azzawi (discussed in the preceding section) 
were shown on the screen, so audiences can see them as well as hear their stories.  
The image below [107] shows Abu Abdulla and his family who were reported to have taken a 
dangerous adventure to leave IS-controlled areas.     
 
Figure 107 Abu Abdulla and his family 
In the following image [108] RT’s audiences can see Um Khaled, who cried as she recalled that 
her son, a father of 8 children, was killed by IS. The viewers can hear the voice of the crying 
mother, who gazes at the camera with a sad facial expression, so they can feel her pain and engage 
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with her suffering. According to Chouliaraki (2006a), the act of “choosing to capture the sufferers' 
gaze with the camera is also one of giving them a voice and humanizing them” (p.89).  
 
Figure 108 Um Khaled, a mother whose son was killed by IS 
Additionally, in the image below, Ibrahim Al Azzawy, appears in front of the camera, showing 
how IS crucified his cousin’s body, so audiences can imagine the tragic memories that he recalls 
and think of the war on IS as a humanitarian response. For Graber, war images have a strong effect 
on how audiences respond to conflicts. She maintains that visuals “make audiences care about an 
issue and the people involved in it” (Graber, 1987, p. 76). On the screen, Al Azzawy remembers 
the horrible killing of his cousin by IS while he [Al Azzawi] feels safe after the withdrawal of IS. 
So, audiences can notice how the situation has changed after the US-led intervention and 
acknowledge the role of the coalition forces and particularly the SDF in saving the lives of this 
man and other survivors in Manbij. 
  
Figure 109 Ibrahim Al Azzawi, a survivor from Manbij 
214 
 
Another point in this analysis is that RT visuals confirmed the identity of the SDF as liberators and 
benefactors. The figure [110] shows families who have returned to their homes; also, in the image, 
a member of the SDF appears in his uniform, next to them. This may lead to mobilise public 
opinion in the Arab world in favour of the US-led intervention against IS. 
 
Figure 110 A member of the SDF next to returnees in Manbij 
The image [111] shows a member of the SDF who is filmed frontally, gazing at audiences, while 
she explains the efforts taken by the SDF to help the civilians who appear in the background.    
 
Figure 111 A member of the SDF talks about efforts to relieve civilians 
The last point in this visual analysis is that the images of destruction resulting from US-led air 
strikes were often accompanied by texts that reduced their negative connotations. RT framed these 




Figure 112 Material damage as result of the US-led war against IS 
 
Figure 113 A building destroyed as a result of US-led air strikes in Manbij 
Thus, the visuals showed Syrian sufferers individually as well as in groups. RT focused on the 
images of vulnerable groups, particularly women and children. The visuals did not show civilian 
deaths, throughout the sample. The SDF’s soldiers were shown in control of the recaptured areas 
while civilians started to return to their homes. I would emphasise that RT reports can be 
considered as "witnessing texts" in terms of Frosh (2006) since they enable audiences to witness 
the suffering inflicted by IS in Syria and evoke the need for a response to help civilians. So, RT 
invites viewers to bear witness. I recall Tait’s argument that “to bear witness describes the act of 
appealing to an audience to share responsibility for the suffering of others” (2011, p.1233). By 
emphasising IS brutality and humanising the sufferers, whose portrayals move beyond statistical 
terms and who blamed IS for their suffering, RT attempted to influence Arab viewers’ emotions 
and invited them to engage with the Syrian sufferers; this “includes hearing the appeal, being 
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affected by it, and translating that affectedness into emotions that moralize public action” (Tait, 
2011, p.1233). In this context, RT suppressed the identity of the US-led coalition as an aggressor. 
Its news discourse encourages Arab audiences to think of the US-led intervention, as morally 
needed to help the Syrians who have suffered from IS violence, while the violent actions taken by 
the coalition in this conflict were represented as unintended. I recall Rentschler’s (2004) argument 
that bearing witness is never innocent of politics. RT emphasised the positive role led by the US-
backed SDF against the common enemy, IS, since their military actions do not conflict with 
Russia’s agenda as long as they target IS only, although Russia does not support the US war 
strategy. As noted previously, this positive framing can be also attributed to the fact the both Russia 
and the US, along with other Western countries, suffered from IS terrorism.  
When RT represented the role of the US-backed Syrian opposition factions against IS, it did not 
frame their efforts as an attempt to end the human suffering inflicted by IS. There is thus variation 
in the politics of suffering, as well as the representation of military action and governance, which 









7.2 The representation of the Russian military intervention in Syria 
As mentioned earlier, Russia launched a military air campaign in Syria with the stated purpose to 
degrade IS, in cooperation with Al Assad regime, and Putin called for the formation of a global 
coalition under the auspices of the UN to defeat international terrorism. In what follows, I study 
how RT covered the military intervention of its country of origin in Syria.  
The governance aspect of the Russian intervention  
This section addresses the representation of local and international support for Russia’s military 
intervention. So, it looks at what voices are included from the Russian government, how their 
claims are incorporated in relation to other supportive or critical voices or in relation to the 
journalists’ voices, what messages are selectively promoted, and what implications are involved 
in this representation. 
Throughout the study sample, RT highlighted the legality of the Russian military actions which 
have been taken upon the request of the Syrian president, and it emphasised the need for global 
cooperation in order to defeat IS. These messages were echoed by Russian and Syrian official 
voices. The legitimacy of the Russian involvement is asserted through contrast to the illegitimacy 
of the US-led air campaign which was launched without the Syrian government’s approval, though 
the US-led military actions were framed positively, as discussed earlier. Also, legitimacy of the 
Russian campaign is asserted through the voice of Syrian citizens who welcomed Russia’s 
intervention.  
The analysis begins with the situation in Russia. RT promoted official voices from the Kremlin 
such as the Russian President Putin, the minister of foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov, the minister of 
defence Sergey Shoygu as well as members of the Russian Federation Council. It also quoted 
political experts who supported Moscow’s stance. Oppositional voices were absent, as far as the 
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sample provides evidence for.  That is to say, the reports reflected the consensus among the Russian 
official institutions regarding the military intervention in Syria, as shown in the following 
examples:  
One report read: 
In confirmation with the article NO102, section one, in the constitution of the Russian 
Federation and upon the request of the Syrian President, the Federation Council has 
approved the use of armed forces in Syria. President Putin has stressed his will to encounter 
terrorism through pre-emptive military actions.  
Then, Putin was shown saying:  
I have been granted the Federation’s permission to use military force in Syria. The only 
and best solution to defeat international terrorism in Syria and the neighbouring countries 
is to take pre-emptive steps to face the terrorists in the territories where they operate, rather 
than waiting until they reach our home. 
The voiceover commented: “The Russian action is legitimate since it has been taken upon a request 
made by President Al Assad. This intervention seeks to protect Moscow’s national security 
interests as there are Russian citizens fighting for Daesh.” The deputy chairman of the Federation 
Council of Russia, Ilyas Umakhanov addressed the camera, saying: 
The Western countries have conducted air strikes in Syria without the UN Security 
Council's approval and their actions have been proved ineffective. However, our 
intervention is legal since it is a response to a request made by the Syrian President, and 
we will coordinate our actions with the Syrian army. Therefore, the Russian strikes will be 
definitely effective.  
Another member of the Russian Federation Council addressed audiences, saying: “Unlike the 
Western countries, we do not support one side against the other in Syria. We wish to cooperate 
with the Syrian opposition or any other party.” The reporter commented: “Calling for a broad 
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coalition to fight terrorism, the Kremlin is resolved to support the Syrian army in the war on Daesh, 
in accordance with the resolutions of international legitimacy” (RT, 1 October 2015). 
Similarly, another report read: “The minister of foreign affairs Lavrov has stressed that Russia 
seeks to destroy Daesh, Al Nusra Front and their followers; it does not seek to support one side 
against the other in the Syrian crisis. Russia does not consider the Free Army as a terrorist 
organisation.” Then, Lavrov was quoted as saying: “We have not designated the members of the 
Free Syrian Army as terrorists. We target only the armed groups that are designated by the UN as 
well as the Russian laws as terrorists.”  The reporter estimated: “The Russian intervention is 
legitimate since it is preceded by an official request from the Syrian government, unlike the US-
led action.” Lavrov was quoted again as saying: “If the US-led coalition targets terror groups in 
Syria, we do the same thing.” The reporter commented: “Lavrov said that President Putin’s call 
for a broad coalition against terrorism has begun to evoke positive responses. He has stressed that 
it is unacceptable and illegal to exclude the Syrian government from counterterrorism actions” 
(RT, 2 October 2015).  
In these texts, all the reported sources are supportive of the Kremlin’s policy. They were 
represented uncritically. These patterns emerge clearly in the evaluative language through which 
sources were framed, and preferred meanings were established. Journalistic evaluations were 
added to show the adequacy of Russia’s war strategy. Throughout the above texts, Russian officials 
drew attention to the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the Kremlin’s military involvement in 
Syria. They represented Russia’s military campaign as a pre-emptive war that was launched to 
destroy IS. RT reporters made lexical choices that support these official messages. They referred 
to “Moscow’s national security interests,” noting that “there are Russian citizens, fighting for 
Daesh.” They described the Russian military campaign as “legitimate”, in contrast to the US-led 
220 
 
action. One reporter estimated: “The Kremlin is resolved to support the Syrian army in the war on 
Daesh, in accordance with the resolutions of international legitimacy.” 
This reporting style is quite authoritarian because it does not leave a distance between the 
politician’s claim and the journalist’s account of it. By stating consistently that Russia’s strikes are 
legitimate and pre-emptive, RT reporters leave no room for critical messages or other views. This 
raises questions about RT reporting style as it seems a deliberate act of propaganda (a mouthpiece 
for the government).  
In the same context, RT reported: “Moscow has intervened in Syria upon the request of the Syrian 
government, and it seeks to destroy terrorism in cooperation with the Syrian army and other 
Western partners.” A Russian political expert said: “There is a need to coordinate counterterrorism 
efforts. A new intelligence centre that has staff from Russia, Syria, Iraq, and Iran has been created 
and the door is open for those that wish to participate. Russia is ready for information sharing with 
the US-led coalition.” The reporter commented: “Despite international divisions over 
counterterrorism policies in Syria, Moscow stresses that it will continue its anti-Daesh operations 
in coordination with the Syrian army” (RT, 2 November 2015).  
It is noticeable that RT accepted without question the Kremlin’s political discourse which 
promotes the war in Syria as a pre-emptive action. This media-state relationship is clear and 
unqualified. It should be noted that such a relationship is common in wartime, particularly when 
governments declare “war on terrorism.” For example, in the coverage of the war in Iraq (2003), 
the US media supported their country, although they are not owned or funded by the White House. 
According to Piety and Foley (2006), “the American media accepted without question the Bush 
administration’s doctrine of ‘pre-emptive war’” (p. 65). 
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In the above texts and throughout the sample, RT promoted the idea that the Kremlin has acted in 
parallel with the US campaign against the same enemy but adopted a more effective strategy in 
contrast to it. This news discourse which compares the US-led intervention with the Russian one 
reflects the view of the ruling elites. For some critics, Putin seeks to increase Russia’s profile in 
Syria and the whole region to restore it to the status of a great superpower (Dawisha, 2015). 
According to Plakoudas (2015), “Putin is striving to transform the international system into a 
multipolar world in which the United States will share power with Russia and other powers” (p.37). 
Central to the legitimisation process of Russia’s military action is promoting the satisfaction of the 
Syrian regime and people with this move.  RT communicated the idea that both the Syrian regime 
and citizens welcome the Russian support. One of RT’s reports read: “The Syrian President Al 
Assad says that the Western policies towards Syria hinder his government's efforts to fight against 
terrorism.” In contrast, he estimated: “The Russian counterterrorism operations, in cooperation 
with the Syrian army defend Syria, Iraq and the whole region and seek to protect Russia and 
Europe.” Then, a political advisor to the Syrian president said: “President Al Assad is committed 
to fighting terrorism. Counterterrorism actions in Syria should be carried out legally in cooperation 
with the Syrian army.” The voiceover commented: “President Al Assad stressed his will to destroy 
terrorism and praised the Russian support to achieve this goal” (RT, 6 December 2015). 
Another report which promoted the Syrian regime approval of Russia’s involvement in Syria read: 
“Russian air strikes have targeted different areas in the north, the middle and the east of Syria. 
Officials in Damascus are optimistic about the outcomes of Russia’s air campaign.” RT reporter 
interviewed a political advisor to the Syrian President who said: “Russia is serious about fighting 
terrorism; it always deals with the issues that concern Syria credibly and carefully. So, we expect 
its efforts to succeed. For me, the Russian actions and the US-led operations are incomparable.” 
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She added: “The Russians seek to destroy terrorism in its place of origin in cooperation with the 
Syrian army; therefore, they are welcome” (RT, 1 October 2015). Similarly, the Syrian minister of 
foreign affairs, Walid Al Mualim, was shown welcoming the Russian campaign. The voiceover 
reported: 
Addressing the UN General Assembly, the Syrian minister of foreign affairs Al Mualim 
has asserted that the Syrian government will pursue the war on terrorism. He welcomed 
the Russian air campaign, which have been launched in coordination with the Syrian army. 
Al Mualim has stressed that only through cooperation with the Syrian army can 
counterterrorism actions be effective. 
The minister was shown as saying: “He who seeks to encounter terrorism in Syria needs to 
coordinate with the Syrian government” (RT, 3 October 2015). 
So, RT communicated the Syrian-Russian agreement on how international terrorism should be 
fought. Russia and Syria were always referred to as allies. As shown, RT reports included positive 
expectations of the outcomes of the Russian intervention. For example, Syrian officials were 
framed as “optimistic” about the outcomes of the Russian military actions. Russia was described, 
by Syrian officials, as a “serious” actor whose efforts are expected to succeed. Moreover, RT 
reporters specified that Syria and Russia have been fighting against terror groups, namely IS and 
Al Nusra Front. By naming targets, RT participates in the legitimisation of Russia’s military 
intervention in Syria. This reporting style is a textbook case of television as public diplomacy. 
Throughout the examples discussed above, RT discourse draws distinctions between Russia’s air 
campaign and the US-led air campaign and invites audiences to support the Kremlin’s war policy 
which was justified through contrasting it with the US war policy. This reporting style reflects RT 
role as an extension of Putin’s foreign policies, which aim at challenging the US hegemony in the 
Middle East as well as other parts of the world.   
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 RT reports showed that the Syrian people are, like their government, optimistic and satisfied with 
the Russian move. For example, one report read: “Destroying the infrastructure of the terrorist 
organisations in Syria and cutting their supply routes are the most important objectives of the 
Russian air campaign. The Syrians are optimistic about outcomes of this intervention.” Then, an 
ordinary man was interviewed. He said: “This is a good action taken by Russia. It is a response to 
a request made by the Syrian government and its people.” Another man said: “This is a positive 
development; the strikes are precise, and we are optimistic” (RT, 8 October 2015). Similarly, in 
another report, the voiceover commented: “The residents of Latakia welcomed the Russian 
military campaign which supports the Syrian army in the war against terrorism.” A woman was 
interviewed in the report. She said: “Thank God, we hope that the war stops soon so that we can 
return to our homes.” Also, a young man said: “The Russian involvement is urgently needed. After 
the Russian intervention, we feel safe, we are happy” (RT, 7 October 2015). The use of collective 
references to “the Syrians” and “residents” implies that the Syrians are unified, and all the people 
support Russia’s air campaign, something which is certainly not the case since there is a civil war 
going on in parallel with the war on IS. Throughout the sample, RT reports suppressed the tensions 
between the Syrian people and their government, backed by Russia; in other words, the voices that 
criticise the Russian-Syrian alliance were absent. This can be read in the context of RT’s role as a 
tool of Russian public diplomacy. The war began in the context of political and religious 
differences, so Syria cannot be reduced to one view, which supports the Russia-Syria cooperation. 
RT has given a broad view which reflects its sponsor’s preferred perspective only. So, this news 
channel is not aiming at credibly which involves reflecting political differences in Syria, but it 
seeks to put meaning in the service of power. I have shown earlier how AJA operated within the 
same logic, using the voices of civilians in a way that reinforces the policies of the ruling elites in 
224 
 
Qatar. AJA gave civilians a voice to criticise Russia’s intervention and blame it for their suffering.  
It did not reflect political differences in the Syrian society, as noticed throughout the sample of the 
study.  
In addition to the Syrian regime, RT promoted supportive voices from Egypt that reflected the 
Russian- Egyptian rapprochement over the war on international terrorism and the need for global 
counterterrorism policies. For example, one report read: “The Russian military operations have 
evoked positive responses in Egypt. The Egyptian President Abd al- Fatah al-Sisi has stressed, in 
a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, the necessity to intensify international 
efforts to face transnational terrorist organisations.” Then, a key journalist in Al Ahram Newspaper 
was interviewed in the report. He said: “For Egypt, terrorism should be fought at regional and 
global levels.” The voiceover commented: “The Russian move against the terrorist organisations 
in Syria is consistent with the Egyptian policies that emphasise the need for global actions to defeat 
terrorism.” (RT, 18 November 2015). Similarly, another piece of footage covered Sergey Shoygu’s 
visit to Cairo, reporting: “The Russian defence minister Shoygu and the Egyptian President al-Sisi 
have stressed that their countries will continue to hold consultations on counterterrorism issues to 
prevent terror groups from recruiting new members and dry up their sources of funding.” A 
political expert was interviewed in the report. He said: “Egypt and Russia stand together against 
transnational terrorism.” Then, the reporter commented: “Cairo has shown its full support for the 
Russian military operations in Syria. Both countries will continue to fight against Daesh” (RT, 24 
November 2015). So, the voices of the Russian and Egyptian officials were not quoted directly as 
calling for global cooperation. Egyptian intellectuals [experts, journalists] were interviewed; they 
promoted the importance of global unity to defeat terrorism. These intellectuals can be considered 
as opinion leaders, but they do not represent the official stance of Egypt. 
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 In addition to quoting official voices indirectly, RT used metonymical expressions such as “Cairo” 
to refer to the Egyptian response, which makes the news language imprecise. This 
contextualization does not help audiences make informed judgments about what they watch. 
However, it shows that Russia is not isolated as there are some Arab Sunni regimes and 
intellectuals supporting its policies, in addition to its Shia allies. The reporters used positive lexical 
choices, telling viewers about “positive” response from Cairo, and “full support for the Russian 
military operations in Syria.” The reports have concentrated on the need for global cooperation in 
the field of counterterrorism, but they exclude any messages that refer to negative effects which 
can result from the Russian military actions. Other supportive voices from the likes of Hezbollah 
or Iran are not found in the sample although they could have existed elsewhere in the reporting, so 
no analysis can be made of how they are represented. 
When RT framed responses from Arab and European leaders, who are members of the US-led 
coalition, it selectively promoted messages that raised the need for global unity and emphasised 
the common interests between Russia and the West in the fighting against terrorism. For example, 
RT communicated the disagreement between Russia and the Gulf states over Syria. However, it 
deemphasised this divergence by promoting the necessity of continuous coordination in the field 
of counterterrorism, as shown below.  
RT reported: “The 4th meeting of the strategic dialogue between Russia and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council which was held in Moscow focused on Syria. The Russian foreign minister Lavrov has 
stressed the negotiations about the coordination of military operations with the US coalition have 
not been finalised.” He was then shown saying:  
The effectiveness of the anti-terrorist operation in Syria is still being impeded by the fact 
that many groups of the so-called “patriotic opposition” are mixed in on the ground with 
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terrorist groups, primarily Al Nusra Front. Since last February the Americans have 
promised us in the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and via bilateral channels that 
they will soon achieve, through representatives loyal to them, the division on the ground 
of the loyal patriotic opposition from Al Nusra Front. This has not happened for the time 
being even though the ceasefire declared by the UN Security Council took effect three 
months ago. 
The voiceover continued: “The Saudi foreign minister talked about disagreements over the fate of 
President Al Assad and the names of opposition factions that are entitled to participate in the 
negotiations process in Geneva.”  The Saudi minister Adil Al Jubeir said: “The Syrian opposition 
groups that met in Riyadh are entitled to represent the Syrian people.” The reporter commented: 
“All the participants emphasised the importance of continued cooperation on counterterrorism and 
the need for the international community to deploy efforts to settle the Syrian crisis” (RT, 26 May 
2016). This text reflected the disagreement between Russia and the Gulf over Syria, but the 
reporter allowed the Russian official to explain the situation in the field, justify the Kremlin’s 
stance, and blame the US for the slow progress of the military operations against IS and Al Nusra 
Front in Syria. The Gulf’s critical voice was reported briefly, while the reporter’s evaluative 
statement deemphasised the tensions between Russia and the Gulf countries.     
As was the case when reporting the Egyptian stance, RT promoted European voices that raised the 
need for the formation of a united front against IS and for cooperation with Russia. In the following 
texts, European officials were quoted directly, and their statements were contextualised in a way 
that deemphasised the tensions between Russia and key members of the US-led coalition over 
Syria. RT reported: “The British prime minister David Cameron evoked the possibility of 
cooperating with Russia in the context of the international campaign against Daesh.” The British 
official was quoted as saying: “It is obvious that we should work together to defeat international 
terrorism which threatens the UK, Russia, and the whole world.” The voiceover added: “Crispin 
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Blunt, the Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Commons welcomed this idea 
since the goal is to eliminate the global threat posed by Daesh.” Blunt said in front of the camera: 
The role of Russia in the international cooperation is very important. Russia is a permanent 
member in the United Nations Security Council, which facilitates the coordination between 
us. Since we face a common enemy, we should work with Russia and other international 
partners. 
Then, the voiceover commented: “This recent development in the Russian-British relations may 
lead to further cooperation in various fields, particularly, terrorism” (RT, 20 November 2015). 
Similarly, RT portrayed a convergence between France and Russia in the fight against terrorism. 
Covering a visit paid by the French President François Hollande to Moscow, RT reported:  
President Putin’s call for a broad coalition against terrorism has evoked positive responses 
in the light of the significant outcomes of Russia’s air campaign in Syria and after the 
attacks perpetrated by Daesh in several countries. France and Russia agreed to cooperate 
and exchange intelligence on terrorist groups in Syria. 
Putin said in front of the camera: “We agreed on mechanisms for cooperation with the US-led 
coalition in the near future.” The voiceover added: “Hollande stressed that the areas held by the 
Syrian opposition factions should be avoided.” Then, the French official was shown saying: “We 
agreed on information sharing and the coordination of military operations in the skies of Syria. We 
should concentrate on the so-called “the Islamic State” (RT, 26 November 2015). Similarly, RT 
reported: “The German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has stressed the necessity to 
unify all efforts to tackle terrorism.” Then, he was quoted directly as saying: “After the latest tragic 
attacks in Brussels and those which took place in Paris, Tunisia, Istanbul, and other cities, it has 
become clear that fighting terrorism lies within our common interests. We should take actions to 
prevent terror groups from carrying out attacks in our countries.” The voiceover commented: 
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“Destroying terrorism requires international cooperation, a necessity which the Europeans have 
emphasised after Brussels attacks” (RT, 23 March 2016).    
As shown, European voices were promoted as they echoed Russia’s preferred messages in relation 
to the need for global counterterrorism actions. A UK official was quoted as talking about a 
“common enemy” and the German foreign minister referred to “common interests” in global 
counterterrorism actions. So, RT coverage focused on the common interests between European 
countries and Russia. RT Journalists referred to IS attacks in Europe, which have resulted in a 
rapprochement between countries like France or Germany and Russia. Since RT reports in a 
particular Kremlin-centric context, its news discourse is oriented to deemphasise the gap between 
Russia and other regional or international actors, particularly in relation to Syria. This framing 
contrasts with AJA’s reporting which promoted criticisms of Russia’s war in Syria by regional and 
international actors. 
In the light of the abovementioned, it is possible to say that RT reflected the Kremlin’s voice. 
Throughout the sample, the reporting focused on messages that legitimise the Russian intervention. 
In this context, the Russian air campaign was promoted as a pre-emptive action which aimed at 
defending Russia’s national security and fighting international terrorism. The voices of the Russian 
officials were quoted specifically, as they justified the Russian move. As mentioned above, RT 
reflected a consensus in Russia on the intervention in Syria. Also, this news channel promoted 
Syrian and Egyptian positive responses to the Russian move. I recall that when RT covered the 
governance aspect of the US-led war on IS, the White House officials were framed in a defensive 
position, admitting the limited effect of the US-led air campaign. The voices of the US 
Administration’s representatives were followed by critical voices which was not the case in the 
contextualisation of Russian sources since no critical voices were reported. A common message 
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that recurred in the framing of the governance aspect in relation to the rival interventions is the 
need for global cooperation in the war against international terrorism. RT quoted Russian, Arab 
and European voices which emphasised that need. Also, RT’s journalists, in their comments, 
emphasised the need for global counterterrorism actions. This discourse reinforces Putin’s call for 
the formation of a new coalition against terrorism under the auspices of the UN.  
In terms of professional practices, RT’s reporters did not adhere to professional standards of 
journalism. They did not leave a distance between their account and the Russian officials’ claims. 
Also, they did not reflect divisions among the people in Syria over Russia’s military campaign. It 
can be said that RT’s reporters internalised and reproduced the discourse of the war on terror which 
was promoted by the Kremlin.  
The military aspect of the Russian intervention 
This section explores how RT portrayed the Russian and Syrian coordinated military actions, on 
the verbal and the visual planes. 
On the verbal plane  
This section looks at how RT portrays Russia’s military power in Syria. Also, it covers how the 
Russian forces and their Syrian allies are represented in terms of action and agency, how their 
voices are incorporated in relation to other sources or in relation to journalists’ voices, and whether 
non-official voices are used to evaluate the role of the Russian or the Syrian forces. So, the analysis 
will show whether the military dimension is reported differently to the positively evaluated 
political one. 
The discussion starts with the representation of Russia’s air power. Throughout the study sample, 
RT focused on Russia’s air superiority in Syria. It also portrayed the effectiveness of the 
coordinated Russian-Syrian military operations against IS. In this meaning-making process, RT 
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provided information about the advanced combat warplanes deployed by Russia in Syria such as 
the Sukhoi Su-30SM, Su-30, Su-25. It also depicted the missile defence systems S-400 and S-300. 
RT reporters constructed the identity of Russia in human terms (Russian pilots) and non-human 
terms (warplanes, fighter jets). Their reporting of the conflict gives the impression that the Russian 
Air Force has launched a clean air war thanks to its advanced military power, which has facilitated 
the accurate bombing of IS headquarters, as shown in the examples below.  
One report read:  
The Sukhoi Su-30 is one of the super-manoeuvrable fighters developed by Russia. This 
warplane can be armed with air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles. It can be deployed in 
counter-air strikes, counter-land, and counter-sea missions. Also, it can conduct early 
warning tasks. It is capable of carrying advanced precision weapons, which helps avoid 
civilian casualties. It is noteworthy that preventing casualties remains a priority for the 
Russian pilots in this air campaign (RT, 6 October 2015).  
In another report, RT portrayed the advanced combat capabilities of S-400 missile defence systems 
deployed in Syria: 
Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft weapon system is very sophisticated in terms of combat 
capabilities. The system can simultaneously engage 36 targets at the height of 300 
kilometres, with a maximum speed of 4,800 meters per second. It is capable of tracking 
300 targets at a range of 600 km. The maximum height for the detection of the target is 100 
km. Besides, the guided-missile cruiser ‘Moskva’ has been deployed to defend Russia’s 
aircraft in Syria. This ship is equipped with the S-300 long-range air defence system” (RT, 
25 December 2015).  
In a third news text, RT reported:  
Upon the request of Damascus, Russia sent warplanes to support the Syrian army in the 
fight against the terrorist organization, Daesh. These military planes include Su-24, Su-25, 
and the modernized version Su-34. The Russian fighter jets carry out strikes day and night, 
targeting Daesh’s positions. 
231 
 
In the report a Russian soldier was quoted as saying: “We have accomplished all the combat 
missions assigned to us, and we have not targeted any civilian objects” (RT, 4 October 2015). 
Moreover, RT described the bombs used in Syria as “the world's most advanced guided bombs 
whose margins of error do not exceed 2 meters, to avoid the risk of collateral damage” (RT, 5 
October 2015). 
By showing made-in-Russia high technology military equipment, RT has contributed to 
reinforcing the position of Russia as a key superpower in Syria and the region. It also invites Arab 
viewers to trust Russia’s military capabilities in the fight against IS. This reporting style is common 
in wartime when news media employ their discourses to legitimise military actions led by their 
governments. It reminds us of the coverage of the US-led war in Afghanistan by CNN. According 
to Jasperson and Kikhia (2003), CNN’s “rhetoric of the war in Afghanistan reflected a focus on 
the technology of the battle. A focus on military capabilities, precision technology, ‘clean 
language’ and euphemism by military experts and media allowed Western audiences to remove 
any idea that lives were being lost in the battles” (p.121).  
RT represented the Russian pilots in Syria as responsible agents that take actions against IS, with 
due regard for the safety of civilians. The framing of Russia’s air power gives the impression that 
the Kremlin used the Federation’s armed forces in Syria to target IS and Al Nusra Front only, with 
minimal human cost. To further legitimise the Kremlin’s military involvement in Syria and 
emphasise Russia’s air superiority, RT promoted details about the Russian aerial activities in the 
skies over Syria. Its journalists relied on the Russian official story, reporting authoritative sources 
that provided information about the number of strikes that were conducted, the type of the targets, 
and their locations. For example, RT reported: “Thanks to the Russian air campaign, the Syrian 
army managed to recapture areas from Daesh and Al Nusra Front. The Russian Air Force hit the 
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terrorists’ headquarters in Idlib, Latakia, and Deir Ez Zor.” Then, the spokesman of the Russian 
defence ministry, Igor Konashenkov, said: “During the last 24 hours, Russian warplanes conducted 
precision air strikes against Daesh positions in Syria. Our airmen launched 41 strikes on 40 targets 
in Aleppo, Idlib, and Latakia.” The voiceover commented: “These strikes have led to remarkable 
results and destroyed Daesh’s military equipment near Aleppo. In Idlib, Su-25 bombarded a 
training centre established by the terrorist organisation” (RT, 15 January 2016). This reporting 
style shows that Russia has led a legitimate campaign that targets IS headquarters precisely and 
seriously, with the desired effect. No counterclaims are included. Also, as in the reporting of US 
and allied forces, IS sources were excluded. 
Similarly, another report read: “The Russian air force has continued to carry out strikes against the 
terrorists, who have sustained losses in Syria. The ministry of defence said that Daesh and Al 
Nusra Front have withdrawn from several positions.” A Russian military official was quoted as 
saying: “Russian warplanes are continuing to conduct air strikes in Syria against the terrorist 
organizations, Daesh and Al Nusra Front. They conducted 59 air strikes and destroyed 94 positions 
in Hama, Idlib, Latakia, Damascus, and Deir Ez-Zor.” The reporter commented: “Three training 
centres run by Daesh and a weapon store owned by Al Nusra Front were destroyed. This 
information contests claims circulated in Western media that Russia targets civilian infrastructure” 
(RT, 26 December 2015). This framing shows that RT takes into consideration the other 
representations of the Russian military campaign in the Western media and seeks to contest them. 
Also, RT reported: “In the last two days, Russian warplanes hit hundreds of Daesh and Al Nusra 
Front facilities in different areas. Su-25s targeted weapon stores near Kofor Nbuda and intensified 
their bombardment of Daesh positions in Mahin.” The spokesman of the ministry of defence 
Konashenkov said:  
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Russian fighter jets hit 237 positions held by Daesh in Hama, Latakia, Homs, Damascus, 
Aleppo, and Al Raqqa. In Palmyra, Russian warplanes conducted 131 combat sorties and 
destroyed Daesh’s gun stores, and in Harassta village, Russian air strikes targeted a 
munition store and a training centre used by Daesh to train its foreign members. 
The voiceover commented: “These attacks reflect Russia’s commitment to destroy terrorism in 
Syria” (RT, 11 March 2016).  So, RT promoted news stories in which the reported military sources, 
as well as the reporters use a precise language to depict the military activities conducted by the 
Russian Air Force in Syria. Such details about the number of air strikes and the type/number of 
the targeted objects in addition to the use of the term “terrorist” to describe these targets help 
communicate the idea that Russia has a specific counterterrorism mission in Syria and that the 
Kremlin is serious about eliminating IS as well as Al Nusra Front. However, this precise language 
leads to distracting audiences from impacts of Russia’s strikes on the humanitarian situation in 
Syria and helps obscure other goals which this superpower may seek to achieve. All the reports 
that covered the Russian military actions contribute to the discourse of a clean and justifiable war 
since they give the impression that all the targeted objects are legitimate [IS and Al Nusra Front]. 
In the sample, RT did not report strikes against the positions of the Syrian opposition factions or 
residential areas.  
In addition to the portrayal of the military power and actions of the Russian Air Force, another 
important point in this section is the representation of the military cooperation between Russia and 
the Syrian regime against IS. In the framing of these joint efforts, RT reporters made lexical 
choices which carry positive values. They relied on the Syrian official story, using specifically 
quoted military sources. Also, non-official sources were used to evaluate the situation. The Syrian 
regime was always portrayed in a powerful position against IS. For example, one report read:  
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The Syrian army has won a victory in battles against Daesh, in Aleppo, lifting the two-
year-long siege which was imposed on Kuweires airbase. Syrian troops have recaptured 
the airbase and released several soldiers who were detained by Daesh. This operation which 
was conducted with Russian air support has resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries 
among Daesh fighters.  
Then, a military expert was interviewed in the report. He said: “After taking control over Kuweires 
airbase, the Syrian army will continue its military operations in Aleppo.” Another expert 
commented: “Syrian and Russian forces still have a huge task to accomplish” (RT, 11 November 
2015). Similarly, the voiceover reported in another text: “The Syrian army, backed by Russian air 
cover, managed to recapture Palmyra from the terrorist organisation, Daesh.” Then, a Syrian 
official commented: “Russian forces have played a central role in removing mines from the city. 
They have cleared more than 3000 landmines left by Daesh. The liberation of Palmyra would have 
been impossible without Russia's air support.” The voiceover commented: “The liberation of 
Palmyra is a victory for Russia and Syrian Arab army as they contributed to saving the city’s 
historical heritage from the grip of Daesh terror” (RT, 29 September 2016).  
Also, RT reported: “The Syrian army stormed Al Qaryatain in the countryside of Homs and drove 
Daesh members out of the town.” An officer in the Syrian army said in front of the camera: “We 
managed to enter Al Qaryatain. Now, we are clearing the mines which Daesh left behind.” Another 
soldier said: “The Syrian army has experience in the fight against terror groups. We liberated Al 
Qaryatain from Daesh, and we are moving towards Al Nussir, Al Barda, and Deir Ez Zor.” The 
voiceover commented: “Backed by Russian air support, the Syrian army has launched an operation 
against Daesh positions in Homs and made remarkable gains. After the liberation of Al Qaryatain, 
the army managed to clear Daesh fighters from east Qalamoun” (RT, 3 April 2016).  
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RT framing of Russian and Syrian actions is episodic, as the reporters narrate the immediate events 
and give no information about context. This reporting style allows a simplified and detached 
narrative of liberation, free from the complexity of the political situation in Syria. RT reporters 
framed the recapture of Palmyra and Qaryatain as an action that aimed at liberating these areas. 
This portrayal gives the impression that the Syrian regime’s forces are heroes who protected their 
people, but this representation might be misleading as the people in the recaptured areas may not 
be supportive of the Syrian regime. In this case, the pro-regime soldiers would not be acting against 
IS only but also against those who do not support the Syrian government, that is to say, the Syrian 
forces would be persecutors, not liberators. But such complexities that relate to the internal conflict 
were suppressed in all RT reports thorough the sample.  
As shown, Syrian military voices were quoted directly, as referring to territorial gains made by 
Russia and the Syrian regime. Also, non-official voices were used to support the position of the 
Syrian army. RT reporters contextualised the coordinated Syrian-Russian military operations 
positively, framing them as victories which have led to the protection of the cultural and historical 
heritage in Syria. In all reports throughout the sample, the Syrian army was portrayed as an active 
agent that stormed cities, recaptured lands, liberated people and soldiers, removed mines, and 
protected historical sites while IS was reported to have lost members and territories.   
In addition to using direct quotes, RT journalists used non-identified sources in many news texts 
to contextualise the progress of the Syrian regime and its allies against IS. For example, one report 
read: “The Syrian army has managed to recapture Al Suwan and Tal Almohor hills in Homs. In 
the meantime, Russian warplanes have launched air strikes on Deir Ez Zor, where Daesh has 
sustained losses, according to local media sources” (RT, 5 July 2016). Another report read: “In 
Aleppo, the Syrian army managed to push Daesh fighters back and destroyed their booby traps. It 
236 
 
also cut off Daesh supply routes. Observers attribute the success of these military operations to the 
ability of the Syrian army to stop Daesh fighters’ progress.” A little later, RT reported: “Russian 
warplanes conducted strikes on Daesh and Al Nusra headquarters as well as their weapon stores 
and workshops in the city. Such strikes are expected to be intensified in the future, according to 
observers” (RT, 1 August 2016). 
In this framing, RT uses imprecise news sources when portraying the active agency of Russia and 
the Syrian regime against Daesh. I recall that the use of collective labels (observers) which refer 
to unidentified sources are often fused in news texts to imply the truthfulness of the reported 
information; this strategy helps the reporters background their voices and present the news without 
having to provide precise sources or claims (Publitz and Bednarek, 2009). 
The last point in this analysis is that RT promoted messages about Russia’s cooperation with 
groups from the Syrian opposition, and the SDF in the war against IS. In this context, RT relied 
on Russian voices only. No sources from the Syrian opposition or the SDF were included to 
confirm this cooperation. For example, one report read: “The Russian defence ministry revealed 
that its forces made remarkable progress in the fight against Daesh and Al Nusra Front, after 
receiving intelligence information from opposition factions that are involved in the war against 
these two organisations.” The spokesman of the ministry was quoted as saying: “We have relied 
on intelligence reports, provided by the Syrian opposition, concerning Daesh’s positions, its 
infrastructure and oil smuggling.” The voiceover commented:  
According to the ministry, more than 5000 members, from the Syrian opposition, cooperate 
with the Syrian army. Russian warplanes provide support to these groups. Thanks to 
Russia’s strikes, these local forces have advanced and retaken strategic positions from 
Daesh (RT, 17 December 2015). 
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Another report read: “Russian warplanes have been intensively bombing terrorist targets in Syria. 
The fighter jets, deployed in Hmeimim airbase, provide support for the Syrian government, and 
the Free Army.” Then a Russian military official said: 
Backed by Russian air cover, a group of the SDF fighters have advanced towards the capital 
of the Islamic State, Al Raqqa, under the leadership of Ayman Ghanim. They recaptured 
29 villages and took control over the strategic area of Tishrin Dam. In the meantime, Syrian 
forces, including the Free Army, have continued to launch attacks on Daesh positions, with 
Russian air support. 
Then, the voiceover added: “The ministry of defence stressed that its military strategy proved 
successful in drying up Daesh funding sources and attracting Syrian opposition factions” (RT, 24 
January 2016). Similarly, RT reported: “The spokesman of the Russian defence ministry 
highlighted that the air strikes which targeted Daesh positions in Kuweires airbase were conducted 
based on intelligence reports provided by Syrian opposition factions.” The spokesman of the 
ministry Konashenkov was shown on the screen, promoting the cooperation between Russia and 
the Syrian opposition: “Syrian opposition factions provided our forces with intelligence about 
Daesh positions.” The voiceover commented: “The successful operation which resulted in lifting 
the siege imposed on Kuweires is considered as a significant achievement” (RT, 12 February 
2016). 
The exclusion of voices related to the Syrian opposition as well as the SDF shows that RT coverage 
focuses on the official story of its country of origin. This news channel promoted the idea that 
Russia is welcomed by all the Syrians, including opposition factions. However, RT news reports 
did not include information about the identity and the political stance of these opposition factions, 
and they did not use various sources to verify or comment on the reported cooperation between 
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the opposition factions and the Russian-Syrian alliance. So, RT discourse invites viewers to reject 
the idea that Russia seeks to destroy Al Assad’s opponents. 
Thus, whereas the anti-IS operations which were conducted by the US-backed opposition factions 
were put in the context of shared interest between Turkey and these factions, the cooperation 
between Russia and Syrian opposition forces was framed positively, and this is a clear indication 
of taking sides by RT. I recall that RT’s reporters showed the air superiority of Russia in Syria and 
emphasised that both Russia and the Syrian regime target IS and Al Nusra Front with the desired 
effect. So, the political and the military aspects of Russia’s military campaign were framed 
positively and promoted from the Russian and Syrian perspectives only.   
On the visual plane 
The visual framing of the military aspect of Russia’s intervention supported the previously 
discussed verbal discourse. That is to say, the reporters used narrow patterns of pictorial coverage, 
showing the advanced military power of Russia, but Russian and Syrian forces were not shown 
engaged in violent actions. I draw attention that RT relied on embedded reporters who were 
attached to Russian and Syrian troops and permitted to accompany these forces and/or report from 
behind their lines. According to Pfau et al. (2005), embedding journalists helps narrow the gap 
between the news media organisations and the military since journalists will be in close contact 
with soldiers, which creates a kind of camaraderie relationship. It also helps control the flow of 
information and motivates journalists to develop more favourable reports regarding military 
actions. The reporters and camera operators embedded in the Russian air campaign invited Arab 
viewers to see the war from the Russian-Syrian perspective as shown below.  
Concerning the visualisation of Russia’s military power, images of warplanes, missiles, naval 
vessels, electronic targeting devices, and other military equipment were repeatedly shown on RT’s 
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screen. Russian warplanes were portrayed in various positions such as landing, taking off or flying 
in the skies over Syria in the morning or at night. They were filmed from different distances. The 
images [114, 115, 116,117, 118, 119] were selected from different reports; the accompanying 
verbal texts reported ongoing precision air strikes launched by the Russian Air Force on IS targets.  
   
Figure 114 Russian warplanes landing in Hmeimim airbase 
 
Figure 115 A Russian helicopter flying in the Syrian skies (close shot)    
 




  Figure 117 Russian military activities at night 
 
Figure 118 Precise bombing of IS positions by Russian warplanes  
 
Figure 119 Precision air strikes by a Russian fighter jet  
By showing the warplanes deployed in Syria from a close distance from the perspective of the 
Russians, RT invites audiences to relate to the Russian Air Force and to support the Kremlin’s 
military intervention in Syria. Moreover, by showing the planes flying over the skies or landing in 
Hmeimim airbase in the morning hours or at night, RT reflects the air superiority and the powerful 
military presence of Russia in Syria. In the images below [120, 121] audiences can see Russian 
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technicians performing maintenance tasks. Throughout the sample, the reports did not show 
Russian forces committing violent actions against non-combatants. This distracts audiences from 
the human suffering which the Russian military campaign has caused in Syria.   
 
Figure 120 Russian technicians at Hmeimim airbase 
  
Figure 121 Russian technicians perform maintenance tasks 
 




Figure 123 A Russian military ship in the Mediterranean Sea near Latakia 
In figures [122,123], the images show air and naval defence systems deployed in Syria. Not only 
did Russia send advanced aircraft and professional aircrews to Hmeimim airbase, but it also used 
advanced defence systems to protect its warplanes. This emphasises the huge military power of 
Russia. Throughout the sample, there are no visual or verbal references to military losses, that may 
have resulted from IS attacks. This reporting style reminds us of US media coverage of the Gulf 
War in 1990. According to Baudrillard (1995), the Gulf War did not take place, in the sense of 
fighting or death. He noted that the US media showed the US military power, but the reports did 
not show American forces engaged in combat with the Iraqi army. Also, audiences had no 
information about human or material losses, due to the selectivity of media messages. In the same 
context, Katz argued the US media “mobilised huge audiences for a live television war . . . But the 
fact is that we didn’t see war at all. . . . We saw portraits of the technology (..), but we rarely, if 
ever, saw them in action. Indeed, it was as if there was no other side” (Katz, 1992, p. 8). 
Regarding the visualisation of the Syrian military activities which were conducted with Russian 
air support, RT interviewed officers from the Syrian army in the battlefield. Throughout the 




Figure 124 Members of the Syrian army 
  
Figure 125 Syrian soldiers on the front line 
In the above images [124,125] the soldiers are filmed from a medium distance. They have eye 
contact with the camera. That is to say, they are humanised and related to viewers who are invited 
to admire their military activities against IS. They tell the audiences that they have made territorial 
gains.    
 




Figure 127  Syrian soldiers observe IS activities 
 
Figure 128 Members of the Syrian army in Palmyra 
 
Figure 129 Members of the Syrian army in Aleppo 
The images [126, 127,128,129] show members of the Syrian army in the field. Throughout the 
sample, the Syrian army, like the Russian forces, was not shown in actual combat situations against 
IS. Moreover, in the reports which covered territorial gains such as the recapture of Palmyra, or 
Al Qaryatain, RT did not broadcast images showing deaths from IS or military equipment seized 
from the organization, unlike the coverage of the territorial gains made by the SDF in the north of 
Syria where RT reported the military failings of IS verbally and visually. It showed dead bodies 
of IS members as well as devices seized by the SDF. The absence of images of deaths can be read 
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in the context of presenting the Russian air war as tidy and clean, or perhaps restrictions by the 
Russians on what could be filmed. 
Thus, RT focused on the Russian and Syrian military sources as the fighting was reported from 
behind their lines. IS sources and claims were not included. The Syrian army was framed as a 
liberator that advanced against IS. This portrayal is similar to the framing of the US-backed SDF 
on RT’s screen. These forces were represented as liberators and given a voice. RT war discourse 
is simple as it is established as a struggle between the good [the Russians, the Syrian regime, some 
groups from the Syrian opposition, and the SDF] versus the terrorist organisation [IS]. The reports 
do not include enough information about the cooperation between Russia and the Free Army or 
the SDF for audiences to understand the complexity of the conflict. It is possible to say that RT 
coverage presented a virtual war in Syria where Russia and its allies have led military actions with 
almost no failings or human losses. According to Der Derian (2000), “new technologies (…) have 
collapsed the geographical distance, chronological duration, the gap itself between the reality and 
vitality” (p.774). He maintains that television can regulate the dramatic aspect of wars and provide 
a representation where television wars and video war games blur. So, television can present a 
virtuous war which promotes “a vision of bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic” military actions (Der 
Derian, 2000, p. 772). The representation of a bloodless war relieves Russia and Syria of their 
responsibility in inflicting human suffering as will be shown in the next section. 
The humanitarian aspect of the Russian intervention 
In the previous section, I showed how Russia’s military actions were represented through the 
language of clean technology, which may lead viewers to evaluate the Russian campaign in terms 
of precision technologies and distract them from the impact of such military power on the 
humanitarian situation in Syria. Throughout the sample, Russia and the Syrian regime were not 
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blamed for killing civilians; though, human rights organisations accused Russian and Syrian forces 
of causing human suffering in Syria. For example, Amnesty International (2015) reported: 
“Russian air strikes in Syria have killed hundreds of civilians and caused massive destruction in 
residential areas - striking homes, a mosque and a busy market, as well as medical facilities.” Also, 
Syrian and Russian forces were accused by Amnesty (2016) of deliberately targeting hospitals. In 
what follows I examine the representation of the humanitarian aspect of the Russian intervention, 
verbally and visually. 
On the verbal plane 
This section addresses how RT represents the roles of the Russian and Syrian forces when covering 
the humanitarian situation in Syria, on the verbal plane. This includes how the identities of the 
military actors involved and the sufferers are constructed and how their voices are incorporated. 
In addition to the discourse of clean war, RT contributed to legitimising the Russian and Syrian 
military actions by showing IS brutality. So, the first point in this analysis is the construction of 
IS’s identity as a persecutor. In all reports, which covered the humanitarian situation in the areas 
where Russian and Syrian forces operated, IS members were blamed for human suffering. In many 
reports, civilians were interviewed and allowed to tell audiences about IS’s violent practices, as 
was the case in the coverage of the humanitarian aspect of the US-led war in Syria.  
For example, RT reported: “Life has stopped in its tracks in Daesh-held territories. Civilians who 
fled these areas said they felt like living in a grave.” The reporter interviewed a displaced man who 
said: “Daesh has imposed a very strict dress code for women. Some women were sold as slaves.” 
Another woman said: “The organisation has slaughtered many people, including women and 
children in Al Raqqa. They destroyed many houses as well” (RT, 13 November 2015). Moreover, 
one report included the testimonies of a mother and her son who were reported to have been forced 
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to leave their shelter twice because of IS threats. The woman said in front of the camera: “I was 
not able to leave my home. They [IS members] say women are not allowed to walk in public places 
without a male accompanying them.” Then, the voiceover commented: “Daesh’s violations of 
children rights in Syria is the most dangerous question. The organisation has recruited children 
and trained them to use weapons.” Mohammed, a Syrian child, was interviewed; he said: “Daesh 
members wanted to send me to their military camps.” The voiceover commented: “In these camps, 
children are taught Daesh ideology and witness beheadings, or they may be asked to practice such 
violent actions. Hundreds of children who have been recruited by IS are stripped of their 
innocence” (RT, 5 Jaunuary 2016). In Palmyra, one of RT’s correspondents interviewed survivors 
who accused IS of killing their relatives. An old man said: “They beheaded about 500 people in 
Palmyra and 50 others in Al Sukhna village.” Another old man said in front of the camera: “I asked 
my son to seek shelter in a safe place, but he refused to flee Palmyra, then Daesh attacked the 
house and killed him. They damaged everything they found in the house” (RT, 1 April 2016).   
As shown above, men, women, and children were given voice. Through RT’s televisual account, 
audiences learn about violent practices committed by IS against vulnerable groups. According to 
Ellis (2000), becoming witnesses “through the media, viewers receive a kind of ‘painful 
knowledge’, which is accompanied by an aching sense that something must be done to help the 
misfortunes and alleviate their suffering” (p.11). For Ellis, witnessing is part of the critical role of 
media as the fourth estate, but in the context of RT coverage of Russia’s intervention, it is not 
innocent of politics. By promoting the sufferers’ voice, allowing them to identify their persecutor 
(IS), RT plays a role in reinforcing the position of Russia and its allies as liberators/benefactors 
that intervened militarily to put an end to the suffering of the Syrian people. RT journalists 
selectively reported the voices of vulnerable women, old people and children and used appellative 
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language when contextualising the stories of these sufferers. As shown above, the reporters used 
strong language, saying for example: “Life has stopped” and children are “stripped of their 
innocence.” Through such contextualisation and testimonies, RT invites viewers to bear witness 
and share responsibility for the suffering of the Syrians. I recall that to bear witness refers to the 
attempt to influence viewers and to elicit a response, this includes hearing the appeal and being 
emotionally and morally engaged (Tait, 2011). RT’s audiences are invited to evaluate Russia’s 
intervention positively and think about actions to show solidarity with the Syrian people.         
Another central point in this section is the representation of Russian and Syrian forces as 
benefactors. RT showed Russian and Syrian efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the 
sufferers in Syria. In this context, the reports promoted the voices of Russian and Syrian officers 
as well as civilians. This framing emphasised the idea that Russia’s war on terror is a humanitarian-
oriented action. For example, RT reported: “About 200,000 people live under Daesh’s siege in 
Deir Ez-Zor. Dozens of deaths have been reported in the city as a result of the miserable living 
conditions.” The voiceover added: “In cooperation with the Syrian government, Russia has 
delivered more than 250 tonnes of humanitarian aid to Deir Ez-Zor. The Syrian Air Force 
conducted the airdrop of aid to the besieged civilians.” A Syrian pilot said: “Thanks to the Russian 
technical support, we airdropped aid over Deir Ez-Zor. Russia has delivered more than 800 tonnes 
of humanitarian aid so far.” Another pilot said: “The aid was airdropped successfully.” The 
reporter commented: “As the war on terrorism continues, Russia will send more humanitarian aid 
to the Syrian people” (RT, 11 February 2016). A similar report read: “Despite the tensions in 
Aleppo, the Russian Air Force insisted that humanitarian aid should be sent to the eastern 
countryside.” A Russian pilot was interviewed. He said: “For the first time, we managed to deliver 
aid to Aleppo. We wish to support 700 families, including women and children in this area” (RT, 
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4 April 2016). So, RT promoted the idea that the Russian Air Force used advanced technology not 
only to avoid civilian casualties but also to airdrop aid to those who are besieged by IS. This 
reporting style involves a clear contrast between the self or the in-group [Russian and Syrian forces 
as benefactors] and IS [the persecutor that inflicted the suffering]. 
 Moreover, the voiceover reported in another text: “As the Russian-backed Syrian forces 
recaptured strategic areas from Daesh in Latakia, Aleppo, Homs and Palmyra, they started to 
distribute food and other basic needs to the returnees.” Then, an old woman was shown saying: 
“We returned to our home after the withdrawal of Daesh, thanks to the Russian and Syrian forces.” 
Another person said: “They offered us bread.” The voiceover commented: “Russia’s military 
campaign achieved significant results and allowed displaced families to return to their homes” 
(RT, 4 May 2016). In the same way, when RT covered the situation in Palmyra after the withdrawal 
of IS, the voiceover reported: “After the liberation of Palmyra by the Syrian regime, the residents 
started to return to the city.” A young man said: “We returned to Palmyra after the victory declared 
by the Syrian army, backed by Russia.” Another man said: “We invite all the displaced people to 
come back.” Then, an official from the Syrian government was quoted as saying: “We made 
arrangements to help the residents and facilitate their return. We started to reconstruct the 
electricity and water distribution networks, and we have removed the ruins.” The voiceover 
commented: “Many residents have returned after basic infrastructure had been partially 
reconstructed. Russian and Syrian forces cleared the city of landmines” (RT, 11 April 2016).  This 
contextualisation reinforces Russia’s good conduct of war on terror which is fought in cooperation 
with the Syrian regime.  
The last recurring theme is the framing of material damage in Syria. Throughout the sample, IS 
was blamed for the destruction that took place in the areas recaptured from the organisation. The 
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Russian and Syrian military actions were not reported to have caused material damage. For 
example, one report which covered the situation in the countryside of Homs read: “The scenes 
of destruction are everywhere. Daesh repeated attacks caused enormous damage to civilians’ 
houses. The residents have called for military actions to destroy Daesh. They have cooperated 
with the Syrian army to push Daesh fighters back.” In the report, a housewife complained: “shells 
fired by Daesh hit our pen and killed animals.” An old man said: “I have not accessed my farm 
[near IS-held territories] for five years. I am afraid. I might be harmed, killed, or kidnapped by 
Daesh” (RT, 12 July 2016). So, the voice of civilians was employed as a force to legitimise 
Russia’s role in Syria, showing that IS targeted people, animals, and properties.  
In Palmyra, RT showed the material destruction inflicted by IS in contrast to the constructive role 
of Syrian and Russian troops that contributed to protecting historical sites in the city. For example, 
the voiceover reported: “The ancient city of Palmyra was massively destroyed. Daesh’s barbaric 
acts can be seen everywhere. The organisation turned public facilities into torture centres or courts 
to enforce its laws on the subjects of the so-called the Islamic State.” A Syrian military officer 
said: “The Red Crescent centre was turned into a torture centre for those who did not respect the 
dress code imposed by Daesh. It was also used by Daesh to collect the Zakah (Islamic taxes).” The 
voiceover commented: “A delegation from the UN visited the city and expressed shock over the 
amount of damage. Some facilities were completely destroyed.” An official from the UN said: “In 
coordination with the governor of Homs, we entered Palmyra where we visited schools, hospitals, 
an automatic bakery, and the Red Crescent centre. We are shocked over the damage we have seen 
across the city.” The reporter concluded: "For life to return to its normal course in Palmyra, 
international and local efforts should be carried out” (RT, 10 April 2016).  Also, RT reported: “IS 
left mines in Palmyra. Russian forces have removed more than 1000 mines so far.” A Russian 
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official said: “We will participate in removing the mines left by Daesh, and we will protect the 
ancient archaeological sites in Syria.” RT showed the damage caused to the temples of Bel and 
Baal Shamin in addition to the triumphal arch. A Syrian official was quoted as saying: “The 
temples of Bel and Baal Shamin and the Arch of Triumph have been heavily damaged; we sent 
experts to Palmyra to assess the damage.” The voiceover commented: “Russian military specialists 
will continue to remove Daesh’s explosive devices. In the meantime, Russia has started to build a 
camp for the experts who will participate in the reconstruction of the sites damaged by Daesh” 
(RT, 8 May 2016). This news discourse involves a binary opposition: [They] IS fighters destroy, 
damage, terrorise, place mines, versus [We] Russia and the Syrian government liberate, 
reconstruct, remove ruins/mines and help people. This positive frame is consistent and systematic 
throughout the sample. 
RT showed the ruins of the ancient Christian monastery of Mar Elian, which was destroyed by IS, 
in the town of Al Qaryatain. The voiceover reported: “Backed by Russian air cover, the Syrian 
army liberated Al Qaryatain from Daesh fighters who forced about 40 000 residents to flee the 
town and destroyed their homes. Daesh’s crimes include the destruction of places of worship. Mar 
Elian Monastery, like mosques and houses, was demolished by this organisation. It was established 
in the 5th century as a symbol of peace and interfaith coexistence. Daesh gave Christian residents 
the choice of conversion to Islam or paying the Jizya, (a tax imposed by Islam on non-Muslim 
subjects). After the withdrawal of Daesh, civilians began returning home. They saw ruins across 
the town” (RT, 5 April 2016). So, RT portrayed the positive role played by Russia and the Syrian 
regime in protecting and assisting civilians in Syria. The exclusion of messages that refer to the 
negative impacts of Russia’s air campaign on the humanitarian situation there is a clear indication 
of taking sides in RT coverage. By not showing the role of Russia and the Syrian regime in 
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inflicting the suffering in Syria, RT ultimately suppresses the emotional and moral issues that lie 
behind their military actions.  
Thus, to legitimise Russia’s military actions, RT reports included witness statements from civilians 
who blamed IS for their suffering. These sufferers have what Chouliaraki (2008) termed 
‘conditional agency.’ That is to say, the sufferers are active agents: they identify the source of their 
suffering, they feel, and they act to improve their situation, but they need external help. On RT’s 
screen, the Syrian people and their government are shown acting together against IS, but they have 
limited agency. The Syrian government is reported to have taken actions to help the sufferers, but 
it needs the support of Russia to eliminate the threat of IS and relieve the population. According 
to Chouliaraki (2006a), showing the limited ability of the sufferers endows them with humanness 
and invites audiences to engage with them. Moreover, giving voice to the UN official that visited 
Palmyra in coordination with the Syrian government and allowing him to refer to massive material 
damage across the city carries moral and political messages. First, it raises the moral demand to 
take actions to save the city and support its residents. Second, it shows that any visits or 
humanitarian actions should be carried out in cooperation with the Syrian regime. RT coverage 
showed how the Russians reacted responsibly through aid delivery as well as reconstruction of 
material damage. Also, RT showed how “the barbaric acts” of IS targeted both Muslims and 
Christians. This portrayal invites the international community, not only the Arab or Muslim world, 
to acknowledge the humanitarian mission of the Russian Air Force that participated in defending 
the Syrian people against IS. The visuals which accompany the voiceover emphasise Russia’s 





On the visual plane 
In the visual representation of the humanitarian aspect, RT employed narrow patterns of pictorial 
coverage. The visuals support the verbal account, showing Russian humanitarian aid delivered to 
Syria. The scenes include images of displaced women and children who blame IS for their 
suffering in addition to images of returnees who acknowledge the efforts led by Russia to help 
them. RT also showed the damage caused to historical and religious places.  
The analysis begins with the visualisation of the sufferers. Civilians in Syria are often humanised. 
The figures [130, 131] show Syrian women, with their children. These sufferers, who are filmed 
from a medium distance, have an appellative power as they look at the camera. RT’s audiences are 
invited to relate to them. The voiceover that commented on these images described how civilians 
are persecuted by IS. Similarly, the sufferers in figures [132, 133, 134] have a voice and a gaze 
which humanises them. Their gaze and voice elicit pity towards them and anger towards IS. So, 
RT’s viewers are invited to support Russia’s military intervention and think about more actions to 
respond to the needs of the vulnerable civilians. 
 




Figure 131  A family suffered from IS's siege 
   
Figure 132 Mohammed, a child fled IS-held territories 
In the figure [132] a displaced child is shown individually. RT’s audiences are told that his name 
is Mohammed. He gazes at the camera as he tells audiences about his personal suffering. His gaze 
is appellative, and his facial expressions reflect his fears and miserable conditions. By showing 
Mohammed and others like him in a vulnerable situation, RT contributes to moralising Russia’s 
military intervention which aims at protecting the Syrian children who are persecuted by IS.   
 
Figure 133 An old woman from Homs 
In addition to children, old people are filmed individually from a medium distance. They are 
allowed to have eye contact with audiences. As shown in figures [133, 134], the sufferers have sad 
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facial expressions. The visual representation of the aged sufferers in addition to children and 
women communicates the idea that the use of force is urgently needed to put an end to IS’s 
extensive use of violence. Throughout the sample, verbal references to IS fighters lack the power 
of pictorial presence.      
 
Figure 134 An old man whose son was killed by IS 
Another point in this section is the depiction of the airdrop operations and the delivery of 
humanitarian aid supplies to Syrian cities. By showing images like [135,136], RT contests claims 
that Russia and its allies caused human suffering in Syria. It showed how Russian and Syrian 
planes were used to facilitate the airdropping of supplies to civilians in IS-held areas. That is to 
say, RT selected images that promote its preferred reality. Drawing on the power of images that 
give us a vivid reality, the reporters made truth claims that push the other critical claims [related 
to Russia’s identity as a persecutor] to the background. Then, RT sought to consolidate the position 
of its government inside Russia and around the world as it showed that the Kremlin sent air forces 




Figure 135 Humanitarian aid sent to Deir Ez-Zor 
 
Figure 136 Airdropping of humanitarian aid by Russia 
 
Figure 137 The Syrian army distributes aid to People  
In figure [137], a Syrian soldier is shown distributing aid to civilians in Palmyra. Audiences can 
see the image of the Syrian flag on donation bags, which signifies that the Syrian army took control 
over the city and that the Syrian government practices its duties towards its people. In the image 
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above, the beneficiaries stand peacefully near the soldier, waiting for him to distribute the aid. This 
framing shows a good and respectful relationship between the Syrian army and civilians, which 
reinforces the position of the government forces, and their allies, as liberators rather than 
aggressors. The verbal texts which anchor this image and the like tell viewers that civilians are  
happy as they have returned to their homes safely thanks to Russia and the Syrian government.   
 
Figure 138 Russia's flag waving in Syria 
Similarly, the figure [138] reflects the liberation of Syrian cities from IS, by Russian and Syrian 
forces. Showing a Russian flag waving on a civilian building gives the impression that life has 
returned to normal and suppresses the idea that the Syrians suffered under Russian air strikes. Flag 
waving is a visual echo of liberation parades, after the end of military operations, and it shows that 
the Syrians – both the government and the people – acknowledge Russia’s role. In the same 
context, RT showed survivors who were allowed to express their gratitude to Russia in front of the 
camera. These people also showed their happiness as they returned to their cities after the 
withdrawal of IS. In the figure [139], audiences can see an open shop while the seller says in front 
of the camera that the situation is stable in Palmyra, and that Russia has provided aid to all the 
returnees. His voice and gaze as he thanks Russia, as well as, the availability of food products on 





  Figure 139  A shop reopened in Palmyra  
 
   Figure 140  A woman thanks Russia for fighting against IS 
The above image [140] shows a young woman who returned to Palmyra, after driving IS out of 
the city. She smiles as she acknowledges the military efforts led by Russia to destroy IS. By 
showing this unveiled woman with her happy facial expressions in front of the camera, RT invites 
audiences to see how Russia has managed to change the situation on the ground and free the Syrian 
women from the dress code and other restrictions imposed by IS. This kind of visuals enables 
viewers to notice how Russia and the Syrian government have managed to restore and protect civil 
liberties which were violated by IS. Then, on RT’s screen, audiences can see the sad facial 
expressions of those who were persecuted by IS versus the happy facial expressions and the 
positive response of those who returned to their homes.  
The last point in this analysis is the depiction of the material damage caused to historical sites and 




 Figure 141 Ruins in the historical city of Palmyra 
 
Figure 142 Ruins of Mar Elian monastery 
 
Figure 143 Civilian infrastructure destroyed by IS 
In figures [141, 142, 143], RT shows material destructions for which IS was blamed. In all reports 
throughout the sample, Russian warplanes were reported to carry out precision strikes against IS, 




By showing the massive damage caused to civilian infrastructure in Syria, while the voiceover 
tells audiences about Russian and Syrian efforts to assist the sufferers, RT suppresses the identities 
of Russia and the Syrian regime as persecutors.  
Thus, the analysis of RT’s coverage of Russia’s military intervention in Syria showed that this 
channel contributed to legitimising the military project of its sponsor. The reporters muted 
oppositional voices and excluded critical messages. RT news discourse is shaped by Russia’s 
national security concerns and the Kremlin’s goal to restore Russia’s status as a great power in the 
region. The reports reflected the huge military arsenal of Russia verbally and visually and 
emphasised its capability to destroy IS. RT promoted a clean version of war. The negative impacts 
of the war on civilians were censored. Hence, it can be said that RT operated as an instrument of 
propaganda, in this crisis.  
 At the end of this chapter, I would like to draw attention that RT’s framing of the multi-sided war 
on IS is analysed qualitatively to explore how this international TV channel responded to the 
political context in which it operates and professional standards of journalism when covering the 
rival military campaigns. I cannot claim that the sample of the study is completely exhaustive; it 
is a selection from an overall output of news reports that are available on RT Arabic YouTube 
channel during the period of the study. Since my approach is thematic and comparative, the news 
stories used for the purpose of this research are helpful to examine the media-state relationship and 
show evidence of the variation in war coverage in the media outlets under study.   







Findings and Conclusions 
This chapter seeks to pull the strands of the research together and compare AJA and RT coverage 
of the multi-sided war on IS. It discusses the findings of the study and presents its conclusions.  
As mentioned throughout the study, the US and Russia launched separate military campaigns with 
the stated purpose to destroy international terrorism in Syria. In this context, transnational news 
media organisations have the power to draw boundaries between the conflicting actors and 
influence the perception of their audiences regarding the situation in Syria. So, this research is 
aimed to examine and compare how the multi-sided war against IS is reported by AJA and RT 
Arabic when their governments are participants in this war but are in disagreement with other 
leading states on how it should be fought.  
The study is based on the premises that a) war coverage operates deeply within Van Dijk’s (2006) 
ideological square, which is based on the positive presentation of the in-group and the negative 
presentation of the out-group, and b) that the news media support their governments in wartime. 
The surrounding political environment within which the news media operate have an impact on 
their practices since journalists tend to react to what happens in the political world, and this is 
especially true with regard to violent conflicts (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Also, this study is guided by  
theories of mediated public diplomacy which argue that the coverage of wars that are declared by 
state actors against terror groups in international media is affected by the degree of cultural and 
political proximity between the country from which the media operate and the country engaged in 
the conflict (Sheafer et al., 2014; Yarchi et al., 2013). Whereas previous research on media 
coverage of the war on terror examined two-sided conflicts, my research addressed the media 
coverage of a multi-sided war on terror against a common threat. So, this study provided an 
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opportunity to explore whether the war discourse is driven by the shared global counterterrorism 
objective, which is to defeat IS, or the media will reflect and support the political divergence 
between their governments and the other sides of the conflict. 
8.1 Findings 
The study found that AJA and RT reflected the policies of their countries towards Syria. Like other 
terror-related conflicts, the reporting of the war on IS draws boundaries between the terror 
organisation and the actors that have fought against it. However, the framing of this global conflict 
involves a complex discourse that is not reduced to a binary opposition structure [good vs bad]. 
That is to say AJA and RT did not frame the conflict in terms of the shared global counterterrorism 
objective. Instead, their coverage is influenced by the degree of convergence in anti-terrorism 
approaches between their governments and the actors involved in Syria. The closer the policy 
proximity between a political actor and their countries, the more likely that actor will be framed 
positively. 
The analysis showed how AJA emphasised the shortcomings of the US war policy, promoting 
voices that raised the need for more involvement in Syria. However, it used a more critical tone 
when representing the Russian policy and actions. In this war, AJA reporting gives the impression 
that there is an ‘antagonist–protagonist’ structuring which effectively sets the ‘out-group’ - Russia 
and the Syrian government- versus ‘the in-group’ - politicians from around the world. It 
communicated a wide negative opinion climate about Russia’s role in Syria. Also, AJA promoted 
non-official critical voices that stood against Russia and its allies. In this way, AJA reporting 
contributes to reinforcing the US hegemonic position in the Middle East against Russia and invites 
Arab audiences to identify with a US-dominated worldview. The legitimacy of the US-led 
intervention was construed through showing the precise bombing of IS positions. AJA’s reporters 
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emphasised that the US-led campaign targeted IS-held areas and contributed to drying up IS 
resources but had a limited effect. So, compared with the findings of Jasperson and Kikhia’s study 
(2003) according to which AJA represented the US-led war in Afghanistan as a war on Muslims, 
this study found that AJA used positive terms when covering the US-led war in Syria. Then, there 
is a shift in AJA’s discourse towards the US, which can be attributed to Qatar’s direct involvement 
in the US coalition. This supports the abovementioned premises that the news media roles in 
conflicts vary and that their discourses are reconstructed according to the relationship between 
their governments and the parties involved in conflicts.  
In contrast to the relatively positive portrayal of the US-led military campaign on AJA’s screen, 
the framing of the Russian campaign on the same screen was highly critical. AJA news discourse 
contributed to delegitimising the Russian military intervention since Arab viewers were told that 
most Russian air strikes hit targets that had nothing to do with IS. AJA’s reporters communicated 
the idea that some strikes were launched against IS-held territories; however, these strikes targeted 
empty or non-strategic areas. In this context, the reporters portrayed the advanced military power 
of Russia but framed this power negatively. They showed that the Russian Air Force used 
internationally prohibited weapons against civilians. They represented the vulnerability of the 
Syrian government and Russia showing their human and material losses verbally and visually. US 
deaths were reported as well, but they were not shown. AJA reporting gave the impression that 
Russia waged war on the Syrian people. It deemphasised the contribution of the Russian-Syrian 
alliance to the war on IS. 
Furthermore, the taking of sides in this conflict can be noticed in the way the roles of the US-
backed SDF and the Syrian opposition factions were represented. AJA framed the role of the SDF 
critically. AJA’s reporters raised the Kurdish-led SDF’s nationalistic agenda, presenting them as 
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an armed group that took a role in this conflict to advance their interests and not to defend their 
people. In this context, the SDF’s connections to other armed groups that are designated 
internationally as terrorists were emphasised. In this way, AJA takes a role in mobilising the Arab 
viewers against the US-Kurdish cooperation. This framing reflects Qatar’s voice. The SDF 
adopted the US counterterrorism strategy in Syria and used the military support provided to them 
to fight against IS only, which is inconsistent with Qatar’s preferred approach to the war. 
Additionally, the negative stance of Qatar towards the Kurdish ambitions for independence shaped 
the war discourse.  
AJA portrayed the intensive military aid provided to the SDF in contrast to the modest support 
provided to the opposition factions. It framed the Syrian opposition factions positively showing 
the efforts taken by them to recapture lands from IS, despite the “modest” air support available to 
them. These factions are Qatar’s preferred local ally. They fight against IS, as well as the Syrian 
regime, so they adopt the Qatari counterterrorism policy. 
Again, it should be highlighted that the media under study operate in authoritarian countries where 
foreign policy and security issues are tightly controlled, and public debate is not allowed. This 
contrasts with news reporting style in liberal societies, where journalists can operate in different 
spheres following the elites’ debate, as Hallin (1994) noted. Thus, AJA reflected the perspective 
of the Qatari ruling elites and participated in legitimising their policies towards Syria and 
normalising their values, which reinforces their hegemonic position in Qatar and contributes to 
shaping the international public opinion in their favour. The degree of policy proximity between 
Qatar and the abovementioned actors in Syria affected the way these actors were related to the war 
on IS.   
265 
 
This logic applies to RT war coverage as well. This channel promoted a positive image of the 
Kremlin’s polices, which helps make the values of Russian ruling elites prominent and enables 
these elites to maintain power over their country. Also, RT took a role in reinforcing the position 
of Russia as an influential player in Syria. This can be seen in the way RT construed the legitimacy 
and the effectiveness of the Russian air campaign. It informed Arab viewers that Russia’s strikes 
targeted IS and Al Nusra Front precisely, upon the request of the Syrian regime. The responses of 
the Arab, as well as European countries, that belong to the US-led coalition, were contextualised 
in a way that suppresses the tensions between Russia and the US-led coalition over Syria. It can 
be said that RT’s news discourse is less complex than AJA’s discourse. This is to say RT 
constructed the war on IS as a struggle between the good actors [Russia, the Syrian regime, the 
US-backed SDF and groups from the Syrian opposition] versus the evil enemy – IS. It only 
employed its discourse to deemphasise the role of the Syrian opposition factions, that stand against 
the Russian-backed Syrian regime, in the war against IS.    
So, RT showed that both the US-led air strikes and the Russian strikes targeted IS positions 
precisely, with the desired effect since they used precision bombs. It promoted a one-sided war in 
which IS was always portrayed in a weak position. As far as the sample provided evidence for, 
only IS deaths were visualised on RT’s screen. Moreover, RT suppressed the SDF’s nationalistic 
agenda. The reporters took viewers inside IS’s tunnels, emphasising that the SDF’s members 
managed to clear IS from the areas they attacked. Syrian government forces and the US-backed 
SDF were framed as liberators. However, the anti-IS operations, which were conducted by 
opposition factions, that fight against the regime and its allies, were contextualised in terms of the 
common interests between these factions and Turkey in the North of Syria. RT promoted Russia’s 
cooperation with the SDF and some groups from the Syrian opposition.  
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The positive framing of the US-led coalition and the SDF as liberators is consistent with Russia’s 
policies since their actions contribute to defeating IS, and they did not fight against Russia or the 
Syrian regime. Another factor that helps explain the positive coverage of the US-led military 
campaign by RT in this context is that Russia and some members of the US-led coalition, 
particularly, the US were targeted by IS. According to Yarchi et al. (2013), when the country in 
which the media operate is a victim of terrorism, this motivates its media to support the 
counterterrorism actions taken by another country against armed organisations. This can be applied 
to RT’s coverage of this conflict. Russia’s experience with IS motivated RT to support the US-led 
military actions, although the US war policy was framed negatively. In contrast, Qatar does not 
have the same experience with terror, and this may explain why AJA coverage is shaped mainly 
by Qatar’s stance towards both campaigns. 
As the war discourse in these transnational news media that target the same audiences is driven 
primarily by their political contexts, this results in significant variations in the war coverage. The 
way AJA and RT reacted to the actors that disagree with their sponsors over Syria shows that their 
journalists mainly sought to put their stories into the general political context of their news 
organisations, rather than telling interesting stories. Arab audiences are exposed to contested 
versions of truth about the same war. The common enemy was framed as a potent agent by AJA. 
On RT’s screen, IS was unseen. Russia’s forces appear on RT’s screen as liberators/benefactors 
that lead a bloodless war, but they appeared on AJA’s screen as aggressors that  committed 
“massacres” against civilians. This leads to another point in this discussion which is the 
construction of human suffering in this multi-sided war. 
The study showed that both media outlets contextualised the human suffering in Syria in a way 
that reinforces the policies of their countries of origin. However, unlike RT, AJA did not operate 
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as a propaganda machine to relieve Qatar and its allies of their responsibility for the suffering. 
Instead, AJA represented the bombers on the screen in a way that supports Qatar’s stance.  
The analysis showed that AJA enabled its audiences to witness the suffering inflicted by Russia 
from a close position compared to the human suffering caused by the US-led coalition airstrikes. 
The identity of Russia as a bomber was constructed in human and non-human terms which 
emphasises the agency and complicity of the Russian forces in killing civilians in Syria. The 
sufferers were humanised, verbally, as they were represented individually or in groups, with 
reference to some of their specific characters (name, age, gender, or origins). They were visualised 
as well. AJA allowed the sufferers to tell their personal stories and blame Russia for their 
misfortune. The reports showed verbally and visually the impact of the Russian military actions 
on civilian infrastructure. This includes homes and mosques, hospitals, as well as markets. The 
coverage of the human aspect of the US-led war was not highly critical. The bomber was 
represented in non-human terms. AJA blamed the US led-coalition for causing civilian deaths, but 
these deaths lacked the power of pictorial presence. According to Zelizer (2005), by not showing 
killed people in wartime, the news organizations can obscure “the more problematic finality of 
death itself” (p. 14). Also, the displaced people that were interviewed by AJA did not blame the 
US coalition for their suffering which limits the viewers’ identification with them. This is to say 
the sufferers lacked the appellative power. Thus, AJA framing of the human suffering inflicted by 
the Russian campaign involved practices of bearing witness against Russia in Syria. By showing 
the negative impact of Russia’s air strikes on civilians in different places across Syria and allowing 
the sufferers to blame Russia for their miserable conditions, AJA invited its audiences to share 
responsibility for the suffering of the Syrians and mobilised Arab public opinion against Russia 
and its allies.  
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In contrast, RT relieved the US-led coalition as well as Russia and the Syrian government of their 
responsibility for human suffering. Whereas AJA constructed the roles of the rival air campaigns 
as bombers in a way that corresponds to its political context, RT constructed the roles of both 
campaigns through a regime of care that foregrounds the identities of military actors, particularly 
the US-backed SDF, the Syrian government, and Russia, as liberators and benefactors of the Syrian 
people. It showed the roles of the abovementioned actors in liberating Syrian cities from IS and 
providing humanitarian aid to civilians.  
By suppressing the roles of the US-led campaign and Russia’s campaign in inflicting the suffering 
in Syria, with focus on their positive outcomes, RT relieved the actors involved in these campaigns 
of the moral responsibility that lies behind their violent actions. Then, it can be said that RT 
construed the humanitarian aspect of this conflict through a propagandistic style, showing that ‘our 
forces’ and ‘those who are like us’ fight a clean war on terror.  
By focusing on IS’s violence against civilians, RT contributed to magnifying IS’s threat and 
legitimising Russia’s concerns about the growth of this transnational armed organisation. As 
mentioned previously, the Kremlin highlighted that IS recruited fighters of Caucasian origins, 
particularly Chechnya, which therefore justified the military project of Russia in Syria as a pre-
emptive war (Souleimanov and Petrtylova, 2015). Hence, driven by Russia’s national security 
concerns, RT framed the military actions of both air campaigns positively as humanitarian 
responses that aim at eliminating the threat posed by IS to Syria and the whole world. 
Finally, the analysis shows similarities and variations in AJA and RT Arabic reporting styles.  
There are similarities in AJA and RT reporting styles in terms of sourcing and framing practices. 
This supports previous studies that found shared professional practices among journalists in 
different countries.  
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Both channels relied primarily on official sources in their coverage. This is common in political 
news reporting, particularly in wartime (Bennett, 1990; Gans, 1979). So, official voices from the 
US, Russia as well as Arab and European countries were promoted by both media outlets. AJA 
and RT often relied on official quotes when contextualising their sources which gives the news a 
sense of immediacy. Moreover, both media outlets used non-official sources, particularly the voice 
of civilians to support the political stance of their sponsors. So, AJA reported civilian protests in 
Syria and around the world against the Russian -Syrian alliance. Also, AJA promoted the voice of 
human rights organisations and activists when it reported the use of internationally prohibited 
weapons by Russia. Supportive non-official voices were not found in the sample. In contrast, RT 
gave access to civilians who promoted positive evaluations about the Russian air campaign. 
Critical voices were absent from the sample studied. This confirms Bennett’s (1990) conclusion 
that non-official voices such as experts or civilians are used in news stories in a way that reinforces 
the rhetoric of officials. This reporting style shows that both AJA and RT aligned with their 
governments in this war, without regard to basic principles of professionalism since they did not 
promote various civilian voices. 
Both news media used episodic framing when reporting military actions and relied on military 
sources. This allowed journalists to promote simple and detached stories. So, they did not provide 
enough information about the context of the reported events and the progress of the war. In both 
media samples, the sufferers were given voice.  
Dissimilarities: AJA and RT were expected to apply very similar reporting styles since both are 
transnational channels, operating in authoritarian political contexts, and their governments are 
directly involved in the war against IS. However, the analysis showed that while both media put 
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the meaning of this multi-sided conflict in the service of power, AJA showed more respect for 
basic principles of professionalism.  
This is to say, AJA reported different sides of the conflict and promoted opposing claims. It gave 
access to IS sources, the US, the SDF, the opposition factions, Russia, and the pro-regime Syrian 
army. It distanced itself from the reported information, by using different strategies such as non-
identified sources, metatextuality, abstract entity (statistics, indications) or metonymical 
expressions, which makes the news language imprecise.  
AJA operated within the framework of Qatar’s policy when it reported dissent in the US regarding 
the war strategy as well as criticisms by members of the US-led coalition. Promoting critical voices 
reflects AJA’s alignment with Qatar, for these voices echoed Qatar’s preferred messages.  
Since AJA promoted the voice of the ruling class in Qatar, it can be said that this channel operated 
within Hallin’s (1994) sphere of consensus. However, it should be noted that Qatar is a monarchy, 
ruled by Al-thani family, so opposition parties are not allowed to operate. 
 AJA reported messages or voices that did not align with Qatar’s policies, but it gave them  limited 
space and legitimacy, so that any sphere for legitimate controversy was narrow.  
For instance, AJA reported that several members of the US-led coalition supported the US war 
strategy, but the reports did not provide further information about these members and their views. 
In contrast, AJA quoted US voices that disagree with the White House over the war strategy and 
that call for military actions against IS as well as the Syrian regime. Also, AJA used metonymical 
expressions and quoted international voices when it promoted the need for more effective US 
counterterrorism policies to destroy IS in Syria. Then, the study showed that the messages of the 
White House officials were balanced by critique, leaving audiences with not much information 
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about the voices or countries that supported the US war strategy. So, AJA coverage of views that 
did not align with the Qatari policies was very limited.  
This channel gave access to the enemy [IS sources] whose voice can be classified as deviant since 
IS’ views and claims are not accepted by mainstream society. Nonetheless, AJA distanced itself 
from IS. The reporters referred to the organisation by its full name [ سالميهاال الدولة تنظيم ] which means 
[the Islamic State organisation]. It did not use the terms ‘terror or terrorist.’ The study found that 
AJA supported its government, but not through propaganda. That is to say, AJA reported that both 
campaigns conducted air strikes on IS-held territories, and it showed the negative impacts of these 
military actions on civilians. However, as mentioned previously, this channel showed that most of 
Russia’s strikes hit targets that have nothing to do with IS.     
 RT operated within the sphere of consensus as It accepted without question the Kremlin’s 
discourse of a pre-emptive war on terror and emphasised the legitimacy of this war. RT’s 
journalists did not report dissent in Russia, so they did not operate within Hallin’s sphere of 
legitimate controversy. RT deemphasised the disagreements between its government and the US-
led coalition’s members over Syria. The voice of the deviant group, IS, was absent.  
RT relied on non-identified sources to provide information that supports the position of its country, 
without having to specify the source. Furthermore, RT used the Arabic name [Daesh- داعش] to 
refer to IS. The reporters used the term ‘terrorist’ when depicting IS without reporting its voice. 
On RT screen, audiences heard about IS’s violence and tactics, but they did not see this enemy on 
the front line. They only saw the liberators [Russian forces, US forces, the SDF, and Syrian 
government forces]. 
Besides, RT reporters provided details about the types and the high technical specifications of 
Russian military hardware. They also used precise language when reporting the number of Russian 
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strikes and their targets. In so doing, RT promoted the Russian military campaign in terms of 
technical power and suppressed its impact on the humanitarian situation in Syria. It is noticeable 
that RT’s reporting of the Russian military intervention is similar to CNN coverage of the Gulf 
war in the 1990s. CNN reporters used the language of clean technology which directed viewers to 
“evaluate the war’s success in terms of the technological precision of weapons, rather than in terms 
of other values, including loss of life, environmental damage, or even U.S. policy objectives" 
(Allen, O'Loughlin, Jasperson, and Sullivan, 1994, p. 280). Similarly, in Afghanistan, CNN and 
other US news networks focused on the advanced capability of the US air power and showed the 
precise bombing of military targets (Jasperson and Kikhia, 2003; Samuel-Azran, 2010). In this 
study, I am not seeking to compare RT and the US media, but I would like to draw attention that 
when serving the military projects of their countries, news media outlets that operate in different 
media systems and different countries adopt similar practices, and they support their governments 
at the expense of journalistic professionalism. In this conflict, RT reporting style is deliberate and 
strategic aiming at serving the Kremlin’s policies. It invited Arab viewers to see a hi-tech virtuous 
multi-sided war and censored the tragic consequences of this war.  
8.2 Conclusion 
The study confirms the role of news media outlets in promoting and legitimising the policies of 
their governments in today’s interdependent and crisis-ridden world. Then, it confirms Samuel 
Azran’s (2013) conclusion that AJA is a potent public diplomacy tool for Qatar. The research also 
supports previous studies that proved the role of RT as a public diplomacy tool for Russia. 
Moreover, this thesis supports previous research which argued that human suffering can be staged 
in different ways, according to the surrounding environment in which the media operate, and that 
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human suffering is crucial to construe the legitimacy of military actions and influence public 
opinion.   
Drawing on the findings of the study, transnational media outlets that operate in authoritarian          
countries can adopt significantly different reporting styles and so align with their governments in 
different ways. For instance, in this conflict, RT operated as an instrument of propaganda, 
reporting a one-sided clean war. AJA’s ability to discuss issues outside the Qatari policy was very 
limited, but it operated also according to conventions of professional reporting as it used a variety 
of sources and represented multiple sides of the reported news stories, including the enemy voice. 
In addition, it showed the suffering inflicted by Russia as well as the US-led coalition, which 
involves Qatar, on civilians in Syria.   
Furthermore, this research contributes to the literature on media, terrorism, and public diplomacy. 
It studied the coverage of a multi-sided war on terror in transnational media. It concludes that when 
states that have different counterterrorism approaches fight against a common enemy, their media 
will reflect and support that political divergence, rather than emphasising the shared 
counterterrorism goal. The degree of convergence in anti-terrorism approaches between a political 
actor and the state in which the media operate has an influence on how that actor will be framed 
and related to the conflict. Then, the closer the policy proximity, the more likely that actor will be 
framed positively. So, politics comes first, which means that the enemy of my enemy is not always 
my friend.  
Also, the experience with terror in the country from which the media operate can play a role in 
how a multi-sided war on terrorism can be framed. Inspired by previous research on the factors 
that influence international media coverage of terror conflicts, this study maintains that if the 
country from which the media operate, and a rival country are engaged in a multisided war against 
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a transnational armed organisation and are victims of terror attacks, the media tend to frame the 
counterterrorism actions of the rival state positively. This can explain why RT framed the US-led 
military actions positively, in addition to the fact that these actions did not expand beyond IS and 
Al Nusra Front.       
Regarding the methodology of the study, this thesis builds on Jasperson and Kikhia’s study (2003), 
as it applied qualitative frame analysis, examining the governance, the military, and the 
humanitarian aspects of the war on IS. However, this research adopted more extensive textual 
analysis. I looked at news intertextuality, the way in which news sources are structured and 
contextualised, in addition to other elements that have something to do with language choices and 
professional journalistic practices. Also, I conducted visual frame analysis of the military and 
humanitarian aspects and examined how the verbal texts related to the visuals.    
Through AJA and RT Arabic, Arab viewers witnessed conflicting truth claims that aimed at 
shaping their imagination of the war against international terrorism in Syria. Both media outlets 
have sought to promote the policies of their governments and convince audiences of the 
effectiveness of such policies to defeat IS. However, RT is expected to have less power to influence 
public opinion in the Arab world since this channel has construed the legitimacy of the war through 
a propagandistic style that violates basic principles of professionalism. RT suppressed the negative 
impacts of the war on civilians. AJA’s history of critical humanitarian reporting style in areas of 
conflicts, particularly in the Middle East serves to enhance its credibility in contrast to RT. 
Addressing the development of Russia’s soft power, Rutland and Kazantsev (2016) argued that 
Russia “has invested heavily in trying to promote a positive image of the country abroad, for 
example through the Russia Today television channel,” but its “authoritarian turn since 2004, and 
its use of force in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, have reinforced negative stereotypes of Russia as 
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a hard power.” Therefore, the Kremlin “has failed to develop soft power as an effective policy 
tool” (p. 395). 
Finally, the study supports that the ruling elites in rich countries, either small states or superpowers, 
use global broadcasting to mobilise public support for their policies and reinforce their hegemonic 
position in their societies. The elites also use international media outlets to promote good images 
of their policies around the world. As long as news media organisations support their governments 
in wartime, they contribute to legitimising and normalising the use of violence worldwide rather 
than operating in the interests of a global public sphere. 
8.3 Strengths and limitations of the Study 
This study contributes to the literature of media studies since it discusses a recent crisis in Syria, a 
multi-sided war on an armed organisation, that has been in the centre of media attention. It applies 
qualitative frame analysis. By providing an extensive textual analysis which looks at language 
choices and professional journalistic practices as well as visual analysis of the military and 
humanitarian aspects of the war, the study made deep interpretations about how media respond to 
their governments’ policies when covering a multi-sided war against a common enemy. Moreover, 
there are very few research studies in English, by Middle Eastern scholars, on how Arabic 
audiences are addressed in global conflicts. So, the thesis contributes to the de-westernising of 
media studies, as mentioned in the introduction. Furthermore, whereas most of the previous 
research on AJ compared this channel with Arab or Western media outlets such as CNN or the 
BBC, this study contrasts AJ with RT. It showed how they operated in the context of a global crisis 
and in an area where there are interests and tensions across the Arab world.  
The main limitations of study can be summarised as follows:  
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One of the limitations is using YouTube as an archive to collect the data of the study. YouTube 
channels may not include all broadcast videos about the war on IS, so there is a risk that important 
stories were left out by the broadcaster. Another limitation is that the broadcast reports were put 
up without the news reader’s introduction; this introduction, if available, contributes to better 
understanding the framing of news stories. For the purpose of this study, news texts were translated 
from Arabic into English. Since the text is the vehicle through which the meaning is ultimately 
transferred to the reader, language differences generate additional challenges that might hinder the 
transfer of meaning. It should be taken into consideration that concepts in one language may be 
understood differently in another language, and this might result in loss of meaning. Finally, 
qualitative textual analysis is not fixed in advance and is a matter of interpretation and negotiation. 
This is very challenging as any text cannot be reduced to one interpretation.  
8.4 Recommendations for further studies   
Given the crucial role of media in setting public agendas and reshaping our worldviews, there is 
always a lot of work to do to investigate the factors that affect their roles and discourses, 
particularly in areas of conflicts, as well as their effects on how political actors and viewers relate 
to conflicts. Further studies can be done to compare AJA and RT in terms of the organisational 
structures in newsrooms, which involves investigating the operations that regulate the flow of 
information and the meaning-making processes and exploring how journalists relate to their news 
media organisations, when reporting on crises.   
Moreover, more studies are needed to examine the coverage of this multi-sided war. For example, 
further research can be done to explore how this conflict is covered by news media in the countries 
that are not involved in Syria. Also, research needs to be done to study how IS media sources have 
reacted to different state-actors in the context of their divisions over Syria, whether the actors 
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involved in the war on IS are portrayed in the same way and through the same language, and what 
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